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The United States presents an interesting topic for the discussion about secularism in the
West, as it is sometimes considered as an anomaly amongst secularising Western nations
and as evidence of the failings of the secularisation theory. The influence of religion on
the culture and political life of the U.S. is well known, but the relationship between
religion and U.S. foreign policy has not gained much scholarly attention until the 21st
century.
This study participates in the discussion about the relationship between religious beliefs
and U.S. foreign policy by analysing discourses that previous U.S. presidents George W.
Bush  (GOP)  and  Barack  Obama  (D)  construct  about  the  fight  against  terrorism.  The
analysis is conducted using a Faircloughian three-dimensional critical discourse analysis
on a total of 17 speeches from Bush and Obama. The research material consists of
inaugural addresses and State of the Union Addresses.
The subject of this study is approached using a three-part theoretical framework. The
theoretical framework consists of secularism, the concept of the post-secular, and the
American civil religion. The three-part theoretical framework enables a comprehensive
approach that allows versatile religious phenomena to be considered in the analysis. Thus,
the analysis also includes versatile religious phenomena that are not straightforwardly
connected to certain religions or religious groups.
The analysis revealed that Bush constructs three distinct discourses and a total of seven
sub-discourses about the fight against terrorism, whereas Obama integrates the matter in
a larger security-discourse and its sub-discourses. By not constructing distinct discourses
about the fight against terrorism, Obama’s addresses counter the Bush administrations
high profile treatment of the conflict and the narrative of it as a distinct war. Bush’s and
Obama’s addresses establish a relationship between religious beliefs and the American
civil religion, although in Obama’s case, the connection to religious beliefs is established
chiefly in his inaugural addresses. This study argues that the presidents’ discourses
indicate a post-secular relationship between religion and politics in the context of the fight
against terrorism, as they do not indicate either secularism or dominant religiousness, but
a relationship that accommodates both religious and secular interpretations of politics and
supports a non-traditional way of relating to religious beliefs in politics.
Keywords: critical discourse analysis, discourse, secularism, post-secular, American
civil religion, religion, war on terror, terrorism, foreign policy
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The West is frequently described as secular and this depiction is often used to distinguish
it  from  more  religious  areas,  such  as  the  Middle  East.  The  United  States  provides  an
interesting subject for the discussion about Western secularity as it can be argued that the
U.S. is secular due to its formal separation of church and state, even though religion is
clearly visible in its politics and culture (Dillon 2012, 257−258). Recently, in the 21st
century, scholars have been paying more attention to the role of religion in the politics of
the United States. Examining U.S. politics from the viewpoint of secularism is
particularly interesting since the U.S. may be considered as a deviant case amongst
secularising Western states, and it has been used to criticise the secularisation theory
(Hackworth 2010, 356; Gorski et al 2012, 7).
The  U.S.  has  a  high  variety  of  different  religions  and  the  importance  of  religious
tolerance, diversity and freedom is often emphasised. Different religious groups usually
focus more on the domestic and social affairs than on foreign policy, but various groups
have also views about the role that the U.S. should play in the international arenas. The
Christian Right, which is mostly identified with the Republican party, can be argued to
be one of the most influential interest groups in the politics of the U.S. Another noticeable
group is the Catholic Church, to name one. (Hastedt 2011, 117, 123−124.) The Christian
Right is often referred to as Conservative Protestants, and it may be argued that their
influence in the U.S. foreign policy-making grew after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Croft
2009, 120, 123). Even though the relationship between U.S. politics and religion has been
gaining more scholarly interest lately, the religious nature of many seemingly secular
policies and the impact of religion in them has been under studied, especially in the
context of secularism and the post-secular (Hackworth 2010, 357). Also, the religious
dimension that affects the foreign policy of the U.S. was widely ignored before the 21st
century (Marsden 2011, 327).
After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, president George W. Bush declared
war on terrorists, followed by military interventions in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. The
interventions were justified by the terrorist connections of the Afghani and Iraqi regimes.
(Katz 2013, 14.) The Bush administration dubbed the war as the War on Terror, a term
that the Obama administration seized to use. Therefore, the conflict is generally referred
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to as fight against terrorism in this study and the term War on Terror is only used in the
context of Bush’s addresses. This study discusses the relationship between religious
beliefs and politics in the discourses about the fight against terrorism that previous U.S.
presidents George W. Bush (Republican party) and Barack Obama (Democratic party)
construct in a selection of their speeches during their presidencies. In that way, this study
contributes to the discussion about the relationship between religious beliefs and U.S.
foreign policy by analysing a foreign policy topic, the fight against terrorism, and the
influence of religious beliefs in the discourses concerning it. The fight against terrorism
remains a contemporary topic as the struggle still continues. Often the discussion about
the fight against terrorism does not consider the influence of religious beliefs in Western
politics, as the focus is generally on Islam, its radical forms and Jihad, which is why this
study focuses on the relationship between religious beliefs and the politics in the U.S.
The main research questions of this study are: What is the nature of the relationship
between religious beliefs and politics in the discourses about the fight against terrorism?
Are the discourses different from one another? Thus, the content of both presidents’
discourses and the relationships between religious beliefs and politics within them are
compared. Additional research question that this research seeks to answer is: How do the
discourses reproduce the American civil religion?
Using the term religious beliefs instead of religion in the research question is intentional
as examining religious beliefs instead of only the effects of any recognised religions or
religious groups enables including broader religious phenomena than just “traditional”
religions in the analysis. The research material consists of one inaugural address and
seven State of the Union Addresses given by George W. Bush and two inaugural
addresses and seven State of the Union Addresses by Barack Obama. The discourses
about the fight against terrorism and the relationship between religious beliefs and politics
within the discourses are analysed using a Faircloughian three-dimensional form of
critical discourse analysis.
The theoretical framework of this research consists of three different approaches that
support each other: secularism, the concept of the post-secular, and the American civil
religion. These three components together allow the relationship between religious beliefs
and politics to be analysed thoroughly and from versatile perspectives. When discussing
the relationship between state and religion, and especially the nature of the relationship
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and whether it is secular or not, a well-fitting component of the theoretical framework is
secularism. Secularism is a political doctrine or ideology that consists of the idea of the
separation of religious and public spheres. Secularism is not, however, a uniform political
doctrine or a way of separating the church and the state, but it appears differently in
different cultures and states. Secularism must be distinguished from secularisation, which
refers to historical and social processes of, for example, the privatisation of religion and
the decline of religious faith. (Berg-Sørensen 2013, 2−3.)
The second part of the theoretical framework is the concept of the post-secular. The idea
of many modern societies being secular has been widely questioned. The concept of the
post-secular provides an approach to societies that are traditionally considered as secular
but in which religion has maintained its status or is growing its significance. Contrary to
secularist expectations, the significance of religion has grown, and its privatisation
diminished in the 21st century. These societies that have not developed according to what
the secularisation theory expected can be described as post-secular. (Beaumont 2010,
8−9.) The term post-secular can refer to the re-emergence of religion or its increased
visibility  in  politics  and  culture,  to  critique  towards  modernist  or  secularist  politics  or
ideology, or to a new, faith-based political approach, for example. The term has multiple
uses, the simplest and perhaps most common being the re-sacralisation of public life and
the increased significance of religion in moral, social and political matters in modern
democratic societies. (Knott 2010, 20; Berg-Sørensen 2013, 3.)
Both secularism and the concept of the post-secular are used to analyse the relationship
between politics and religion, for which purpose both are applicable but provide different
perspectives. The third part of the theoretical framework is the American civil religion,
largely based on Robert Bellah’s definition of it. Bellah defines the American civil
religion as the religious dimension that exists in the political realm and is expressed in a
set of beliefs, symbols and rituals (Bellah 1970/1967, 171). The American Constitution,
for  example,  has  special  symbolic  role  in  the  American  civil  religion  (Levinson  1979,
123). The American civil religion is largely based on biblical events and themes but has
also  its  own  sacred  events,  rituals  and  martyrs,  which  differentiates  it  from  pure
Christianity (Bellah 1970/1967, 175). An important theme in the American civil religion
is the idea that God has a plan for the United States and that the nation must fulfil this
religiously interpreted purpose while it acts as an example for other nations. (Rouner
1986, 136; Bellah 1970/1967, 175).
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To provide background information for this study, chapter two discusses the role of
religion and the American civil religion in the U.S. society, in addition to a review of U.S.
foreign policy and the fight against terrorism. Freedom of religion is an important theme
to discuss as it creates a substantial foundation for the relationship between state and
religion.  A  central  discussion  revolves  around  the  Religion  Clauses  of  the  First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and their interpretation. The issue
that the different interpretations evoke is whether the state should be strictly secular or
endorse religious activities to best ensure freedom of religion.
Chapter three further illuminates the theoretical framework and its application to this
study. Chapter four introduces the research material and the methodology of critical
discourse analysis (CDA). The chapter discusses the theoretical background of CDA, its
applications, and how Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of CDA is applied to this
study. The analysis is discussed in chapter five, which consists of three parts that each
discuss one dimension of the analysis. The results of the analysis are summarised and




2.1. Religion, state and secularity in the United States
John Torpey (2012, 298) argues that the United States has become considerably more
secular during the last hundred years in terms of differentiation of church and other
institutions. However, despite the increase of the number of non-religious people in the
U.S., Americans are still more religious and attend church more actively than people in
Western Europe (ibid., 299). Bruce Ledewitz (2011, xvii−xvii) also argues that
secularism in the United States is growing, even though the American society is still
distinctively religious in many respects.
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause, together called the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, are notable in the discussion about the relationship between state and
religion in the U.S. The Free Exercise Clause secures the U.S. citizens the right to exercise
or not to exercise any religion of their choosing without governmental intervention
(Hammond 1998, 1). The Establishment Clause states that the “congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion”, thus promising governmental neutrality
towards religion and that religiosity will not be endorsed by the government (Ledewitz
2011, xvii, 3). The purpose of the Clauses is to give people the freedom to choose their
own religion without the federal government endorsing any specific form of religion
(Hammond 1998, 1).
The U.S. is a federal union and is thus formed of partly independent states that are
differentiated from the federal government in scope. In the U.S., the federal government
has primary jurisdiction over foreign affairs, whereas the state government has
jurisdiction over civil and criminal law and public order, to name a few. (Deutsch 1970,
183, 229.) Even though the states have some independence, their laws and acts must
always be in accordance with the Constitution. The judiciary is an important channel of
federal influence over the states as it is the duty of the courts to decide whether the actions
and laws of the state or federal government are valid under the Constitution. However,
this does not ensure that the Constitution is interpreted in the same manner in every state
as the interpretation always depends on the judges. (Ibid., 250−251.) Consequently, even
though executing the Constitution consistently throughout the U.S. may at first seem
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simple, due to differences of interpretation of the Constitution, this is not always the case.
Hence, even the Constitution cannot ensure similar treatment of religion everywhere in
the U.S.
There  are,  for  example,  difficulties  with  defining  the  meaning  of  neutrality  in  the
Establishment Clause as the line between neutrality and favouritism has been in the centre
of the discussion regarding the application of the Clause. Nowadays it seems clear that
the Establishment Clause requires equal treatment of all faiths, at least, but the true
meaning and application of the Clause is still widely contested. (Beschle 2002, 456, 462.)
Furthermore, defining governmental neutrality towards religion is difficult because
accommodating religion can still be accepted in schools, for example, under the Free
Exercise Clause. Several court cases in the U.S. have shown that even apparent
favouritism can be portrayed neutral and thus be accepted under the Establishment
Clause. (Beschle 2002, 463; Ledewitz 2011, 21.) Even though the purpose of the Clause
may seem clear and in support of secularism, the application of the Clause in addition to
the application of the Free Exercise Clause has not been consistent, clear or in many cases
in support of secularism.
The issue regarding the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is that people interpret
them and their meaning differently. For some, a literal interpretation is sufficient,
meaning that everybody can choose to either practice or not to practice any religion and
that the federal government will not express favouritism towards any religion. However,
the literal interpretation is not sufficient and not applicable to different areas of life when
the lack of resources may lead governmental actions to seem to favour some particular
religion. A problem also arises when the two Clauses are in contradiction with each other,
when the question is which Clause should be favoured. Two different approaches to the
interpretation of the primacy of Clauses can be distinguished: separationist and
accommodationist. The separationist approach emphasises the priority of the
Establishment Clause since a secular state that does not favour any religion and a non-
religious public sphere are believed to be essential in guaranteeing freedom of religion.
According to the accommodationist view, practicing religion in the public sphere should
be encouraged over nonreligion, because it is believed to be the only option in ensuring
freedom of religion. (Hammond 1998, 1−3.)
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Thus, there are clear differences regarding the interpretation of the Religion Clauses of
the  First  Amendment,  which  also  reflects  the  differences  of  opinions  regarding  the
relationship between state and religion. There is no consensus on whether the U.S. federal
government should be strictly secular without endorsing any kind of religious activity in
the public sphere or should it, on the contrary, endorse all kinds of religious activity in
order to ensure freedom of religion.
To conclude, the U.S. can be argued to be secular in the sense that it formally separates
the church and the state. However, religion is still an important part of American society
and politics, which may make the claim of the secularity of the U.S. unconvincing.
2.2. Freedom and religion, civil religion and founding myths
“[T]he United States stands always for human liberty, for individual rights, for freedom
of movement, and for freedom of the person.” This is what former U.S. Secretary of State,
Henry A. Kissinger, stated about the policy principles of the U.S. when questioned by the
senate in 1973 on his nomination for Secretary of State. (Kissinger 1974, 205.) This
statement implicates that freedom in its many forms is in the centre of U.S. policy, both
foreign and domestic. Freedom is evidently the concept that many associate in some way
with the United States and its foreign policy, whether or not one believes that the U.S.
embodies it in reality.
Different American generations have held various views about liberty and freedom. For
example, after the War of Independence, several views of liberty and freedom clashed:
unitary and pluralist, national and sectional, republican and democratic, and traditional
and modern. Furthermore, the clash between differing opinions about southern liberty and
northern freedom sparked the Civil War. (Hackett Fisher 2005, 719.) Liberty and freedom
can be perceived as terms with different meanings due to their origins from different
words and different areas. Liberty, originating from ancient Mediterranean civilisations,
came to mean the condition of being independent from another’s will, whereas freedom,
with its  Indo-European origin,  refers to being connected to a community,  to other free
people, by kinship or affection. Whereas most nations in the West adopted either of the
terms, the English-speaking world adopted both, which resulted in clashes between the
two concepts. (Ibid. 716−717.) After the Second World War and during the Cold War,
individual liberties and civil rights started to gain more attention. Hackett Fisher argues
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that over time the American society has enlarged the meaning of liberty and freedom and
become freer themselves. (Ibid. 721−722.)
Due  to  the  versatility  of  concepts  of  freedom  and  liberty  during  U.S.  history  it  is  not
necessary, or perhaps even possible, to try to identify one cohesive American concept of
freedom, although similarities between different concepts can be found. The emphasis on
civil liberties is evident (Abraham 1988, 3). Understanding freedom as a set of civil
liberties, such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech, is visible in academic texts
also, as scholarly texts often address different civil liberties separately instead of
discussing the concept of freedom as a whole. A dominant idea regarding liberty,
originating from the U.S. Constitution, is that liberty can only be achieved by the rule of
law (ibid., 5).
American journalist  M. Stanton Evans discusses the role of religion in the founding of
the American concept of freedom in his book The Theme is Freedom: Religion, Politics
and the American Tradition (1994). He claims that the American concept of freedom as
the absence of coercion, more specifically the absence of state coercion over its citizens,
was born of Western Christian views of human nature and the purpose of the state. These
Christian views also affected how American institutions were formed in a way that
protects and respects the freedom of U.S. citizens. (Evans 1994, 316−317.) According to
Evans, the development of Western faith, especially in America, also affected the
American  Constitution.  In  the  American  faith,  the  state  was  seen  as  subordinate  to  a
higher power rather than an expression of divine power, which enabled the restrictions of
state power and more profound freedom to the U.S. citizens, as Evans interprets it. (Ibid.
309, 311−312.) Evans then argues that not only did religion affect the development of
American institutions, religious belief is also “conceptually indispensable to a regime of
freedom” (ibid. 37−38). Thus, it may be argued that religion and freedom have a close
relationship in the U.S. history and present day.
The U.S. can be perceived as secular on the basis that state and religion are formally
separated, even though religion is still an important part of the U.S. politics. Despite the
Christian faith of presidents Bush and Obama, the U.S. has long promoted freedom of
religion and acceptance of different religions (Gunn 2004, 503). The freedom of religious
belief and association is achieved in the United States by the principle of separating
religion and state, according to Robert Bellah (1970/1967, 170−171). The state of
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religiosity in the U.S. is still a highly debated issue as some consider it more secularised
that ever and some as religious as ever. The American civil religion and the discussion of
its nature also bring another approach to the debate: if the American civil religion is
accepted as an actual religion, its existence would naturally make the U.S. society
religious. The debate on the nature of the American civil religion will be discussed further
in chapter three. It can be argued that secularism or the post-secular period, depending on
whether one believes that the age of secularism or secularisation has come to an end, has
caused  the  birth  of  civil  religion  and  the  adoption  of  religious  symbols  to  be  used  as
political tools to promote national integration (Beyers 2014, 9; May et al. 2014, 340).
This is one reason why the American civil religion is also included in the theoretical
framework of this study.
When it comes to the relationship between religion and state, there is a sharp difference
between the United States and France, for example. In France, religious expression is
banned from public schools based on the French concept of secularism, laïcité, whereas
in the United States religious expression in schools is promoted (Gunn 2004, 424.) Thus,
the premise from which the U.S. conceptualises and treats religion is quite different
compared  to  France.  However,  T.  Jeremy  Gunn  (2004,  422)  points  out  in  his  article
Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and France that the
two doctrines, laïcité and freedom of religion, have many similarities, such as that they
are both presented to promote equality, neutrality and tolerance, and both can be seen to
operate as founding myths.
The freedom of religion is portrayed as the “first freedom” which the Pilgrims and other
people who settled in America came to seek. Former U.S. president George W. Bush
portrayed it as the cornerstone of the United States and many governmental actors reflect
this idea. (Gunn 2004, 430, 431.) However, religious freedom in the United States did not
actualise  in  reality  for  a  long  time,  and  although  freedom  of  religion  is  the  first  right
written in the Bill of Rights, the idea of freedom of religion being the “first freedom” is
wildly overstated (ibid. 444−445). Only in the 1940s were real steps towards freedom of
religion and banning religious discrimination taken. Freedom of religion is portrayed to
originate gloriously from the past and embody equality, freedom of conscience, and other
core values of many modern societies, but in reality, it emerged from times defined by
hostility and violence. (Ibid., 451−452.)
10
It may be argued that the U.S. foreign policy is largely shaped by a religious identity and
foundational myths of manifest destiny, exceptionalism, and the U.S. being an innocent
nation, which over time transformed into the American civil religion. Lee Marsden argues
that president Obama used the American civil religion intentionally to gain support for
his foreign policy agenda to maintain U.S. hegemony. (Marsden 2011, 326.) According
to  him,  the  will  to  “convert”  the  whole  world  into  freedom,  liberty,  human  rights,
democracy and capitalism is especially visible in Obama’s speeches. Marsden argues that
Obama’s foreign policy agenda was based on the tradition of the civil religion and that he
used civil religion to frame and justify his agenda. (Ibid., 341.) American identity rests
heavily upon the myth of American exceptionalism, the idea that the Americans are a
nation chosen by God with higher morals and purpose such as freedom and human rights.
The United States portrays itself embodying the way of life that is centred upon freedom,
as the guardian of liberty, which is used as justification for its interventions in other
countries. (Ibid., 328−329.)
2.3. On U.S. foreign policy
The grand strategies of different U.S. foreign policies can be associated with presidential
doctrines that determine the agenda of the foreign policy (Hastedt 2011, 13). The Bush
Doctrine emphasised the significance of pre-emptive action in preventing attacks against
the U.S. and endorsed the use of U.S. force to encourage free and open societies, thus
providing the intellectual framework for the launch of Global War of Terrorism (ibid.,
20−21). The doctrine also includes an “America first” mindset and does not put as much
weight on harmonious relationships between the U.S. and its transatlantic allies. The Bush
Doctrine is largely shaped by the changing geopolitical position of the U.S. in the start of
the 21st century, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent strategy re-evaluation.
The U.S. foreign policy was based on a combination of containment and deterrence for
over 50 years, but the Bush Doctrine differed from the earlier alignments on its emphasis
on pre-emption, its hegemonic aspirations and unilateralism. Previous U.S. strategies
have had the same characteristics, but they became more pronounced in the Bush
Doctrine. (Dunn 2009, 181−182.) Especially Bush’s pursuit towards unilateralism, even
characterised as “neo-imperial”, harmed the image of the U.S. and the trust between the
U.S. and it European allies (ibid., 186).
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Obama continued to support the leadership role of the U.S., and even though he sought
to realign the U.S. foreign policy, it can be argued that his foreign policy initiatives
nonetheless reflected the “ordinary” characteristics of U.S. foreign policy (McCormick
2009, 245, Hastedt 2011, 65). The U.S. foreign policy can be argued to be shaped by three
patterns of thought and action that shape the American national style of foreign policy-
making. The foreign policy of both Bush administration and Obama administration
reflected this American national style. The first pattern is unilateralism, i.e. the U.S.
inclination of acting alone when addressing foreign policy problems. (Hastedt 2011,
59−60.) The second pattern is moral pragmatism, which contains the idea that American
morality provides the universal criterion according to which every state’s behaviour can
and should be judged. (Ibid., 61.) The third pattern is legalism, which rejects the idea that
the balance of power can ensure national security. Legalism embraces the liberal idea that
as rational beings, humans naturally avoid war and favour peaceful settlements of
disputes. Thus, the central goal of the U.S. policy is to form a global system of institutions
and rules so that disputes can be solved peacefully. (Ibid., 64.)
It may be argued that not one, but two Obama Doctrines exist. The first one strived to be
different than the Bush Doctrine as it emphasised the need of open partnership and new
U.S. relations with the world, for example. However, a second Obama Doctrine seemed
to emerge in 2011 from the need to respond to the pro-democracy movements in North
Africa and the Middle East. The second doctrine was more cautious and pragmatic and
less concerned about the vision of the world and more about the reality. The second
Obama Doctrine is also more attentive to the distinctions between serious threats and
minor threats to the U.S. The second Doctrine has many similar themes as the first one
but does not embrace responsibility in interfering in matters quite as much as the first.
(Hastedt 2011, 3−4.)
The influence of religion in the U.S. foreign policy has been gaining more scholarly
interest only in the 21st century (Croft 2009, 120; Hastedt 2011, 58). The combination of
religion and politics is not a new phenomenon, but religion has been an important theme
in several important U.S. elections since the late 19th century, especially in the post-war
period (Marsden 2011, 332). Religion has affected U.S. foreign policy by both soft power
and hard power. Soft power was used by distributing aid and American values by religious
actors, and hard power even on the battlefields of Iraq, where conservative evangelical
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actors sought to convert locals into Christianity, for example. It has also been revealed
that the entire military culture is highly religious. (Ibid., 338−339.)
It may be argued that four religiously coloured assumptions that have influence on the
U.S. foreign policy exist. The first is that the U.S. is considered God’s chosen nation. The
second is the idea that the U.S. has a special purpose to change the world, and the third is
that this quest involves a fight against evil. The fourth assumption is that the world affairs
are characterised by an “apocalyptic outlook” in the sense that subtle changes are not
considered to be sufficient to cause any change in the world and that evil should be fought
with radical action. (Hastedt 2011, 58.) These themes are also visible in the American
civil religion and in its foundational myths, which will be discussed in chapter three.
However, it is important to remember that not all religious groups share the same view
about the U.S. and its role. Glenn P. Hastedt (2011, 58) distinguishes three different
schools of thought within U.S. Protestantism that all have different views regarding the
U.S. foreign policy and how it should be conducted. Liberal Christianity provided the
worldview for many people of the founding generation but is now been replaced by
fundamentalism and evangelicalism. Fundamentalists have a pessimistic view about the
future and the possibility of change, they draw sharp distinctions between believers and
non-believers and are often not willing to cooperate with people they do not agree with.
Like fundamentalists, evangelicals also separate believers from non-believers, but are
more optimistic about prospects of change and cooperation. (Ibid., 58−59.) The idea that
the U.S. must use its foreign policy to achieve the goals set by God is especially strong
among the evangelicals (Croft 2009, 124). Differences within these groups exist,
nonetheless, and often domestic social policy is more important to them that foreign
policy. Regardless of where the idea of American exceptionalism stems from, it has great
influence in the view that the U.S. should be the leader in world affairs. (Hastedt 2011,
58−59.)
American  Christianity  is  a  complex  phenomenon full  of  different  views  and  purposes,
political purposes being one of them. A group called the Christian Right, or otherwise
called Conservative Protestants, is often in the centre of interest when discussing the role
of American Christianity in politics. Bush was highly popular among the Conservative
Protestants in the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004. Lee Marsden has argued that
the influence of the Christian Right on U.S. foreign policy-making has grown after the
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9/11 attacks. (Croft 2009, 120, 123.) Many have argued that the George W. Bush
administration was largely affected by the Christian Right and theological elements in
general, and the administration faced accusations that it tried to gain profit from the
president’s apparent commitment to Christian values even though the senior official of
the White House disregarded religious leaders and faith-based agenda. (Ibid., 122−123.)
This demonstrates how the president may use religion to gain more personal support.
However, the question is not only about the president being able to use religion to their
own personal gain but how the majority of the American people also seem to expect that
their  president  is  a  Christian.  This  was  indicated  clearly  during  Obama’s  presidential
campaign before his first term, when his suitability to lead the U.S. and its foreign policy
was questioned due to his race and religion. Christianity appeared to be especially
important in the context of the fight against terrorism as voters seemed to worry about
Obama having too empathetic views towards Muslims and being soft on terrorists.
(Ledwidge 2009, 153−155.)
The relationship between the Bush administration and religion is often portrayed as
straightforward, but in truth it was rather complex. It may be argued that the influence of
religion on the Bush administration was subtler than expected, since although the
administration had clear connections to the Christian Right,  their  views did not always
coincide with each other and the administration’s commitment to Christian values was at
times more ostensible than genuine. (Croft 2009, 122−123.) However, religious groups
managed to influence U.S. foreign policy particularly in Africa. The policy on AIDS was
largely shaped by the beliefs and lobbying of the evangelical Focus on the Family group.
(Hastedt 2011, 124.)
2.4. The fight against terrorism
The large military campaign that the George W. Bush administration called the War on
Terror is a highly complex phenomenon with a complicated background and causes that
the  scope  of  this  study  does  not  allow  to  discuss  in  its  entirety.  However,  in  order  to
provide context to the topic of this study, some central themes are discussed briefly.
Justified by the War on Terror, U.S. military forces have been utilised in the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. The effects
of the war go even further, effecting states such as Chechnya, Libya, Palestine, the
Philippines, and Sri Lanka. (Gregory 2011, 238.)
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In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, George W. Bush’s
administration with the U.S. allies declared war on terrorists, resulting in military
interventions first in Afghanistan and later, in 2003, in Iraq. The Bush administration
justified both interventions by the linkages of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and
the alleged linkages of the Saddam Hussein government in Iraq to the terrorist network
al-Qaeda. The Bush administration claimed that Hussein and his government were allies
with al-Qaeda, although in reality they had little or no connection to the terrorist network.
Resistance against foreign occupation was strong in Afghanistan and Iran, and it resulted
in suicide bombings and insurgencies. (Katz 2013, 14.) Besides military intervention,
Operation Enduring Freedom that started in October 2001, the U.S. also took
counterterrorism and political and assistance actions in Afghanistan, aiming to eliminate
al-Qaeda (Fair 2013, 76; Semple 2013, 47−48). The military campaign was successful in
overthrowing the Taliban regime and drove the remaining organised troops of Taliban
and al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan but did not stop insurgencies and other internal
disturbances (Semple 2013, 53−54). It may be argued that the invasion of Iraq benefitted
al-Qaeda as it allowed it to regroup and reorganise itself. The occupation also turned many
Iraqis more hostile towards the U.S. and other Western troops and escalated the conflict
that was initially rather limited to a larger one, which connected Arabian Muslims beyond
state borders in resistance against foreign occupation. (Gerges 2013, 34.)
In addition to the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. has made many other
global efforts to fight terrorism, including military force, covert action, intelligence
gathering, diplomacy, and creating new forms of international policing and forensic
cooperation. U.S. actions in the fight against terrorism are not limited to U.S. actions
abroad, as U.S. military and intelligence budgets have been increased significantly to
improve safety on the U.S. soil. (Flibbert 2013, 95.) The War on Terror has also severely
influenced the Middle East and North Africa by strengthening many authoritarian regimes
and weakened Arab-Israeli-relations even further (ibid., 108).
At first, Bush and his anti-terrorism policies alongside the War on Terror enjoyed wide
popularity in the U.S. However, by the end of Bush’s second presidency, approval of the
president himself, the war in Iraq and the actions taken on behalf of the War on Terror
had dropped to record lows. One reason behind the disapproval may be that the Bush
administration failed to invent a sufficient enough “counter ideology” to justify the
military actions in the Middle East. (Watson 2009, 10, 13.)
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Obama sought to change the Bush administration’s course of action and the conduct of
the  fight  against  terrorism  so  that  they  would  correspond  U.S.  values  better.  His
administration also wanted to reconstruct the narrative of the War on Terror, ceasing to
use the term and making it appear less dominant alongside other foreign policy priorities.
Despite Obama’s promises and efforts to close down the detention centre at Guantánamo
Bay, it remains debatable whether the substance of the U.S. counterterrorism actions
actually changed significantly as the fight against terrorism remained in the centre of his
administration’s foreign policy. Osama bin Laden was tracked down and killed by U.S.
military troops in May 2011, marking a success in the fight against terrorism for the
Obama administration. However, although the successful assassination of bin Laden was
praised by many, the Obama administration’s counterterrorism actions nevertheless drew
much criticism. (McCrisken 2011, 782−783, 788.) The U.S. ended its large-scale military
involvement in Iraq in 2011 as by that year, U.S. soldiers had left the country (Brennan
et al. 2013, 5).
The costs of the fight against terrorism have been high. According to a Congressional
Research Service report (DeBruyne 2017), as of April 2017, a total of 6901 U.S. military
personnel were killed in action and over 85 thousand wounded in action in five military
operations in the fight against terrorism: Operation Enduring Freedom (mainly conducted
in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014), Operation Iraqi Freedom (the invasion of Iraq in
2003, major combat operations ending in 2010), Operation New Dawn (replacement
name for Operation Iraqi Freedom, casualties occurred between 2010 and 2011),
Operation Inherent Resolve (against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, started in 2014), and
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (in Afghanistan, started in 2015). The number of wounded
does not include the numerous health and mental health problems that the veterans
encounter. The exact number of the casualties of the U.S. operations, both enemy
combatants and civilians, is hard to count, but the International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War publication (2015) estimated that a total of around 1.3 million
people were either directly or indirectly killed due to the operations in Iraq, Afghanistan
and Pakistan: 1 million in Iraq, 220 000 in Afghanistan and 80 000 in Pakistan, not
including farther war zones such as Yemen. The war has also been very expensive for the
U.S. Since the attacks of 9/11, the spending on the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan
and Syria and on Homeland Security and the Departments of Defense and Veterans
Affairs  was  $4.3  trillion  in  total  in  the  fiscal  year  2017.  And as  the  war  goes  on,  it  is
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The theoretical framework of this research consists of three parts, which complement and
support each other when examining the relationship between religious beliefs and politics
in the United States. The three parts of this framework are secularism, the concept of the
post-secular, and the American civil religion.
Secularism is not an unequivocal term: it refers to a variety of different views about the
relationship between state and religion and is a common lens through which the
relationship is examined in the West. Secularism commonly refers to the separation of
church and state in the sense that political institutions are separated from religion and that
they are justified using secular or public reason. When understood in a normative sense,
secularism is usually interpreted as a political doctrine that gives priority to tolerance and
neutrality. Secularism is often justified by the protection of religious freedom, freedom
of conscience and equality between all people, regardless of whether they exercise
religion or not. (Berg-Sørensen 2010, 1, 3.)
The nature of the post-secular is highly contested. It is unclear whether the term refers to
a  time  that  follows  previously  secular  societies,  or  to  a  new  kind  of  religion  and  the
changing relationship between states and the secular (Knott 2010, 34). Jürgen Habermas
is probably the most influential scholar of the post-secular, but his views have also been
widely criticised. According to Habermas, religion has maintained its significance in
post-secular societies, contrary to the claims of the secularisation theory. Habermas
conceives the post-secular as a change of consciousness in the sense that a new reaction
towards the continued existence and influence of religion in an increasingly secular
environment is required. (Habermas 2008, 19−20.) Thus, the term post-secular may also
refer to the misconceptions of the secularisation theory, i.e. to the continued existence or
resurfacing of religion and religious diversity (Molendjik et al 2009, x; Berg-Sørensen
2013, 3).
The American civil religion is a concept originally introduced by Robert N. Bellah. He
argues that an independent public religious dimension, expressed in a set of beliefs,
symbols and rituals, exists in the U.S. He named this religious dimension the American
civil religion. (Bellah 1970/1967, 168, 171.) A large debate surrounding the American
civil religion is whether it is a genuine religion, merely a religious dimension or
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something else. For example, Richard Neuhaus argues that the American civil religion is
not a religion but a certain understanding of the U.S., influenced by a religious dimension
(Neuhaus 1984, 100). Bellah argues that the American civil religion is ultimately based
on Christianity, but that over time a set of beliefs, symbols and rituals, which are general
enough to satisfy non-Christians, developed and institutionalised the society. The
American civil religion, with its rather specific notions about America and its purpose,
provides U.S. citizens a unifying, common identity and a tool for national religious self-
understanding. (Bellah 1970/1967, 175−176; Rouner 1986, 128.)
Secularism and the concept of the post-secular provide different and useful approaches to
the analysis of the relationship between religion and politics, and of the societal role and
significance of religion. The concept of the post-secular is included in the theoretical
framework because the concept brings certain flexibility to the analysis and allows to
examine phenomena that are not traditionally considered religious. Secularism, in the
most common sense of the term, is concerned with the separation of church and state and
therefore is not best suited to study untraditional religious phenomena, such as civil
religions and the influence of unestablished religions and religious beliefs. Thus,
including the concept of the post-secular in the theoretical framework enables this study
to analyse more versatile religious phenomena than the approach of secularism alone
would enable. The American civil religion is included so that the influence and role of
religious beliefs in U.S. politics can be examined more thoroughly. Whether one beliefs
that the American civil religion is an actual religion or not, it consists of beliefs that are
clearly religious in nature and thus, should not be left out of the analysis of the relationship
between religious beliefs and the politics of the U.S.
The discussion about the post-secular is largely based on the failings of the secularisation
theory, which is why the main arguments of the theory will also be introduced in the
following chapter. However, the secularisation theory will not be applied to the research
itself.  The secularisation theory assumes that different processes will cause a
secularisation of people’s worldviews and a decrease in the number of religious
institutions (Pratt 1970, 6). Thus, as the theory is concerned about societal processes, it is
more applicable to studies that examine societal changes and processes and religiosity in
general from a wider perspective, rather than to studies that examine some specific
phenomena within a short timeframe. Since the focus of this research is on discourses
19
rather than on any processes that may have or may not have taken place in the society,
secularism is more applicable to this study than the secularisation theory.
3.1. Secularism
The meaning of the secular is generally co-constructed with the meaning of sacred or
religion. However, the definition of religion is not clear either. One reason behind the
difficulty to define religion is cultural differences, as people around the world conceive
religion differently (Torpey 2012, 282). Definitions of religion vary depending on the
culture in which the definition is born and developed. In the modern West, where religion
is supposedly differentiated from other spheres of life, at least to some degree, religion
has come to mean a distinct sphere that is connected to the other spheres, possibly in
strained terms. However, this concept of religion is not applicable to cultures and societies
where differentiations have not taken place. (Madsen 2012, 31.) Madsen argues that
although people in the West often claim to have a neutral attitude towards religion,
Western concepts of the secular and religion are often largely shaped by Western
Protestant theological concepts and connected to essentially theological concepts. In other
words, Western social scientific concepts of the secular and the religious have certain
assumptions and standards that some religious-like phenomena do not fit into, which
makes defining different religious phenomena often difficult. (Ibid., 26, 29−30.)
John Torpey (2012, 187) describes two principal axes around which a satisfactory
definition of religion revolves: whether a practice or an activity has a social dimension
which can be used to challenge existing social arrangements, and whether it involves
supernatural powers that might be able to change the current state of affairs in this world
or the next. Usually some form of institutionalisation occurs (ibid.). However, untangling
the definition of the “traditional” way of conceiving religions is not enough, since the so-
called para-religions, such as civil religion, political religion and secular religion need to
be considered, too (ibid., 285). The difficulty to define religion elaborates the complexity
of defining the secular.
Before discussing secularism further, it is necessary to make distinctions between secular,
secularism and secularisation. A rough distinction can be made as follows: secular refers
to the differentiation of religion from other areas of society, such as politics and culture,
whereas secularisation is a process that involves a decline in the number of religious
people and the loss of the significance of religion and religious authority in the society.
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Secularism  refers  to  an  ideology,  political  doctrine  or  belief  that  religion  should  be
differentiated from other spheres of public life. (Berg-Sørensen 2010, 1; Fox 2013, 31;
Snape & Brown 2016, 3−4.)
Secularism generally refers to the separation of church and state in terms of institutional
arrangements and individual reasons, i.e. so that political institutions are independent of
religion and they are justified using secular or public reason. (Berg-Sørensen 2010, 1, 3.)
As a normative term, secularism is usually interpreted as one that gives priority to
principles such as tolerance and neutrality, but the function of secularism as a political
doctrine varies depending on the contexts in which it is adopted. The separation of
religion and politics is often made to promote political ideals of liberty, tolerance, equality
and neutrality, or more specifically, secularism is justified for the sake of religious
freedom,  freedom  of  conscience  and  the  equality  of  people  of  all  religious  and  non-
religious beliefs. (Ibid., 1−3.)
To distinguish secularism and the secularisation theory from each other and to clarify the
later discussion of the post-secular, the main ideas of the secularisation theory are
introduced. The secularisation theory usually consists of two different assumptions.
Firstly, the interest towards religion and the amount of religious institutions will decline
due to a social process; and secondly, people’s worldviews will become more secular due
to an intellectual process. (Pratt 1970, 6.) According to the theory, scientific and
technological advancements and developing societies will cause the decline in religious
worldviews,  the  loss  of  societal  significance  of  religious  institutions,  and  the  general
decline in the exercise of religion. Secularisation theory has faced much criticism and
some scholars even argue for the end of secularisation theory. Religion still has a
significant role in the modern world, and even increasingly so according to some theorists,
for example in the form of religious fundamentalism. (Habermas 2008, 17, 18.)
There have also been efforts to simplify the matter of secularisation by dividing the issue
to “political secularisation” (the differentiation thesis) and “social secularisation” (the
commodification thesis). The differentiation thesis refers to the historical separation of
church and state and different spheres of the social system, such as politics, religion, and
the economy, becoming more specialised. Social secularisation, in turn, refers to the
decline in church membership, religious belief, experiences, and acts of devotion. Bryan
S. Turner argues that the distinction between social and political secularisation is
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important as the processes do not necessarily take place simultaneously. (Turner 2012,
140−142.)
As there are many different interpretations of secularism, there are also a variety of
different views about the extent of religiosity in today’s world: some scholars still argue
for secularisation, while the others consider that the secularisation theory has failed.
Jürgen Habermas argued after the 9/11 attacks that the world has entered a post-secular
age, meaning the increasing significance of religion in the public sphere and the need to
re-evaluate the relationship between politics and faith. Some scholars argue that the
secularisation theory is only correct when applied to Western Europe. If this view is
accepted, then an interesting question arises about why religiosity has maintained its
significance in the U.S. while Western Europe has become more and more secular, as can
be argued. (Torpey 2012, 279−280, 300.) The United States is one reason why the
secularisation thesis may seem questionable (Hackworth 2010, 356; Gorski et al 2012,
7), which makes it a fascinating research topic to be approached from the viewpoint of
secularism. The division between church and state, in terms of legal principles and often
in terms as institutional arrangements as well, is quite sharp in the U.S. However, the U.S.
may still be the least secular country in the West in terms of individual beliefs and public
engagement. (Gorski et al 2012, 7.)
It can be argued that many different versions of secularism exist. Secularism first
developed mainly in Europe, from where it spread to other countries, and with this spread
its values and ideas often also changed. Different versions of secularism can be
understood as results of differences in socio-cultural and political modernity in different
societies. (Bhargava 2013, 18−19.) According to Rajeev Bhargava, the broad definition
of secularism means the aim to ensure the freedom to either practice or not to practice
religion and ensuring that religion has no institutionalised religious effect on political or
social life. He understands secularism as a normative doctrine. Bhargava also
distinguishes a narrower, but equally normative, definition of secularism: political
secularism. Political secularism refers to the idea that religion and state should be
separated in order to ensure religious and non-religious freedom and to avoid religious
tyranny and oppression. Political secularism also has many different variations. (Ibid. 20.)
Modern democracies are generally expected to be secular, but the problem is that as
interpretations of the term vary, it is unclear to what kinds of phenomena “secular” strictly
22
refers. It can be argued that the formal separation between church and state is not enough
to make a regime secular. In addition to the liberty to either practice or not to practice
religion, different beliefs and their practitioners must be equal among themselves.
Furthermore,  all  religious orientations must be heard in the process of determining the
political identity of the society and defining and reaching its objectives. The third
requirement is surely hard to achieve in real life due to conflicts of interests and values,
for example. (Taylor 2011, 34−35.) Charles Taylor (2011, 36) argues that the real essence
of secularism is not the relationship between state and religion but how democratic states
react to diversity. State neutrality is required to ensure that every religion and non-
religiosity are treated equally without favouring any over the other (ibid., 37).
Thus, Taylor provides yet another way of interpreting secularism and how it relates to
states. Regardless of the interpretation of the true nature of secularism, neutrality remains
in the centre of it. Other important aspects that are connected to neutrality are tolerance
and pluralism. Not only is a secular state required to treat all religions and non-religiosity
equally and neutrally, it also must allow all kinds of religions and wold-views to coexist
peacefully without fanaticism, as Harvey Cox argues in his influential book The Secular
City (1990). (Pratt 1970, 1−2.) Secularism is thereby not, according to many
interpretations, necessarily against religion, even though some forms of anti-religion
secularisms also exist (Bader 2007/2013, 49; Bhargava 2013, 25). The version of
secularism that does accept religion does not demand the abolishment of religion but
rather requires that the role of religion be articulated in a way that protects the freedom
of religion and the equal treatment of citizens of all religious or non-religious orientations.
In its most basic form this means the formal separation of state and church, even though
to many scholars this is not a sufficient definition.
The formal institutional separation of state and church may be an insufficient feature in
defining secular states since the institutional separation is also a feature found in states
that have established religions. The separation is an important feature of secular states,
but alone not sufficient to make a state strictly secular. A secular state has no formal or
legal alliance with any religion, which means that in order to be classified as secular, a
state cannot have an established religion. (Bhargava 2013, 22.)
Bhargava distinguished three levels at which states can disconnect themselves from
religion.  Firstly,  at  the  level  of  ends  (first-order  disconnection),  meaning  that  the  state
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does not serve any religion’s ends but has its own, at least substantially independent,
objectives. Secondly, at the level of institutions (second-order disconnection), so that
governmental and political institutions are separated from religious institutions. Lastly, at
the level of law and public policy (third-order disconnection), meaning that religion is
disconnected from state by removing religion as an object of politics and public policy.
A  state  can  disconnect  itself  from  religion  at  just  some  levels  or  at  all  of  them.  The
different disconnections may also serve different ends, amoral or value-based. Secular
states are amoral if they are not committed to values such as peace, liberty and equality,
and they aim to maximize either power or wealth or both. Amoral secular states tend to
be imperial and autocratic. Value-based secular societies, in turn, are committed to values
such as peace, toleration and religious liberty. (Bhargava 2013, 21−24.)
The disconnection at different levels also vary in form, and the variations help in
distinguishing different kinds of secular states. The disconnection at the third level, law
and public policy, may be interpreted in a one-sided manner so that religions are excluded
in order to control and even abolish them. Secular states with this kind of disconnection
are anti-religious. Even though these kinds of states are secular, they may be against
Bhargava’s definition of political secularism, which requires religious liberty. The third
level disconnection can also be interpreted as mutual exclusion. Religion should not affect
the matters of the state and in turn, state cannot affect religion either, but a mutual non-
interference prevails. (Bhargava 2013, 25−26.) A form of secularism that argues for the
separation of state and religion as a way of protecting individual liberty can be called
liberal secularism. Republican secularism argues for a one-sided exclusion of religion for
the sake of individualistic equality of citizenship. These are the most common Western
forms of secularism. (Ibid., 20, 26.)
Especially when examining societies where religion still has high relevance, it is
important to take some criticism of liberal-democratic secularism into account. Liberal
secularism requires citizen support to coercive laws only if they can be popularly justified,
as the principle of equal respect requires. The terms of laws must then be acceptable to
all citizens which is why a coercive law can never be based on religious reasoning since
it would not enjoy public justification. Purely religious convictions and commitments
should be rejected in a liberal secular state, which might cause contradictions between
one’s politics and morality. Morality is often derived from religion, but liberal secularism
requires  people  to  separate  religion  from  politics.  This,  however,  might  be  virtually
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impossible if people believe that their politics should be consistent with their morality.
Thus, liberal secularism may force people to act against their conscience by requiring a
religious person to exclude their religious reasoning, and thus it violates the principle of
equal treatment. This may also lead to separation between religious and non-religious
people into their own, separate social spheres, which is why excluding religious views
and people might not be the best option. (Bhargava 2013, 29−30.)
Another criticism towards liberal secularism is that it is based on and shaped by Protestant
ethic. Thus, quite ironically, this form of secularism presupposes a Christian civilisation
and makes it difficult to coexist peacefully with other religions and might be hostile
towards non-liberal and non-protestant believers. However, as Bhargava points out,
although it is important to give room to different kinds of religious views, non-liberal
religions are often those that seek to oppress and exclude some groups of people. Non-
liberal religions should be allowed to exist, but oppression does not need to be accepted.
(Bhargava 2013, 30−32.)
Charles Taylor (2007) distinguishes three different characterisations of secularity. The
first one is when religion is separated from political structures and is privatised as
people’s private matter. Politics is, then, completely separate from religious beliefs. This
conception of secularity revolves around different public places that have no religious
influence anymore. This conception, unlike the second, allows the existence of religions
and religious beliefs as long as they remain people’s private matters. The second meaning
refers to the decline of religious belief and practice. (Taylor 2007, 1−2.) Taylor introduces
a third sense in which secularity can present itself, one which he argues to be visible in
the United States, for example. In this third sense, secularity means a transition from a
society in which religious belief is not questioned to a society, where religious belief is
conceived as merely one option among many. Thus, the thirds conceptualisation refers to
the conditions in which people experience and search for the spiritual, a context which
allows the existence of a plurality of options through which people interpret the world.
With the new context and plurality of contesting options, people’s naïve and automatic
belief in the transcendent is ended. The reason for this condition is the emergence of
exclusive humanism. (Ibid., 3, 21.)
Candice Dias and Justin Beaumont (2010) equate Taylor’s conception of secular in its
third sense, “Secularity 3”, with Robert Baird’s term “late secularism”. The reason for
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this equation is that both conceptions allow the existence of religious belief without
making the society less secular. Dias and Beaumont agree with Taylor’s claim that the
U.S. is a secular state in secularism’s third sense but choose to use Baird’s term “late
secularism” to describe the role and state of religion in the public life in the U.S. They
argue this because while the church may have grown its significance as actors that
complement governmental actions, especially under the second Bush administration, the
relationship between religion and politics has changed relatively little since the 19th
century. The legal separation between church and state remains, though as contested as
ever, and the church remains as a complementary actor rather than a replacement of state
actions, which indicate a role of religion typical to late secular societies. Dias and
Beaumont further argue that Taylor’s concept of Secularity 3 and Baird’s late secularism
can be used to contest Habermas’s conception of the post-secular; an argument that will
be explored further in the next subchapter. (Dias & Beaumont 2010, 269−270.)
In this study, secularism will be treated as a normative doctrine to analyse the ways in
which religious beliefs are or are not separated from politics in the context of the fight
against terrorism in Bush’s and Obama’s discourses. In other words, secularism is used
as a lens through which the secularity, the separation between religious beliefs and state,
is examined.
3.2. The post-secular
Like secularism, the concept of the post-secular is highly debated. It may be argued that
the role of religion has not diminished in the world, contrary to what the supporters of the
secularisation theory suggest, and the question about the societal role of religion remains
(see Gorski et al 2012, 5). It is virtually unclear whether the post-secular refers to a time
after secular societies, or to a new kind of religion and the changing relationship between
modern states and the secular (Knott 2010, 34). Therefore, no consensus exists on the
strictly “correct” way of using the term, which on the one hand makes the concept a
versatile tool in examining different phenomena regarding the relationship between state
and religion, but on the other hand makes its essential meaning ambiguous.
The term post-secular is often used to explain the continued presence or resurfacing of
religion into the public sphere. It refers to the increased significance of religions and
religious belief in political, social and moral issues. (Berg-Sørensen 2013, 3.) The post-
secular can also refer to the diversity of religious, secularist and humanist views that exist
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in modern societies contrary to the assumptions of secularisation theory (Molendijk et al
2009, x). The meaning of the post-secular is often co-constructed with the concepts of
secular and religious, which may be considered as opposites, despite the difficulty to
define both terms. The perhaps most obvious meaning of the post-secular is in reference
to secularisation, as the post-secular can be conceived as a pause or stop to the
secularisation process in terms of religion’s retreat from the public sphere. (Knott 2010,
23.) Gorski et al (2012, 2) argue that there are two lines of inquiry trying to answer the
question  of  the  post-secular:  defining  the  state  of  religiosity  in  the  world  and
understanding  how  scholars  of  different  disciplines  are  or  are  not  paying  attention  to
religion. According to them, the real question is whether the real world has changed or
just the scholarly one.  There is no consensus on the answer. (Ibid.)
Habermas is probably the most influential scholar of the post-secular. Habermas argues
that even though religion has become more privatised, it does not mean that religion has
lost any of its significance in the political, cultural, and societal arenas or in the lives of
individuals. In post-secular societies, religion has kept its public significance in the
society, contrary to the assumptions of the supporters of the secularisation theory.
According to Habermas, the post-secular refers to a change of consciousness in the sense
that people, Europeans to be more exact, have to find a new way of reacting to the
continued existence and influence of religion in an increasingly secular environment.
(Habermas 2008, 19−21.) Habermas argues that this change is due to three phenomena.
First, the public consciousness is changed in the sense that reducing the role and
significance of religion is not conceived as the only way to advance cultural and social
modernisation. The second phenomenon is the increased influence of religious
communities to public opinion and will formation. And finally, the third phenomenon is
the challenge of the pluralism of ways of life that is posed by immigrants and refugees,
especially from traditional cultural backgrounds. From these conditions arises the
question of how citizens should relate to these changes and each other. (Ibid., 20−21.) In
brief, this means that secular and religious people must find an interpretation of the
relationship between faith and knowledge without automatically deeming each other’s
claims illegitimate, so that they are able to coexist peacefully in a self-reflective manner
(ibid., 29).
Sociologist Michele Dillon criticises Habermas’s conception of the post-secular by
arguing that it “underappreciates the contested nature of religious ideas, marginalizes the
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centrality of spirituality, emotion, and tradition to religion, and fails to recognize
religion’s intertwining with the secular” (Dillon 2012, 250). Thus, although Habermas is
very influential in the discussion about the post-secular, his views are contested. Dillon
also argues that the post-secular is applicable to the United States, whereas Habermas
stated that it could only be applicable to societies that had experienced notable
secularisation and where religion has resurged, such as Europe. Dillon sees the post-
secular applicable to the U.S. because the post-secular takes religion’s public relevance
and the effect of religious ideas on civic discourse into account. Even though the
American society is still largely religious, Americans presume they live in a secular
society and are typically autonomous in deciding their form of worship. Dillon also argues
that the U.S. is secular because of its strictly separated church and state, despite the clear
visibility of religion in politics and culture. The public is also very aware of this separation
and it affects the public opinion and legislative and policy debates. (Dillon 2012,
257−258.)
Michiel Leezenberg (2010) criticises Habermas’s conception and definition of the post-
secular for Eurocentrism. Habermas portrays the concept of the post-secular as only
applicable to modern Western European states but Leezenberg argues that Habermas’s
definition is based on many unwarranted assumptions, so he calls for the redefinition of
the post-secular so that it would be applicable more generally. Leezenberg also questions
the nature of the post-secular and whether it is, in fact, a normative ideal, empirical
analytical concept, or a mere catchphrase. (Leezenberg 2010, 92−92.) It seems that the
term can function both as an empirical analytical concept and as a normative ideal.
Habermas’s later work emphasises the meaning of the post-secular as a phase following
a secular, secularist or secularised time, where the post-secular becomes a matter of
consciousness. During this phase people reject the previous secularist conviction of the
eventual disappearance of religion due to the process of modernisation. (Ibid., 94.)
Leezenberg also criticises Habermas’s way of portraying modernisation and
secularisation as linear processes, so that a successful modernisation should always lead
to societies which base their policies on secularist, or at least non-fundamentalist,
principles, even though this view can be contested. Leezenberg also considers
Habermas’s notion of the separateness of public and private spheres misleading.
According to Habermas’s linear temporal imagery, the re-emergence of religion in
political matters should be an anomaly in an irreversible process of modernisation and
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secularisation, not only because it should not happen in this process and because it breaks
the differentiation between the private and public spheres. Leezenberg further argues that
the assumption of linear temporality has no empirical or historical evidence to support it
and that Habermas’s concept “fails to do justice to the typically if not essentially contested
nature of religion, and its potential role as an arena or focus of struggles for power and
cultural legitimacy.” (Leezenberg 2010, 95−95.) Terms “modern” and “secular” can be
used consciously to frame one society or opinion secularised and the other religious, and
thus legitimating the secularly presented argument while illegitimating the religious
(ibid., 100). Leezenberg uses the Muslim Middle East as an example of the weaknesses
of Habermas’s assumptions since Habermas’s assumption of the differentiation of the
public and private spheres are not applicable there and this separation has not been their
path to modernity (see e.g. Leezenberg 2010, 107; Dias & Beaumont 2010, 268).
Leezenberg argues that a better approach to the post-secular would be redefining the
different spheres of life so that the new definition would “trace the history, or genealogy,
of religion and secularism against a background of changing metadiscursive regimes”.
This would, according to him, allow scholars to better research the new nature and role
of religion, not just in modern Western Europe but all around the world, and explain the
remaining, and some would say misleading, master narratives of secularism and
secularisation. (Leezenberg 2010, 111.)
Candice Dias and Justin Beaumont (2010) acknowledge Leezenberg’s criticism of
Habermas’s definition of the post-secular and extend it to Habermas’s claims about the
role of religion in the United States. According to them, Habermas fails to grasp the state
of historical religiosity in the U.S. politics by claiming that religion was reintroduced to
politics  in  the  U.S.  only  during  George  W.  Bush’s  era,  even  though  Bill  Clinton  had
already granted religious institutions roles as government assistants. Dias and Beaumont
claim that by ignoring the previous role of religion and connections between
neoconservatives and the religious right, Habermas mistakenly considers the pre-George
W. Bush era and the pre-9/11 United States largely secular. (Dias & Beaumont 2010,
268−269.)
Dias and Beaumont (2010, 269−270) argue that the U.S. is currently in a state of late
secularism, using Charles Taylor’s concept of the thirds sense of secularity and Robert
Baird’s term late secularism. They argue that religious actors in the U.S. supplement
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governmental actions in reaching goals that are secular by nature, such as community
welfare, which does not constitute a post-secular state or a Habermasian secular state, but
rather a state of late secularism (ibid., 277−278). In other words, Dias and Beaumont’s
argument is that the U.S. has not passed a secular stage but rather remains in a form of
secularism and cannot thus be called post-secular in its Habermasian sense. Treating
secularism as a flexible concept enables the recognition of multiple layers of interaction,
unlike classical views of secularism that classify interaction as either religious or secular.
This way the presence or mentioning of religion does not automatically lessen the value
of other elements in the interaction. (Ibid., 275.)
Thus, what is similar in the concepts of the post-secular and late secularism is that they
both aim to identify features of society or interaction that might be ignored if examined
only through the lens of classical secularism. The problematisation of using terms
“secular” and “religious” in legitimisation or de-legitimisation purposes is not central to
this  research  as  the  purpose  of  this  study  is  not  to  examine  the  legitimacy  of  the
presidents’ policies from any subjective point of view. However, how the concepts of the
post-secular and late secularism help to respond to the research problem is that they
enable the analysis of the relationship between religion and politics from a new approach,
which is not as restricted as the traditional understanding of the secular.
If  scholars are to take on a post-secular view on discussing and analysing religion, not
only does it require a new way of thinking about religion, it also compels scholars to think
about the secular differently than before. If religion is defined as particular, “charged”,
identity-forming practices and not just the traditional way as a set of ideas, beliefs, values
and doctrines, scholars will be able to analyse practices and institutions that have similar
function as “traditional religions” but have been left out of the discussion before. (Smith
2012, 161.) A post-secular approach may then enable scholars to take phenomena that are
previously thought to be secular into consideration when researching religiosity and the
relationship between the secular and sacred.
A debatable issue regarding the post-secular is whether it is a descriptive term or a
normative program. As a descriptive term it would be a counterargument to secularisation
theory,  answering  questions  about  the  level  of  religiosity  in  the  modern  world.  As  a
normative ideal, the post-secular would work as a guideline to the society and scientists
on how to counter secularism’s normative doctrines. (Smith 2012, 163.) This study does
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not discuss the matter of whether the post-secular is a descriptive term as this study does
not discuss the success or failure of the secularisation theory, or whether it is a normative
program, nor will it seek to answer whether the U.S. society is religious, secular or post-
secular. The concept of the post-secular is used to analyse the role and influence of
religious beliefs in a supposedly secular state. Applying the concept of the post-secular
also makes it possible to approach the matter in a way that enables to discuss religious
phenomena that are not religious in the traditional sense of the word, such as the American
civil religion.
According to Hent de Vries (2012, 108) Barack Obama represents a post-secular style of
politics. In his article Simple Ideas, Small Miracles: The Obama Phenomenon he
discusses Obama’s political theology, which he defines as “a theologically inspired,
informed and inflected politics, characterized […] by its ‘deep pragmatism’” (ibid.). De
Vries describes Obama as an atypical Democrat regarding the question of the relationship
between religion and politics as he argues that Obama’s administration advocated actively
for the realignment of religion in the public sphere (ibid., 119). Thus, applying the concept
of the post-secular in a narrower sense to politics instead of the entire society is possible.
The concept of the post-secular provides a useful approach to analyse Obama’s politics,
and considering the close relationship between religion and politics during the George W.
Bush, the concept of the post-secular is applicable to the Bush administration’s policies,
too. Although it has been established that a relationship between the Bush administration
and religion, more precisely the Christian Right, existed, the nature of the relationship
between the administration’s policies and religious beliefs in general is not yet resolved.
3.3. The American civil religion
It may be argued that the American civil religion was able to be born because of the
religious plurality in the U.S. Because of the plurality, no single form of religion could
achieve a strong enough position to offer all people a generalised meaning, but a common
meaning that would bring diverse people together was needed, however. Thus, the
American  civil  religion  formed to  fill  this  void  as  a  substitute  for  a  belief-system that
could provide meaning to all people. (Hammond 1980, 121−122.)
The term “civil religion” originates from Rousseau’s work. To Rousseau, civil religion
means a devotion to a country that rivals the devotion to some faith. (Torpey 2012, 285.)
According to Robert Bellah (1970/1967, 172), Rousseau’s conception of civil religion
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was based on the following principles: the existence of God, life after death, “the reward
of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance.” Bellah’s
conception  of  civil  religion,  which  he  first  introduced  in  his  essay Civil Religion in
America, originally published in 1967, is a broader model than Rousseau’s. Bellah’s
definition of the American civil religion is central when discussing the different aspects
of the American civil religion but it is also widely criticised, which is why a further review
of Bellah’s definition of the American civil religion and its criticism is necessary.
According to Bellah (1975, 3), citizens can interpret their “historical experience in the
light of transcendent reality” through civil religion. Bellah argues that a certain kind of a
religious dimension, a well institutionalised civil religion exists in the U.S. According to
him, this religious dimension exists separately from any church and must be given the
same attention as to any other religion. This public religious dimension that is expressed
in a set of beliefs, symbols and rituals, is what Bellah calls the American civil religion.
(Bellah 1970/1967, 168, 171.) Thus, Bellah does not distinguish sharply whether what he
calls the American civil religion is an actual religion or just a religious dimension. This
question has been central in the criticism towards his argument. Richard John Neuhaus
argues that the American civil religion is, in fact, only an understanding of the U.S.
marked by a religious dimension and not a religion comparable to Christianity, Hinduism
and Islam, for example. Neuhaus does not deny the possible existence of civil religions
elsewhere but argues that a civil religion does not exist in the U.S. (Neuhaus 1986,
100−101.)
Neuhaus bases his argument on several characteristics or criterion that religions should
fulfil but the so called American civil religion does not. First, religions have certain cultic
aspects, for example the celebration of certain events and beliefs that construct
understanding of the reality. Second, religions have in some ways, formally or otherwise,
accepted leaders with sacred authority. Third, religions have explicitly defined ways of
determining who is a member and who is not. Fourth, explicit or implicit statements of
beliefs exist, and incorrect beliefs are often condemned. Fifth, there is a moral code
regarding the connection between belonging to the religion and individual and corporate
behaviour. And lastly and most importantly, a religion embodies all the characteristics in
an institutionalised way, or there is at least effort to bind all these elements together to
make the religion and its claims identifiable. Neuhaus argues that Bellah’s definition of
the American civil religion fails to reflect these characteristics sufficiently and coherently
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and cannot therefore be called a religion. (Neuhaus 1986, 101.) Leroy S. Rouner agrees
with Neuhaus in the sense that he does not consider the American civil religion an actual
religion in any socio-historic way but does not agree with Neuhaus’s and Bellah’s later
adoption of the term public philosophy either, since according to him, it does not
sufficiently reflect the binding power of civil religion (Rouner 1986, 129).
In  addition  to  a  large  debate  on  whether  the  American  civil  religion  is  a  religion  or
something else, there is much debate on what the phenomenon that Bellah calls the
American civil religion should be called correctly. Bellah acknowledges that the term he
chose turned out to be unexpectedly provocative but at least it stirred vivid conversation,
which might not have happened had he chose to use terms such as “political religion”,
“religion of the republic” or “public piety” instead. (Bellah 1980, 3−4.)
Bellah uses John F. Kennedy’s inauguration address of January 20th, 1961, as an example
of the presence of the American civil religion in speeches of previous presidents of the
United States. Kennedy mentions God in the first two paragraphs and the closing
paragraph of his address, which could indicate that religion has an irrelevant position in
the American society, since religious references are not made when discussing serious
matters in the middle of the speech. Bellah notes that other presidents, too, tend to
mention God in ceremonial situations, which might mean that the significance of religion
is merely ceremonial. One might also say that the president of the United States must
refer to God in order to maintain popularity and not to lose votes. (Bellah 1970/1967,
168−169.) However, Bellah argued that rituals and their significance cannot be ignored
just because they are “merely” rituals. He writes that what people say on solemn
situations, often reflect the deep-set values and commitments of the society, and
examining them might reveal something important about religion in the U.S. Another
interpretation can be drawn, however, from the way in which Kennedy speaks of God.
Kennedy does not make references to any specific God, but rather to a general concept of
God that every American can be expected to recognise, which could indicate the lessened
significance of religion. Thus, the question is whether religion has significance only as a
concept and not for its content. Examining the true significance of religion in the political
life and people’s private lives is important since it reflects how civil religion relates to
these different spheres of life. (Bellah 1970/1967, 169−170.)
The paragraphs of John F. Kennedy’s inauguration address in question are as follow:
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We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom—
symbolizing an end as well as a beginning—signifying renewal as well as
change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn
oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago.
The  world  is  very  different  now.  For  man  holds  in  his  mortal  hands  the
power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life.
And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are
still at issue around the globe—the belief that the rights of man come not
from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.
[…]
Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of
us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of
you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final
judge  of  our  deeds,  let  us  go  forth  to  lead  the  land  we  love,  asking  His
blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly
be our own. (John F. Kennedy, 1961.)
A study published in 1983 argues that the American civil religion has existed and been
visible in the U.S. presidents’ speeches since the times of George Washington (Toolin
1983). The study examined religious references in 49 presidential inaugural addresses
from George Washington to Ronald Reagan, and its findings proved that almost 90
percent of the addresses had references to a deity of some sort. Some of the references
were explicit enough to be identifiable as results of a Judeo-Christian tradition. However,
more important for the examination of the American civil religion were the references
concerning the people and history of the U.S. Themes such as the Constitution and some
particular presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt and especially
Washington, were prominent in the addresses, with the Constitution treated almost as a
sacred book. (Ibid., 40−43.) Toolin (1983, 45) argued that the civil religion serves three
basic functions: culture binding, culture affirmation, and legitimation. This further
provides proof of the existence of the American civil religion and of the ritual-like role
of the inaugurations, as the inaugural addresses of previous U.S. presidents clearly
reproduce the American civil religion.
The separation of church and state in the U.S. secures religious freedom but also separates
religion from the public life, which may explain the ambiguous nature of the God in
question. The exact nature of any president’s faith is not, or should not be, relevant in
their actions as a public servant. The reason why the president is even able to speak about
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religion despite the separation of state and church is, according to Bellah, that the
separation has not prevented a religious dimension from existing in the political realm, a
religious dimension that is the American civil religion. (Bellah 1970/1967, 170−171.) A
common American conception of religion has influenced the evolution of American
institutions and affect different spheres of American life, including the political sphere.
The inauguration of a president functions as a religious legitimation of the highest
political authority, among other things, and is an important ceremonial event in the
American civil religion. (Ibid., 171.)
The reason why religious legitimation and attributing the highest sovereignty to God is
important is that the popular democratic vote itself does not offer sufficient criterion of
right and wrong and does not provide an “ultimate significance”, as Bellah expresses it
(Bellah 1970/1967, 171). The motto, “In God we trust” and including “under God” in the
pledge to the flag, among others, serve as signs of attribution of the highest authority to
God, which provides the higher standards according to which actions should be judged.
By swearing an oath not only to the people but also to God, the presidents extend their
obligation to the higher criterion, God. Bellah describes Kennedy’s inauguration address
as an expression of the divine duty of the U.S. to carry out God’s will on earth, a theme
that is deeply imbedded in the American culture. (Ibid., 171−172.)
The American Civil War brought another important theme to the American civil religion:
a  theme  of  death,  sacrifice  and  rebirth,  symbolised  by  the  life  and  death  of  Abraham
Lincoln. This new theme of citizens giving their lives for the survival of the nation has
clear Christian symbolism, without a connection to the Christian Church. The new theme
is expressed both physically and ritualistically. Symbolically in national cemeteries, such
as Gettysburg National Cemetery and Arlington National Cemetery, ritualistically on the
Memorial Day, for example. The public school system provides an effective context for
the cultic celebration of the rituals of the American civil religion, for example on Veterans
Day and on the birthdays of Washington and Lincoln. (Bellah 1970/1967, 177−179.)
Bellah notes that the God of American civil religion is austere in the sense that His focus
is on law and order rather than love and salvation. The God is, however, deeply involved
in the events of history and cares especially for the U.S. (Bellah 1970/1967, 175.) Bellah
argues that the set of beliefs, symbols and rituals that constructed the American civil
religion developed since the founding of the United States and institutionalised in the U.S.
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society.  The  result  was  a  civil  religion  that  has  its  roots  in  Christianity  but  is  general
enough to satisfy the non-Christians of the nation. However, the emerged civil religion is
not completely generic, but has rather specific notions about America, which allows the
civil  religion  to  be  used  as  a  tool  for  national  religious  self-understanding.  (Ibid.,
175−176.) Rouner (1986, 128) argues that civil religion in the U.S. has enabled the
multicultural  and  pluralist  society  to  work  and  not  fall  apart  by  providing  people  a
common identity, a shared sense of home.
Bellah clarifies to his critics that the American civil religion does not mean worshiping
the American nation itself but “the subordination of the nation to ethical principles that
transcend it and in terms of which it should be judged.” He argues that all nations and
peoples will come to a religious understanding of themselves. (Bellah 1970/1967, 168.)
Much of the American civil religion is based on biblical events and themes, such as
Chosen People and Promised Land, but the U.S. also has its own martyrs, solemn rituals
and sacred events, for example the inauguration of a new president. (Ibid., 175.) The
American civil religion revolves around the thought that the U.S. must behave in the way
that God intended it and make the nation an example for all other nations: it is the credo
of the purpose of the U.S. (Rouner 1986, 136; Bellah 1970/1967, 175). The civil religion
binds the American society together and creates a common identity by creating loyalty to
values that transcend the nation and give it a purpose. These values in the American civil
religion include sacrificial love and freedom of the individual. What makes the American
civil religion a civil religion rather that a public philosophy, according to Rouner, is the
binding power that a religious loyalty to these values induce. (Rouner 1986, 133.)
Thus, it may be argued that the American civil religion is ultimately based on Christianity
and hence has many Christian characteristics. However, it is important to note that it is
not  analogous  to  nor  the  same  as  Christianity.  The  American  civil  religion  is  often
conceived by religious leaders, for example, as a corrupted version of actual Christian
faith and as a false religion that threatens true religions (Neuhaus 1986, 102; Rouner 1986,
128). It may be argued that especially Protestants, among other religious groups, may
influence the U.S. foreign policy in varying degrees. When identifying religious
implications in policy-making or political addresses, it is important to consider whether
the policy or address were affected directly by a religious group or the American civil
religion. They probably are connected with regards to Christianity, but sometimes it may
be hard to distinguish. However, the American civil religion expresses itself in ambiguous
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references to religious concepts that all citizens can relate to, which helps in
distinguishing which references are influenced by pure religion and which by the
American civil religion.
The exact nature of what Bellah originally called the American civil religion is still highly
debatable, but what seems clear is that the different concepts are used to depict an aspect
of the American society that provides a religious interpretation of the nation’s identity
and purpose. Thus, there is clearly a phenomenon to be studied but no consensus on what
to call it. The purpose of including the American civil religion in the theoretical
framework of this study is not to determine whether it is a religion or not, but to examine
the religiosity of concepts that are seemingly secular, such as freedom or the purpose of
the nation, but what are interpreted religiously in the U.S. for what seems like an attempt
to unify the nation and construct a shared understanding of self as members of the nation.
If  one  compares  the  concept  of  the  American  civil  religion  to  a  classic  definition  of
religion, like Neuhaus did, it may be argued that the American civil religion is not an
actual religion in the traditional sense of the word. However, as the definition of religion
is  a  matter  of  wide  discussion,  Neuhaus’s  definition  is  not  the  only  way  to  determine
whether a certain set of beliefs counts as a religion. The definition of religion, however,
is a question for theologians and scholars of religion.
The viability of American civil religion is often questioned, and a timely question
concerning the subject of this study is whether it can survive after the 9/11 attacks and
the following prospect of diminished tolerance towards religious diversity (Turner 2012,
145).
3.4. Conclusion
As interpretations of the meaning of secularism vary, it is often unclear what kinds of
phenomena the term secular strictly refers to. In general, the term refers to the separation
of church and state, and it may also be understood normatively as a political doctrine that
advocates for tolerance, neutrality, religious freedom and equality. (Berg-Sørensen 2010,
1, 3.) Bhargava (2013, 21) introduces three levels of disconnection between religion and
state which can be used to examine the relationship between church and state. However,
of the three levels of ends, institutions, and law and public policy, only the first-level of
disconnection, level of ends, can properly be applied to a limited aspect of politics, such
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as the topic of this study, as the second- and third-level disconnections concern politics
and society on a broader level.
Charles Taylor’s concept of the third sense of secularity, or what Dias and Beaumont
(2010) refer to as late secularism using Baird’s term, refers to the state in which the role
of religion in a society has transformed into one option among others rather than being
the default. The concept forms an interesting discussion with the concept of the post-
secular. The terms refer to similar phenomena but choosing one term over the other
depends on whether one believes that the society in question remains in a secular state or
not. However, because this study does not make conclusions about the state of the entire
U.S. society but only about a small fraction of U.S. politics, the concept of late secularism
is better applied to other studies. I short, in this research secularism will be used as a
normative doctrine to analyse the secularity, i.e. some form of separation between
religious beliefs and politics, in Bush’s and Obama’s discourses about the fight against
terrorism.
Jürgen Habermas has had great influence in forming the concept of the post-secular, albeit
views about the concept still vary. The concept of the post-secular may be understood as
an answer to the misconceptions of the secularisation theory, as religions have maintained
their significance in many societies contrary to the expectations of the secularisation
theory. The concept may also be understood as a new way of relating to religions and
their relationship with states. (Knott 2010, 34; Berg-Sørensen 2013, 3.) It is also debated
whether the concept of the post-secular can be applied to the United States. Habermas
mainly considers the concept applicable to Western Europe, whereas Michelle Dillon, for
example, argues that it is also applicable to the U.S. due to the separation of church and
state and the assumption that many Americans have about living in a secular society
(Dillon 2012, 257−258). Thus, despite the clear visibility of religion in the American
politics and culture, it may be argued that the U.S. is or was secular, making the concept
of the post-secular applicable.
In this study, the concept of the post-secular is used to analyse the relationship between
religious beliefs and a particular foreign policy theme, the fight against terrorism, in a
supposedly secular state. The post-secular is a part of the theoretical framework because
it enables the analysis of many forms of religious belief, including the American civil
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religion, instead of merely traditional religions. In this way, the relationship between
religious beliefs and politics can be examined more comprehensively.
Robert Bellah defined the American civil religion as the independent public religious
dimension  that  exists  in  the  political  realm  of  the  U.S.  This  religious  dimension  is
expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols and rituals that are based on Christianity but have
developed  to  be  general  enough to  satisfy  the  non-Christians  of  the  American  society.
(Bellah 1970/1967, 168, 171, 175−176.) The reason why the American civil religion is
included in the theoretical framework of this research is closely connected to the reason
why the post-secular is part of the theoretical framework: so that religious phenomena
that are not traditionally considered religious can be included in the analysis. Whether or
not the American civil religion is a religion comparable to recognised religions makes no
significance for this study as the focus will be on the religious beliefs concerning the U.S.
that the phenomena named the American civil religion contains and analysing how they
influence the discourses about the fight against terrorism.
The three components of the theoretical framework provide this research a versatile and
comprehensive approach to the analysis of the relationship between religious beliefs and
politics. This approach does not ignore the influence of religious beliefs that are not
straightforwardly connected to recognised religion such as Christianity, which a simpler
theoretical framework would not enable.
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4. MATERIAL AND METHODOLOGY
4.1. Research material
The analysis includes eight addresses given by George W. Bush and nine addresses by
Barack Obama during their two-term presidencies. The total of 17 speeches consists of
seven State of the Union Addresses from both presidents, one inaugural address from
Bush and two inaugural addresses from Obama. Bush’s first inaugural address is not
included in the research material as the War on Terror had not started during the time of
Bush’s first inauguration. Bush’s addresses were given between January 2002 and
January 2008, and Obama’s between January 2009 and January 2016. The addresses are
retrieved from the presidency archive of the Miller Center (Miller Center 2018).
The president of the United States is required by the Constitution to give the Congress
information and recommendations about the State of the Union. While the Constitution
does not specify when the addresses are to be given, it was eventually established that the
message should be given to the Congress annually, except for the year that the president
is elected. The addresses discuss a wide range of affairs: budget, economy and any other
relevant domestic and foreign policy issues. (History,  Art  &  Archives,  U.S.  House  of
Representatives 2018.) George Washington’s inauguration started the tradition of
inaugural addresses. Inaugural addresses do not have any official contentual
requirements, but they usually present the president’s vision about the nation and its
future. (The Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies 2018.)
State of the Union Addresses were chosen as research material because despite the
members of the Congress changing, the context of the addresses remains the same to a
large extent, which facilitates critical discourse analysis. While the language and even
discourses might change depending on the audience to which the president gives his
speech, it can be expected that the language in the State of the Union Addresses is not
specifically coloured or aimed at one certain group of people, as the speech is given to
Congress and a diverse crowd with both opposing and agreeing views. Thus, the contexts
of the speeches remain similar to one another and the analysis becomes more trustworthy
than if the analysis examined speeches that were given to a religious crowd, for example,
which can be expected to include more religious vocabulary. The inaugural addresses
were included in the research material for the important role they have as rituals of the
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American civil religion, so that the influence of the American civil religion can be
examined more thoroughly.
The State of the Union Addresses are lengthy; Bush’s addresses are over 5000 words
except for his first one, which is roughly 3800 words. Obama’s speeches are even longer,
his shortest one being over 6000 words and the longest over 7000 words. Inaugural
addresses are significantly shorter, Bush’s address being roughly 1700 words and
Obama’s addresses around 2200. However, as the State of the Union Addresses discuss
a  wide  range  of  topics  and  both  foreign  and  domestic  policy,  not  nearly  all  of  the
addresses’ content is relevant for this study. The relevant sections were chosen by topic,
i.e. when the presidents discussed their administration’s acts regarding the fight against
terrorism or when they addressed their foreign policies in a broader manner. The analysis
of this study solely concerns these relevant sections.
4.2. Methodology and method
The analysis of this study is conducted using critical  discourse analysis (CDA). To be
more specific, the method applied to the analysis of the research material follows a
methodological approach and concept of discourse introduced by Norman Fairclough.
The basic ideas of CDA are largely shaped by the work of Fairclough and Teun A. van
Dijk, for example. Discourse analysis, in general, is ultimately text analysis. There are
many versions of discourse analysis: some versions focus on detailed analyses of texts
and some on the discourses and their influence on a more general level. In social sciences,
discourse analysis is often based on the work of Michel Foucault, and linguistics do not
play such an important part in the analysis. (Fairclough 2003, 2−3.) This study uses an
approach that includes linguistic analysis but focuses also on the content and influence of
the constructed discourses. Critical discourse analysis seeks to develop methods and
theory that can coherently examine the relationship between language, power and
ideology, and reveal politically or ideologically invested practices and conventions in and
behind texts. Critical discourse analysts are also committed to political intervention and
social change. (Machin & Mayr 2012, 4.) Before discussing critical discourse analysis
further, it is necessary to introduce its key concepts and premises; social constructivism
and the concept of discourse.
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4.2.1 Social constructivism
Even though there are several variations of critical discourse analysis, what they have in
common is the idea of language as a social construction. This means that language is
understood to shape and be shaped by society and construct social reality. (Jokinen, Juhila
& Suoninen 2004, 17; Machin & Mayr 2012, 4.) Due to this this specific view of the
social world, some argue that discourse analysis should not be characterised as a clearly
defined method but rather as a loose theoretical framework that provides various
methodical applications (Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2004, 17). Discourse analysis
examines how reality is constructed by language and has thus theoretical connections to
social constructivism (Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2002, 39; Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009,
228).
Social constructivism is a highly diverse and multi-faceted type of philosophy of science
which contains the idea that reality is socially constructed. Social constructionist studies
often analyse something that is taken for granted as truth to break this conception
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, 15, 23−24). Social constructivists, such as pioneers of
social constructivism Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, assume that the social order
is a human product, created to bring stability into people’s lives. Kenneth J. Gergen
emphasises the importance of language and the local nature of knowledge: he argues that
knowledge can never be objective or absolute but is always tied to human practice. (Ibid.,
26, 30.)
Discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis see language as action that not only
portrays the world, but constructs, changes, rearranges and reproduces social reality.
Language creates meaning and thus constructs to the topics it discusses. Social practices
produce significations and meanings; thus, they are not born arbitrary from the minds of
individual people. (Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2004, 18, 21.) This view is acknowledged
in this study as the analysis of social practices is included in the method, as well as the
role of language in constructing ideas and discourses.
Not only does social constructivism affect the choices the researcher makes concerning
the objective, research questions, and analytical tools of their research when using
discourse analysis, it also affects the way in which the relationship between researcher
and their object of study is conceived. The nature of this relationship is also seen as
constructive in the sense that on the one hand, the researcher depicts social reality by their
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findings, but on the other hand also constructs it. The work of the researcher must then
also be regarded reflexively. (Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 2002, 40−41.) Reflection
enables researchers to examine the extent to which they are able to portray different
phenomena without constructing them in the usual, expected manner (Jokinen, Juhila &
Suoninen 2004, 24).
4.2.2. Discourse
Many disciplines use different versions of discourse analysis, which is why terms such as
“discourse” and “discourse analysis” have various meanings (Schiffrin, Tannen &
Hamilton 2001, 1). Generally, discourse refers to something that is not just grammar or
semantics but a broader idea that is communicated by a text. Discourses express social
values and ideas and contribute to the reproduction of social life, thus affecting the way
we see the world and effectively influencing the way the world is built. Discourse can be
defined as a framework of interpretation that consists of ideas and events. Individual
semiotic choices of different actors may influence how people place ideas and events
within the framework, thus producing different associations and affecting the way people
conceive the world and reality. (Machin & Mayr 2012, 20−21.)
Thus, discourse is not only sentences and language, but language use in its particular
context (Pietikäinen 2000, 57). Two different definitions of discourses, derived from two
linguistic paradigms, the functionalist and formalist, can be distinguished. The formalist
definition focuses on the structure and form of language and regard language as an
autonomous system, whereas the structuralist definition studies language in its relation to
its social functions, thus conceiving language as a social phenomenon. Following these
concepts of language, a formalist type of discourse analysis is concerned with the
structure and forms as discourse, while a functionalisticly inspired approach focuses on
the functions, variations and uses of discourse. However, to conduct a comprehensive
analysis,  one  would  have  to  combine  aspects  of  both  views  since  either  is  not  enough
alone. It may be difficult since the approaches have different assumptions about language,
but including both structure and function in the analysis of discourses is nonetheless
important. (Ibid., 58−59.) This study adopts a mainly structuralist definition of discourse
and language because the focus of the analysis will be on the relationship between
language and social functions and how discourses operate and are consciously used.
However, although the functionalisticly inspired approach is more dominant in this study,
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the formalist approach cannot be ignored and it necessarily visible in the analysis of the
structure and form of language and discourse, which is an important part of CDA.
Discourses are social and dialogic in nature. They vary depending on the situation,
institutions, social customs, and participants that shape them. Different situations, social
classes and people have different meanings for words, which consequently alters
discourse. Discourse can also take the form of knowledge, although not every discourse
is accepted as knowledge by everyone. Thus, a hierarchy between discourses exists.
(Macdonell 1986, 1−2.) Discourses can be described as systems of meanings that are
constructed within social practices and construct social reality (Jokinen, Juhila &
Suoninen 2004, 26−27).
Ian Parker (1992) distinguishes several features of discourse. First, he argues that
discourses are actualised in texts, which is why discourse analysis is interested in texts
and not so much on the authors of the texts as individuals. Second, discourses are about
objects; discourses are sets of meanings that constitute an object, and thus they provide
meaning or a “life” to objects that they discuss. Third, discourses contain subjects. This
refers to how discourses can attract individuals to assume certain positions of personality,
in other words, discourses affect the way we conceive ourselves in certain situations and
how  we  behave  in  them.  Fourth,  a  discourse  is  a  coherent  system  of  meaning  that  is
formed by the metaphors, analogies, and images that the discourse uses to portray reality.
Fifth, a discourse refers to other discourses. Discourses are entwined with other
discourses, borrowing analogies and metaphors from each other. Thus, a contradiction
within a certain discourse may be the effect of some other discourse. Sixth, a discourse
reflects on its own way of speaking, which means that it is possible to find aspects of a
discourse that comments on the choices of words and terms included in it. Examining the
internal contradictions of discourses is of interest to discourse analysis, also. Finally,
Parker claims that discourses are historically located. Discourses are not static but located
in time and history, which is why their origin and change should be pinpointed. (Parker
1992, 6−17; Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen 1994, 60−63.)
Parker also introduces three auxiliary criteria for discourse, which are important to
consider especially in the context of critical discourse analysis. First, they support
institutions by acting as practices that reproduces the material basis of the institutions, i.e.
as discursive practices. Second, discourses reproduce power relations. Institutions, for
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example, entail power relations and reproduce them, which in itself forms a connection
between power and discourse. However, it is important to remember that power and
discourse do not always involve each other. And lastly, discourses have ideological
effects, although it is important to note that not all discourses are ideological in nature.
(Parker 1992, 17−20.)
4.2.2.1. Fairclough’s three-dimensional concept
The critical discourse analysis applied to this research is based on Norman Fairclough’s
approach, and thus it is also deeply connected Fairclough’s concept of discourse.
Fairclough sees discourses as three-dimensional concepts that consists of social practices,
discursive practices and texts (see e.g. Fairclough 1992, 73). Fairclough portrays the
concept as pictures in two ways that illustrate the dimensions of the concept and also the
levels of analysis it requires (see Figures 4.1. and 4.2.). The Figure 4.1. forms the frame
of the critical discourse analysis conducted in this study.
Figure 4.1.: Fairclough’s three-dimensional concept of discourse (Fairclough 1992,
73).
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Figure 4.2.: Fairclough’s concept of discourse as text, interaction and context
(Fairclough 1989, 25).
The three-dimensional model of discourse attempts to connect three analytical traditions
that are important for critical discourse analysis. It combines the traditions of text or
linguistic analysis, the macro-sociological tradition of analysing social practice in relation
to social structures, and the “interpretivist or micro-sociological tradition of seeing social
practice as something which people actively produce and make sense of on the basis of
shared common procedures”. (Fairclough 1992, 72.) The interpretivist claim is that
members of social communities produce their organised worlds, but besides this the way
in which the members’ practices are shaped by social structures, relations of power, and
the nature of social practice must be considered, also (ibid.).
Fairclough uses the term discourse more narrowly than social scientist usually do when
referring to language use. By referring to discourse, Fairclough proposes to view language
as a social practice, rather than purely individual activity. (Fairclough 1992, 63.)
Fairclough defines discursive events as instances of language use that are analysed as
text, discursive practice, and social practice, and texts as the written or spoken language
that is produced in a discursive event (Fairclough 1993, 138). Conceiving discourse in
this way means that discourse is, on the one hand, a mode of action; a way in which people
may act towards the world and each other. On the other hand, the concept also assumes
that dialectical relations exist between discourse and social structure, and between social
structure and social practice. Social structure shapes discourse by class and other social
relations at a societal level, by social institutions such as law and education, by systems
of classification, and by norms and conventions, among others. Discourse is also socially
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constitutive: it in turn shapes all dimensions of social structure by shaping norms and
conventions, and relations, identities and institutions behind it. (Fairclough 1992, 63−64.)
Fairclough introduces three constructive effects of discourse. First, discourses affect the
construction of social identities and subject positions, but this effect should not be over-
emphasised. Second, discourses help in constructing social relationships between people.
And lastly, and most importantly for the subject of this study, discourse contributes to the
construction of systems of knowledge and belief. Fairclough argues that these effects
correspond respectively to three functions of language and dimensions of meaning which
coexist and interact in all discourse. The identity function of language refers to how
discourse enacts identities, the relational function to how social relationships between
discourse participants are formed and negotiated, and ideational function to how texts
signify the world and its processes, entities and relations. (Fairclough 1992, 64.)
According to Fairclough, it is imperative to see the relations between social structure and
discourse as dialectic as it prevents overemphasising the social determination of discourse
and the construction of the social in discourse. Social practice has many orientations, such
as political and ideological, and all of these might have implications of discourse without
being merely discourse. Discourse may, however, be a political or ideological practice,
and thus establish, sustain and alter power relations and the collective entities between
which these power relations exist, such as classes, communities and groups. Discourse
can also function as a political or ideological practice which establishes, sustains and
changes power relations and different collective entities between which power relations
exist, and naturalise certain power relations and ideologies. No particular discourses are
necessarily political or ideological in nature but may be used in a political or ideological
way. Thus, same discourses can be used in various ways. (Fairclough 1992, 65−67.)
Discursive practice is a particular form of social practice. Discursive practice influences
the reproduction of society concerning social identities, social relationships and systems
of knowledge and belief, and also contributes to transforming society. (Fairclough 1992,
65, 71). Discursive practice involves processes of text production, distribution, and
consumption. Context affects how these processes function: text is produced differently
in different situations and contexts. (Fairclough 1992, 78; Fairclough 1993, 138.) Text,
whether spoken or written, is only a part of the social process that discourse is. Text is
the product of the process of production and a resource of the process of interpretation.
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From the perspective of discourse analysis, texts can be perceived as traces of the
productive process and clues in the process of interpretation. (Fairclough 1989, 24.)
Order of discourse refers to the total amount of discursive practices of an institution and
to the relationships between them. Order of discourse is sometimes referred to as
interdiscourse, but Fairclough opts to use the Foucauldian term. It is the structural entity
that underlies discursive events; a complex of related discursive formations that
contributes in determining what can be and should be said by someone in certain
situations. The different parts of an order of discourse, i.e. the different types of discursive
practice, are called elements. The element boundaries may become a focus of contestation
and struggle and might produce the re-articulation of orders of discourse. (Fairclough
1993, 135, 138; Fairclough 1992, 31, 68−69.)
In this study, discourse is understood as Fairclough’s three-dimensional concept. This
choice is made because it supports Fairclough’s approach to CDA and provides grounds
for a systematic and comprehensive analysis. The three-dimensional concept shapes the
framework of the analysis, making it three-dimensional as well, as the analysis consists
of textual analysis and the analyses of discursive practices and social practices.
4.2.3. Critical discourse analysis
Critical discourse analysis includes various different approaches and methods that are
chosen according to the research object (van Dijk 2001, 353; Fairclough 2010, 7). Van
Dijk  argues  that  CDA  is  not  so  much  an  approach  but  rather  a  new  perspective  on
theorising, analysis and application within discourse studies (van Dijk 2001, 352). The
primary focus of CDA is on how power relations and inequalities produce social wrongs,
i.e. the effects of the dialectic relations between power and discourse on other elements
in the society (Fairclough 2010, 8). Van Dijk (2001, 352) states that the primary interest
of CDA is in how “social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted,
reproduced,  and  resisted  by  text  in  the  political  and  social  context.”  With  this  kind  of
analysis, it is useful to study ideologies and how they serve power and produce identities
and power relations by representation (Fairclough 2010, 8). CDA assumes that power is
transmitted and practiced through discourse, and thus, power relations are assumed to be
discursive in nature (Machin & Mayr 2012, 4).
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The ‘criticality’ of critical discourse analysis brings a normative dimension to the
analysis. The analysis is based on certain values about right and wrong and criticises the
grievances of a society. However, it must be noted that different values and ideas of right
and wrong exist and differences between interpretations may occur. However, the critique
may also concern the gaps between what a certain society claims to be and what it really
is. (Fairclough 2010, 7.) With these kinds of studies, debates over the different meanings
of concepts of right and wrong might be less central. The critique is negative if it analyses
how societies maintain social wrongs, or positive if it analyses how they are or could be
abolished (ibid.). This study does not so much criticise the society of the United States,
but rather seeks to prove whether it is accurate to use the term secular in connection to
U.S. policies in the context of the fight against terrorism. Thus, it may be interpreted as
critique towards the unadvised use of the term secular.
CDA is more concerned about how and why different linguistic features are produced in
discourses and what ideological objectives they may serve than just describing these
different features. The critical stance of CDA aims to expose strategies that appear normal
or neutral but are ultimately ideological in nature and seek to shape representation for
some particular aim. (Machin & Mayr 2012, 5.)  In this study, the critical  nature of the
analysis seeks to reveal how, if in some way, the relationship between religious beliefs
and politics is maintained, and how the values and views within the beliefs are maintained
in the society. If the presidents’ addresses and discourses about the fight against terrorism
(re)produce religious beliefs and the American civil religion, the influence of religious
beliefs and their relationship with politics are preserved. This study seeks to resolve
whether the discourses participate in the maintaining of the relationship between religious
beliefs and politics in the context of the fight against terrorism. The addresses and
discourses of U.S. presidents are likely to influence the country’s politics and even the
entire society, which is why the techniques they use to shape representation should be
examined.
What makes critical discourse analysis different from other forms of discourse analysis,
according to van Dijk, is that it tries to explain discourses in terms of social interaction
and social structure features, for example. It studies the relationship between discourse
structures and power and dominance: how discourses legitimate, reproduce, confirm, or
challenge them. The research topics of CDA are mainly social problems and political
issues. (Van Dijk 2001, 353.) Fairclough (2010, 3) argues that CDA has three basic
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characteristics. First, it is relational in the sense that it focuses on social relations rather
than  just  on  entities  and  individuals.  Thus,  CDA  recognises  the  complexity  of  social
relations. Second, CDA is dialectical. Relations between different objects, whether they
are physical objects such as people, institutions or power relations, are understood to have
a dialectic nature which explains why discourse itself cannot be defined as a separate
‘object’. Dialectical relations are relations between objects that are different from one
another but not separate, in the sense that they affect and support each other in some way,
like power and discourse. Power depends partly on how discourse supports its legitimacy
but  states,  for  example,  can  also  use  force  to  maintain  their  power,  which  means  that
power is not completely discourse. They have dialectical relations because state power is
partly discursive in character and these different objects are a part of one another.
Fairclough understands CDA as an analysis of the dialectical relations between discourse
and other objects, elements and moments, and as an analysis of the international relations
of  discourse,  rather  than  as  an  analysis  of  the  discourse  itself.  This  kind  of  approach
crosses the lines of traditional discipline boundaries, which is why the third character of
CDA, according to Fairclough, is that it is transdisciplinary. (Ibid., 3−4.)
Critical discourse analysis was chosen as the method, or perhaps more accurately stated
as the methodology of this study because it suits the aims of this study. CDA fits well to
the analysis of whether the discourses in the addresses of presidents Bush and Obama
maintain the relationship between religious beliefs and politics and reproduce the
American civil religion. The question concerning this study is then ultimately about the
relations between power and discourse, which is why CDA is a suitable choice of
methodology to be included in the framework of this study. When it comes to maintaining
the relationship between religious belief and politics and reproducing the American civil
religion, the question is not perhaps about directly causing inequality or injustice, at least
within the U.S. It is, however, about dominance and hegemony regarding the image of
the global role of the U.S. that is being constructed in the discourses, and about knowledge
and beliefs regarding the relationships between different discourses. CDA, with it many
variations, provide a useful framework for the analysis of how this dominance is
(re)produced, which is why it serves the purpose of this study.
Power, or more specifically social power, is a central notion in most critical work on
discourse. Van Dijk defines power in terms of control: power is the ability to control the
acts and minds of others. Power over others is expressed in many ways, and hegemony is
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but one of them. According to van Dijk, hegemony refers to the integration of the power
of dominant groups to laws, rules, norms and habits. (Van Dijk 2001, 355.) The concept
of hegemony was central in the work of Antonio Gramsci. Fairclough defines it as both
leadership and domination over economic, political, cultural, and ideological domains of
society. Hegemony is not, however, simply dominating the subordinate classes, but
forming alliances and winning their consent by concessions or through ideological means.
Hegemony is a focus of constant struggle that forms political, economic or ideological
domination or subordination. (Fairclough 1992, 91−93.) In this study, the concept of
hegemony is especially important in the analysis of social practices, as that dimension of
the analysis examines the relationship between discourses and ideology and power as
hegemony.
Although the most obvious forms of exercising power are through money or abusive acts
such as force, power can also be exercised inconspicuously, through everyday actions that
are taken for granted. By controlling people’s opinions and knowledge, their actions can
be indirectly influenced as action is controlled by the mind. In other words, by controlling
the most influential discourses, it is also possible to influence the minds and actions of
others. (Van Dijk 2001, 355.) What is of interest to this study, is how the discourses
presidents Bush and Obama construct seek to influence the way in which the U.S. and its
actions are conceived and whether the image has connections to religious beliefs. As the
presidents of the United States, Bush and Obama had great influence over the
representation of U.S. actions in the fight against terrorism. The leaders and most
prominent members, the elites, of different social groups have more access to and control
over various public discourses than “ordinary people”. This access and control regarding
social discourses makes the elites more powerful than the ordinary people if social power
is defined discursively. (Van Dijk 2001, 356.)
Van Dijk (1993, 257) argues that while controlling the discourse is a central form of social
dominance, “modern” power has a clear cognitive dimension: often the exercise of power
includes mind management in the sense that it influences people’s knowledge, beliefs,
understanding, plans, attitudes, norms, values and ideologies. This “public mind” is what
van  Dijk  calls  social  cognition  which  refers  to  “[s]ocially  shared  representations  of
societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations such as
interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning, among others” (ibid.).
Social cognition forms the base that moderates discourse and all social action and from
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which social events, power relations and social institutions are interpreted. Social
cognition forms a bridge between micro- and macro-levels, discourse and action, and
individual and group, and thus forms a link between discourse and dominance. Ideologies
have serious influence on values and norms, which is why ideologies are seen as
important reflections of values, beliefs and interests of certain groups. Ideologies
strategically monitor and organise people’s beliefs and attitudes, even though the specific
way in which they achieve this is yet debatable. (Van Dijk 1993, 257−258.)
Critical discourse analysis is also widely criticised. Some criticise CDA for its lack of
actual criticism, while some take it more of a tool for interpretation than analysis (Machin
& Mayr 2012, 208). One problem with CDA may be its countless approaches as choosing
one particular approach may be quite difficult. While different methodological
approaches within CDA provide versatile and comprehensive approaches to text analysis,
there  is  a  risk  of  getting  distracted  from  the  original  research  question,  resulting  in  a
different analysis than originally expected. (Lassila 2010, 185−186.) CDA’s strive for
interdisciplinarity may be problematic also: the systematic analysis of language may not
always be compatible with a social scientific approach. When examining the relationship
between language and social, linguistics tends to focus on language whereas social
sciences  focus  on  the  social  phenomena.  (Ibid.,  186.)  It  may also  be  argued  that  CDA
favours some meanings of texts while ignoring others and that it does not consider the
intentions of text producers enough (Machin & Mayr 2012, 210−211).
The criticism towards critical discourse analysis is acknowledged in this study. It is
evident that other choices about the structure and choices of methodology and method
could have been made, and that although the analysis will be conducted systematically
and comprehensively, the results may still be argued to be only a matter of interpretation.
Since CDA is criticised for ambiguity and its large number of different approaches, this
study acknowledges it by providing as clear an account of the method and the analysis
process as needed to ensure an overt description of how the analysis was conducted and
the results achieved. This will ensure the transparency of this study and provide grounds
for the results of the analysis.
4.2.4. Applying CDA to this study
Critical discourse analysis is utilised in this study to reveal the discourses that Bush and
Obama construct in their addresses and whether the discourses uphold the relationship
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between religious beliefs and politics in the context of the fight against terrorism, on the
one hand, and reproduce the American civil religion, on the other. The theoretical
framework of this study provides much of the framework for the analysis, as the analysis
seeks to find implications of secularism, religiosity, the post-secular or the American civil
religion in the discourses to examine the relationship between religious beliefs and
politics. Other central concepts in the analysis are hegemony and ideology that examine
the influence of power and ideology in the construction of the discourses and in their
content.
In practice, critical discourse analysis incorporates three dimensions of analysis:
linguistic or textual analysis; analysis of production, comprehension, and the usage of
discourse; and analysis of social practices. Using Fairclough’s terminology, the three-
dimensional analysis contains the analysis of textual practices, discourse practices, and
social practices. Thus, the aim is to analyse different dimensions of discourse. (Fairclough
1992, Pietikäinen 2000, 70.) The analysis is conducted following Fairclough’s model of
critical discourse analysis that is based on his three-dimensional concept of discourse,
which was introduced earlier. The analysis then consists of three parts: 1) text analysis
called “description”, 2) “interpretation” consisting of analysis of discursive practices and
3)  the  analysis  of  social  practices.  (Fairclough 1992,  73.)  The  frame of  the  analysis  is
depicted in the Figure 4.1. in its three-dimensional form: the first dimension of analysis
is the text, the second is the dimension of discursive practice, and the last dimension is
that of social practice.
In this study, the text analysis is conducted using Hilary Janks’s linguistic analysis rubric
(Janks 2005). The rubric provides a systematic way to analyse linguistic features of texts
and is suitable and based on Fairclough’s approach to CDA. The rubric includes several
linguistic features that are to be analysed, such as lexicalisation, transitivity, mood, and
sequencing of information (ibid., 101). The analysis is conducted by examining the
linguistic features mentioned in the rubric. The rubric in full is included in the appendix-
section (Appendix A).
The interpretation process of discursive practices is a multilevel one, and a “bottom-up-
top-down” process. Lower levels of analysis are concerned with analysing words and
sentences, whereas higher level focuses on meaning and how they are created in
sentences, in entire texts, or in parts of them. Meanings of higher level units are partly
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built up from meanings for lower units (bottom-up interpretation), but the interpretation
of  higher  units  also  influences  the  way  that  lower  units  are  interpreted  (top-down
processing). (Fairclough 1992, 80−81.)
Fairclough introduces three main headings that will be used in the analysis of discursive
practice: first, the force of utterances, which examines the speech acts in the texts; second,
the coherence of texts; and third, the intertextuality of texts. These headings form a
framework for the analysis of the aspects of the production and interpretation of texts, as
well as its formal properties. (Fairclough 1992, 75.) Force is the component that has an
active, interpersonal nature and meaning, which illustrates what the text is being used to
do socially and what speech acts it is used to perform. These speech acts can be, for
example, giving an order, asking a question, threatening, or promising something. The
force factor can be quite ambivalent in texts, but context can reduce this ambivalence.
Context helps to explain how certain forms of words can have forces that might be hard
to detect without considering the context. Before an interpretation of the force of the
utterance can be made, an interpretation of the context of the situation must be made. The
interpretation of the context of situation helps in the analysis of the text in the sense that
it helps to predict discursive types that might be relevant and how different elements are
related to each other and their backgrounds. (Ibid., 82−83.)
Fairclough argues that coherence is ultimately a matter of interpretation rather than a text
feature as parts of a text only make sense together if the reader can connect them in some
meaningful way, even without explicit connecting markers within the text. The way in
which readers make sense of texts may rest upon ideological assumptions, which is why
there may be cause to resist or struggle against the automatic assumptions connections
that texts convey. (Fairclough 1992, 83−84.)
The last dimension of analysis is intertextuality. When examining intertextuality, the
focus is on the features that have been borrowed from other texts. The intertextual features
may be clearly visible or merged in. The intertextual perspective may emphasise the
historicity of texts in terms of production, i.e. how they communicate with prior texts. In
terms of distribution, the focus is on predictable transformations of one text to another.
Finally, in terms of consumption, an intertextual perspective helps in illustrating the effect
that other texts have on the interpretation process. Fairclough distinguishes between
manifest intertextuality and interdiscursivity or constitutive intertextuality. Manifest
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intertextuality refers to a heterogenous constitution of texts from other specific texts,
while intertextuality refers to a heterogenous constitution of texts from elements of orders
of discourse. The concept of intertextuality sees texts historically as transforming the past
into present by naturalising certain conventions and texts into routines, for example.
(Fairclough 1992, 84−85.)
Fairclough argues that the analysis of discursive practice should include both micro-
analysis and macro-analysis. Micro-analysis refers to examining how participants
produce and interpret texts by their members’ resources, for example the orders of
discourse. Macro-analysis complements micro-analysis by explaining the nature of the
members’ resources, so that it is possible to produce and interpret texts and examine
whether the resources are drawn upon in normative or creative ways. The interrelationship
between micro- and macro-analyses enable Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework to
mediate the relationship between the dimensions of social practice and text, since the
nature of the social practice determines the macro-processes of discursive practice, and
micro-processes shape the text. (Fairclough 1992, 85−86.)
Fairclough draws upon Althusser’s and Gramsci’s contributions to 20th century Marxism
when discussing discourse as social practice. He discusses discourse in relation to
ideology  and  to  power,  more  specifically  power  as  hegemony.  Fairclough  defines
ideologies as significations or constructions of reality, i.e. the physical world, social
relations, and social identities, which are built into various dimensions of the forms and
meanings of social practices. They also influence the production, reproduction or
transformation of relations of domination. Ideologies work the strongest when they are
embedded and naturalised within discursive practices and become understood as common
sense. (Fairclough 1992, 86−87.) Fairclough argues that ideology is located both in
structures and events. The structures, such as orders of discourse, shape the outcome of
past events and the conditions for current events, and events reproduce and transform
their  conditioning structures.  The features of levels of texts and discourse that may be
especially ideologically invested include word meanings, presuppositions, metaphors,
and coherence. Fairclough states that discourses and discursive practices are ideological
if they include significations that contribute to sustaining or restructuring power relations,
but not every discourse is automatically ideological. (Ibid., 89−90.)
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Because orders of discourse, among other elements, may become ideologically invested,
ideology is also a part of hegemony and hegemonic struggle. Fairclough’s view of
hegemony involves the idea that discursive practice, the production, distribution, and
consumption of texts are a part of hegemonic struggle of the existing order of discourse
and existing social and power relations. Thus, hegemonies have ideological dimensions.
The concept of hegemony helps to explain the relations between particular aspects of
discourse and the nature of the social practices that they are a part of, and the nature of
the discursive practice, such as the socio-cognitive aspects of their production and
interpretation. The concept of hegemony helps in analysing the social practice within
which the discourse belongs in terms of power relations and whether they reproduce,
restructure or challenge existing hegemonies. It also offers a way of analysing discursive
practice as a mode of hegemonic struggle, reproducing restructuring or challenging
existing orders of discourse. Examining hegemonies then enables to analyse the
ideological investment of discursive practices. (Fairclough 1992, 93, 95.)
In short, hegemonic discourses are about knowledge, power and truth becoming
intertwined. A central discussion within the process of discourses becoming hegemonic
is whether the process is intentional with strategic aims or whether the process happens
unknowingly. The actors’ intentions are of no interest to discourse analysis, but it does
not exclude examining the possible aims of the hegemonic discourses. (Jokinen, Juhila &
Suoninen 1993, 89−90.)
Questions that help with analysing the process of discourses becoming hegemonic,
following Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen (1993), include: has simplification replaced
diversity, complexity, and contradiction and in what ways? In what ways did
simplification achieve plausibility? How are the socially constructed nature of knowledge
and practice concealed and how are they naturalised so that they are taken for granted?
Identity-formation is central in the construction of hegemony. Thus, the analysis can
involve the question: how and what kinds of strict, personal identity-bound subject
positions are created for people? Beside simplification, appealing to general consensus is
also a central option of hegemony process. Consensus can be derived from appealing to
experts or to the majority opinion. Thus, one can also ask the text: is consensus used to
legitimise knowledge? Appealing to shared cultural conventions is often highly
influential in reproducing hegemonic discourses. This can be examined by noting what
arguments are effective and are thus often utilised. The last question introduced by
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Jokinen, Juhila and Suoninen is how parts of other systems of meanings are used to
support certain discourses. (Ibid. 89−95.)
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5. ANALYSIS
The analysis is conducted following Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of CDA,
which is based on his three-dimension concept of discourse (see figures 4.2. and 4.2.).
The first part of the analysis, the textual analysis, is conducted using Janks’s (2005)
linguistic analysis rubric and seeks to describe the linguistic features of the texts. The
rubric, included in the appendix-section (Appendix A) is used in the form that it is
presented in this thesis, so that the different aspects that are introduced in the rubric are
examined in the texts, and found linguistic elements are placed in the rubric’s table. This
approach ensures that the analysis is conducted systematically. The second and third parts
of the analysis, the analysis of discursive practices and the analysis of social practice
respectively, are conducted using the framework provided by Fairclough. The analyses
of discursive practice and social practice are connected to each other as they both are
concerned with interpretation processes and discursive practices are also forms of social
practice.
Thus, there is some overlap in the dimensions of the analysis, despite each stage having
their own focal points. The discourses will be discussed in their entirety in the chapter
discussing the analysis of social practices. After the two dimensions of analysis a picture
of the features of the texts and the discourses is formed, so that conclusions about the
discourses and their connections to hegemonic struggles and ideologies can be drawn.
5.1. Textual analysis
The first part of the analysis utilises Janks’s (2005) linguistic analysis rubric, which
guarantees a systematic approach to the analysis. Textual analysis aims to describe the
features of texts to provide an image of the nature, style and content of the texts. All
features included in the rubric were considered in the analysis, but some features proved
out to be more significant in the analysis than other features, as some linguistic features
are more prominent in the addresses. Lexicalisation, voice, mood, pronouns, and the use
of definite article the proved to be the most central linguistic features in Bush’s addresses
in the parts of the texts that were of interest to this study. These features revealed the most
significant information about the addresses, whereas analysis of metaphors, for example,
would not have been fruitful as Bush uses very few metaphors in the context of the War
on Terror.
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With Obama’s addresses, the most significant textual feature to this study was
lexicalisation, as it offered the most material for the analysis. Although Obama’s
addresses are more vivid in language use than Bush’s addresses and include more
metaphors and euphemisms, for example, many of these textual features were not relevant
for this study as the analysis only concerned the relevant sections of the addresses. Bush’s
addresses will be discussed first, and Obama’s addresses with comparisons to Bush’s
addresses are discussed in the following sub-chapter.
5.1.1. Bush’s addresses
The president gives his inaugural addresses and State of the Union Addresses alone. Thus,
there is no turn-taking; Bush is the only one being heard and he alone is in control of the
discussed topics and discourses. Bush uses the phaser War on Terror to refer to the fight
against terrorism, which is why the term is also used in the context of Bush’s addresses.
When discussing the War on Terror and U.S. military operations abroad, Bush’s speeches
retain a similar style and voice throughout his presidency. The voice is most often active,
stressing the U.S. as an active and conscious actor abroad. This certainty is not only
constructed with the active voice but also with lexicalisation. For example, in 2006 Bush
stated: “Our enemies and our friends can be certain:  The United States will  not retreat
from the world, and we will never surrender to evil.” This similar assuring and confident
voice is maintained throughout the speeches. The  voice  turns  passive  when  Bush
discusses one motivating aspect behind the actions abroad, which is his belief that the
U.S. is called to responsibilities in the world (see e.g. Bush 2002; 2003; 2004). However,
it is not entirely concluded who or what is calling the U.S. Without an explicit disclosure,
it may be interpreted that Bush believes the call to come from a higher power, as Bush
(2003) states that: “As our nation moves troops and builds alliances to make our world
safer, we must also remember our calling as a blessed country is to make the world better.”
The mood remains similar thorough the speeches, as Bush makes mainly statements that
imply his sureness about his administration’s policies and the global role of the U.S. Some
offers rather than commands are made, but mainly the mood implies sureness and
confidence about the topics discussed. There are also only few modals, such as may,
might or could will, or adverbs to indicate uncertainty. This confidence can be expected
of political speeches and political discourse, and Bush’s speeches correspond this as they
are written in a way that seeks to show the president’s and his administration’s confidence
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in the U.S. foreign policy regarding the War on Terror, and also increase the audience’s
confidence in it.
Clear divisions are made between the U.S. and others by pronouns us and them. Us is
used to refer to the U.S. and its  citizens,  and even U.S. allies are often excluded from
“us”, as Bush mainly speaks about “the U.S. and our allies” (see e.g. Bush 2002; 2003;
2007). This maintains the image of the U.S. as an exceptional actor and emphasises the
idea of U.S. leadership. Emphasising the exceptionality of the U.S. is connected to the
myth  of  American  exceptionalism,  which  is  also  a  part  of  the  American  civil  religion.
Thus, Bush reproduces the set-up of the American civil religion between the U.S., its
allies and enemies. The speeches, quite expectedly, make clear distinctions between the
U.S. and its enemies in the War on Terror. In his second inaugural address, Bush (2005a)
states: “[A]ll the allies of the United States can know: We honor your friendship; we rely
on your counsel; and we depend on your help. Division among free nations is a primary
goal of freedom's enemies.” Although the allies of the U.S. are not included in “us”, the
importance of amicable relations is emphasised so that the distinction between them and
the U.S. enemies can be contrasted.
Definite article the, according to Janks’s (2005) rubric, is used “for shared information –
to refer to something mentioned before” or to something that the audience can be assumed
to know about. It also reveals textual presuppositions (ibid.). This linguistic technique is
used in the speeches to construct the idea that the views or information presented in the
addresses is commonly shared. Bush uses this technique to reinforce the idea of the U.S.
as a protector of freedom, for example. The emphasis on freedom in Bush’s addresses is
consistent with the connection commonly constructed between U.S. politics and the
advocacy of freedom. Freedom is also a central value in the American civil religion, a
value that binds the U.S. citizens together by their religious loyalty to it (Rouner 1986,
133). Thus, as Bush emphasises the centrality of freedom in the U.S. society and in his
administration’s policies, he is also reproducing the American civil religion.
The phrase “the enemies of freedom” is used to construct a shared image of the enemies
of the U.S. as opposing one of the core values of the U.S., freedom (Bush 2004; 2006).
The phrase implies a strict division between enemies of freedom on the one hand, and
allies of freedom on the other. This constructs strict subject positions and identities: one
is either an advocate of the U.S. concept of freedom or against it. Creating stiff subject-
60
positions and identities, according to Jokinen, Juhila and Suoninen (2004, 92−93), can be
used as a technique to hegemonise discourses. In Bush’s speeches, this technique,
whether it is used consciously or not, emphasises the identity of the U.S. and its citizens
as the allies of freedom and their enemies as enemies of freedom, and constructs the idea
that one can only be for or against freedom and hence either a friend or an enemy of the
U.S. Thus, dividing people and countries into defenders of freedom and enemies of
freedom hegemonises the discourse Bush is constructing.
“The attack on freedom” phrase in Bush’s 2005 State of the Union address further
constructs the shared view of the conflict as a fight for freedom. “The cause of freedom”
is a rather often occurring phrase, mentioned in the State of the Union Addresses of 2004,
2006 and 2007 and the second inaugural address (2005b). In 2006, Bush stated that:
“America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our
special calling: This great Republic will lead the cause of freedom.” Using the definite
article the and creating a recurring phrase constructs the idea that there is shared
knowledge about the nature and cause behind the U.S. military actions abroad. Another
phrase  that  Bush  (2008)  uses  to  construct  a  shared  idea  of  the  nature  of  U.S.  military
actions abroad is “the armies of compassion”, stating: “Tonight the armies of compassion
continue the march to a new day in the gulf coast.” Calling the U.S. military forces the
armies of compassion clearly seeks to construct an idea that the military operations in the
gulf coast are acts of compassion. Furthermore, presenting it as a phrase with the definite
article the in it shows, or show an effort to construct, a presupposition of that being the
truth about the mission. With these phrases, Bush reproduces the foundational myths that
influence the American identity and are a part of the American civil religion. The myth
of American exceptionalism portrays the U.S. as a chosen nation with a higher morals
and purpose (Marsden 2011, 328−329), and Bush reinforces this view by emphasising the
role of the U.S. as a leader of freedom with the value of compassion.
Lexicalisation, the selection of wordings, affect how ideas are constructed (Janks 2005).
Lexical analysis is central to this study since the words that are chosen for Bush’s
addresses construct the idea of the U.S. actions in the War on Terror consciously the way
that the Bush administration wants its policies portrayed. To streamline the analysis,
similar lexicalisations were grouped together in a table that also creates a timeline to see
whether lexicalisation changed during Bush’s presidency. No significant lexicalisation
changes over time were found, despite the increased talk about the “advance of freedom”
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during Bush’s second term as president. The entire original table cannot be fitted in this
work due to its size and length, so an abbreviated version is included in the appendix-
section (Appendix B), to provide an example of the analysis process. The table includes
quotes of interest to the analysis from Bush’s addresses, listed under the year of the speech
they were mentioned in. Similar clauses are situated in same rows to ease making
comparisons.
Different portrayals of freedom and the relationship of the U.S. to it are a central topic in
the addresses. While U.S. interests are mentioned too, the use of U.S. military forces is
portrayed as fighting freedom’s fight, fighting against the enemies of freedom and leading
freedom’s cause (Bush 2002; 2004; 2006). Furthermore, Bush appeals to the divine to
justify the need to protect liberty. In the State of the Union Address of 2003, Bush states
that: “The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity”,
and in 2004 that: “I believe that God has planted in every human heart the desire to live
in freedom”. Thus, the position of the U.S. as a defender of freedom and consequently
the actions in the War on Terror are justified by religious references.
Bush  also  argues  for  his  administration’s  aims  in  the  War  on  Terror  by  appealing  to
American idealism. Bush speaks of the idealism and ideals of the U.S. This idealism
includes the ideals of freedom, ending tyranny, and service to the U.S. and to other people.
Bush (2005b; 2006) speaks of the idealism that the U.S. soldiers portray abroad as their
serve their country and take great risks while doing it, and how some criticise the Bush
administration’s aim to end tyranny as misguided idealism, although Bush claims that the
security of the U.S. depends on it. Appealing to a shared set of ideals is an effective way
to convince people and is a better way to influence secular people than appealing to a
higher power.
Bush argues that freedom has the power to change the world and bring hope and peace
on Earth (Bush 2005b). Doing this, Bush further reinforces the value of freedom and
justifies its centrality in his administration’s foreign policy. Furthermore, this argument
brings more legitimation to U.S. actions in the War on Terror that Bush presents as the
promotion of freedom. The selection of words in Bush’s addresses construct a certain
image that he wants to convey of his policies, and that image is that the U.S., as a defender
of freedom, is with its military actions protecting God’s gift to humanity and thus bringing
peace and hope to humans everywhere. In 2007 and 2008 respectively, Bush expressed
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his beliefs about the nature and consequences by freedom by stating that “[f]ree people
are not drawn to violent and malignant ideologies”, and that the U.S. foreign policy is
based on the premise that “people, when given the chance, will choose a future of freedom
and peace.” Thus, Bush associates particular beliefs with freedom, as he expects that the
freedom’s ability to bring peace is due to the peaceful mindset of free people. He also
reproduces the American civil religion as the emphasis on the good qualities of freedom
reinforces its status as a central American value. In his second inaugural address, Bush
states the following:
By our efforts, we have lit a fire as well, a fire in the minds of men. It warms
those who feel its power. It burns those who fight its progress. And one day
this untamed fire of freedom will  reach the darkest  corners of our world.
(Bush 2005b.)
Bush claims that the U.S. is  striving for peace,  and by expressing his beliefs about the
nature and influence of freedom, Bush ties the goal of world peace to the need to expand
his concept of freedom in foreign nations (Bush 2003, see also e.g. Bush 2002; 2004;
2005a; 2005b). “The advance of liberty is opposed by terrorists and extremists, evil men
who despise freedom, despise America, and aim to subject millions to their violent rule”,
Bush (2008) states, constructing an idea of a confrontation between evil, represented by
terrorists and the enemies of freedom and the U.S., and good, represented by the U.S. and
its allies in the cause of freedom. Constructing the idea that the U.S. concept of freedom
is good and those opposing it are evil displays the U.S. foreign policy tradition of moral
pragmatism, the idea that the U.S. provides the criterion according to which other states’
actions should be judged (Hastedt 2011, 61). Furthermore, it reproduces the myth of
American exceptionalism as it reinforces the superiority of freedom as an American value
compared to views that are not compatible with it.
Already in his first State of the Union Address, Bush (2002) famously used the phrase
“axis of evil” to describe Iran, Iraq, North Korea and their terrorist allies. Often in his
State  of  the  Union  Addresses  Bush  describes  U.S.  actions  as  a  fight  against  evil  and
overcoming evil with greater good (see e.g. Bush 2002; 2002; 2006), and in his 2007
address he stated that: “The evil that inspired and rejoiced in 9/11 is still at work in the
world. And so long as that's the case, America is still a nation at war.” Choosing to
describe the U.S. enemies as evil creates justification and legitimacy to U.S. actions, as
63
the  U.S.  is  presented  as  the  good force,  which  suits  the  efforts  to  justify  U.S.  military
campaign abroad well.
Bush also describes the War on Terror as an “ideological conflict” or “ideological
struggle” (Bush 2006; 2007; 2008). This depiction combined with Bush describing the
conflict as the protection of freedom implies that freedom itself is the ideology that is
being contested. Bush (2005b) describes the conflict as “the attack on freedom”,
encapsulating what he believes is the essence of the war, and also with the use of definite
article the he implies that the nature of the conflict is as he supposes. When comparing
these two depictions of the War on Terror, the ideological struggle versus the fight
between good and evil, the latter has more religious connotations with the definition of
good and evil being a central theme in many religions. However, it seems that good and
evil are not, at least explicitly, defined through any particular organised religion but
through the American concept of freedom; those opposing it being evil and those
protecting it being good.
Bush (2002; 2005a; 2005b) argues that the U.S. does not intend to impose its culture or
form of government in the Middle East.  Instead, he emphasises the aim to liberate the
oppressed and help the people in the Middle East to protect their freedom without the will
to dominate (see e.g. Bush 2003; 2004; 2008). While stressing that there is no will to
conquer  or  impose  American  way of  life  upon the  countries  of  the  Middle  East,  Bush
however states:
America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right
and true and unchanging for all people everywhere.
No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We
have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand
firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits
on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech;
equal justice; and religious tolerance. (Bush 2002.)
Thus, the claim of not imposing U.S. ways of life upon foreign nations seems like a mere
strategy to gain acceptance to U.S. policies by representing them in another way.
Bush (2003; 2004; 2006) emphasises that the war was started by the terrorists and forced
on the U.S., and that it “fights reluctantly”, making the U.S. seem like a victim, which fits
the myth of the U.S. as an innocent nation. In 2006, he stated that the U.S. “did nothing
to invite” the ideological conflict at hand. Despite the seeming reluctance, Bush
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emphasises the call he feels the U.S. has as a blessed country to make the world a better
place (Bush 2003). Bush (2002; 2003; 2004; 2008) speaks of the call of history, the
calling of U.S. conscience and the historic commitment to end tyranny. And not only is
the U.S. called to action, it is also called to leadership (see e.g. Bush 2004; 2006). On the
one hand, Bush (2005b) emphasises the involvement of a higher power in the course of
events,  stating:  “History  has  an  ebb  and  flow  of  justice,  but  history  also  has  a  visible
direction, set by liberty and the Author of Liberty.” On the one hand, he also emphasises
the meaning of human action, arguing that “it is human choices that move events” (ibid.).
Bush’s  speeches  construct  the  idea  that  a  path  for  history,  created  by  a  higher  power,
exists but that the path is executed by humans. This idea provides further justification for
the Bush administration’s policies, since it creates the idea that the administration is in its
special calling fulfilling a plan from a higher power.
Bush’s addresses also aim to justify their  military actions with simpler lexical choices,
for example by calling the cause of the U.S. just and right and claiming that the U.S. is
bringing terrorists to justice (see e.g. Bush 2002; 2003; 2004; 2007). Bush emphasises the
compassionate character of the U.S. citizens and describes compassion as the deepest
American value (Bush 2005b; 2007; 2008). He states that: “The qualities of courage and
compassion that we strive for in America also determine our conduct abroad” and as
mentioned earlier, describes the U.S. armed forces in the gulf as the “armies of
compassion” (Bush 2003; 2008). Thus, Bush constructs legitimation for his
administration’s foreign policies, including other policies than military actions, by
presenting them as acts of compassion. In his 2006 State of the Union Address, Bush
argued for showing compassion abroad as follows:
We show compassion abroad because Americans believe in the God-given
dignity and worth of a villager with HIV/AIDS or an infant with malaria or
a refugee fleeing genocide or a young girl sold into slavery. We also show
compassion abroad because regions overwhelmed by poverty, corruption,
and despair are sources of terrorism and organized crime and human
trafficking and the drug trade. (Bush 2006.)
The quote shows that besides freedom, other features that Bush deems God-given also
operate as motivators for the Bush administration’s foreign policies. Bush also
emphasises the honourable nature of the U.S. and its actions and the self-sacrifice of the
Americans for the freedoms of their countrymen and strangers (Bush 2003; 2007).
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Emphasising the sacrifice that the U.S. soldiers make for their country’s freedom and for
the  freedoms  of  people  abroad  fits  the  American  civil  religion’s  theme  of  death  and
sacrifice, which entered the civil religion during the American civil war (Bellah
1970/1967, 177). Bellah (1970/1967, 168) also argued that the American civil religion is
in the end about “the subordination of the nation to ethical principles that transcend it and
in terms of which it should be judged.” This idea of judging the nation by transcending
ethical principles is visible in Bush’s speeches, as he goes to great lengths to emphasise
the good qualities of the U.S. and the goodness of their actions abroad.
While emphasising the selflessness and kindness of the U.S. foreign policy and the self-
sacrifice and compassion of Americans advancing these policies abroad, Bush also argues
that these actions are vital for the safety of the U.S. (see e.g. Bush 2002; 2005a; 2005b).
Bush (2005a) claims that the “survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the
success of liberty in other lands” and further explains:
America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. From the day
of  our  founding,  we  have  proclaimed that  every  man and  woman on  this
Earth has rights and dignity and matchless value, because they bear the
image of the Maker of heaven and Earth. Across the generations, we have
proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to be a
master  and  no  one  deserves  to  be  a  slave.  Advancing  these  ideals  is  the
mission  that  created  our  Nation.  It  is  the  honorable  achievement  of  our
fathers. Now, it is the urgent requirement of our Nation's security and the
calling of our time. (Bush 2005a.)
Thus,  Bush  ties  advancing  U.S.  interests  and  values  while  helping  other  countries
together. Furthermore, God and His gifts to humanity are yet again used as justifications
for U.S. foreign policy. Bush (2003; 2004) expresses faith in a higher plan, speaking of
having faith in Providence and in God’s guiding power. In his 2005 State of the Union
Address, Bush stated: “The road of Providence is uneven and unpredictable—yet we
know where it leads: It leads to freedom.” Bush aligns his administration’s policies and
its goals to the outcome of Providence, constructing legitimacy for his policies in the eyes
of those who believe that a higher plan for humanity exists. Bellah (1970/1967, 171)
argued that a part of the American civil religion is presidents attributing the highest
authority to God, which provides the “ultimate significance” and criterion for right and
wrong that democratic choices cannot themselves ensure to people. As Bush expresses
his faith in God and His plan that the U.S. is to follow, he appoints God as the highest
authority and follows the customs of the American civil religion.
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Terms  such  as  God,  higher  power,  angels  and  Providence  are  not  the  only  explicitly
religious words in the speeches, as Bush also speaks about the creed of the U.S. In his
2002 State of the Union Address, Bush discussed the reactions of the U.S. citizens to the
terrorist attacks of 9/11, and stated the following:
For too long our culture has said, "If it feels good, do it." Now America is
embracing a new ethic and a new creed, "Let's roll." In the sacrifice of
soldiers, the fierce brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and
generosity of ordinary citizens, we have glimpsed what a new culture of
responsibility  could  look  like.  We  want  to  be  a  nation  that  serves  goals
larger than self. We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not
let this moment pass. (Bush 2002.)
Creed, which traditionally refers to religious faith, is used in a secular-like manner in
Bush’s speeches: not referring to any recognised religion but secular matters such as
societal values. Further, Bush (2002) also argues that the terrorist enemies of the U.S.
have chosen tyranny and death as their cause and creed, while the U.S. chooses freedom
and  dignity  of  every  life.  While  these  values  may  be  based  on  religious  beliefs,  as
suggested earlier, the term creed itself does not refer to any particular traditionally
religious  faith  or  beliefs  but  rather  to  matters  that  may  traditionally  be  thought  of  as
secular.
Like freedom, democracy is also associated with particular beliefs in Bush’s speeches. In
2006, Bush stated that: “Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of
their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror”, expressing the belief
that democratic countries are more peaceful than others. Freedom and democracy are also
treated  almost  as  synonyms in  the  speeches,  or  at  least  very  tightly  involved  with  one
another. In 2004, Bush stated the following, associating democracy and freedom together:
We also hear doubts that democracy is a realistic goal for the greater Middle
East, where freedom is rare. Yet it is mistaken and condescending to assume
that whole cultures and great religions are incompatible with liberty and
self-government. I believe that God has planted in every human heart the
desire to live in freedom. And even when that desire is crushed by tyranny
for decades, it will rise again. (Bush 2004.)
Bush offers many reasons for his administration’s foreign policies and actions in the War
on Terror: the special calling of the U.S., liberating the oppressed, and protecting U.S.
interests, to name a few. However, these reasons are all favourable to the U.S. and its
citizens and no negative aspects of military actions abroad are brought up, besides the
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honourable sacrifices of the military and the military families. Even though the war is
justified using different arguments, they all present the U.S. in a positive light,
disregarding other views. This can be interpreted as a simplification strategy to replace
contradiction and complexity, and hegemonise the discourse Bush is constructing in his
addresses.
Some religious terms and phrases are used in Bush’s speeches, but they do not dominate
the vocabulary in any explicit way. Religious expressions are used sparingly, and rather
than taking any dominant role in describing U.S. foreign policy, they imply beliefs and
presuppositions that are motivating factors behind the policies. As Bellah’s example of
president Kennedy’s addresses and the American civil religion, Bush does not offer any
specifications  either  about  the  identity  of  the  God he  is  speaking  about  or  from which
religion his religious expressions are derived from. This upholds the opportunity for
people from various faiths to relate to his words. Furthermore, by not using religious
vocabulary in any overwhelming way and justifying the Bush administration’s policies
also with non-religious arguments ensures that secular people can relate to his message
as well as religious people.
5.1.2. Obama’s addresses
The starting point of Obama’s addresses is the same as Bush’s: Obama gives his speeches
alone and is the sole person in control of the topics and discourses in the addresses. By
external features such as voice, mood, modality, polarity, and tense, Obama’s addresses
have clear similarities with Bush’s addresses, as all these features imply sureness and
trust  in  the  administration’s  policies  and  U.S.  military  actions  abroad.  Like  in  Bush’s
addresses, this sureness is strengthened with lexical choices. A typical way to reinforce
Obama’s message is using the word must, as in his 2010 State of the Union Address: “For
America must always stand on the side of freedom and human dignity—always.” These
features also remain similar throughout Obama’s nine addresses. The voice of the
addresses is active which constructs the idea of the U.S. as an active and conscious actor,
and passive is rarely used. Obama’s addresses contain mainly statements and commands,
which is why the mood implies certainty. The use of present tense when describing U.S.
actions abroad creates the idea that Obama has full confidence in them, while it also
increases the audience’s confidence in them. Modality contributes in the creation of this
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image, as there are few modals when Obama discusses his administration’s policies and
their effects.
As in Bush’s addresses, Obama’s addresses also use the pronoun us to refer quite strictly
to  U.S.,  but  sometimes  also  to  U.S.  allies  or  some  non-defined  group  of  counties,  for
example to countries that “enjoy relative plenty” (Obama 2009). However, Obama’s
addresses use the definite article the to create an image of shared information far more
sparingly that Bush’s addresses, as there are no often recurring phrases created with the
use of the definite article when discussing U.S. policies in the fight against terrorism.
Although Obama’s and Bush’s addresses have many similarities, Bush’s addresses use
more versatile textual techniques to construct discourses about the fight against terror.
The textual feature that is of most interest to this study is lexicalisation. The lexical
analysis of Obama’s addresses was also conducted by placing wordings of interest to a
table, grouping lexicalisations of the same subject together and creating a timeline, as
with Bush’s addresses. As the table is lengthy, an abbreviated version of the table is
included in the appendix-section (Appendix C). What is notable is that the subject of the
fight against terrorism is much less dominant in Obama’s addresses than in Bush’s.
Obama’s addresses discuss topics such as economy, taxation, education and other
domestic policy issues extensively, but mainly discuss the fight against terrorism as part
of a national security -theme. The analysis is then limited to rather small sections of the
addresses.
Furthermore, whereas Bush talked clearly and explicitly about the U.S. actions against
terrorism, Obama is much vaguer about the matter as he does not use the phrase War on
Terror but uses many different terms to describe it. Thus, there is not only over-
lexicalisation but also re-lexicalisation when describing the U.S. fight against terrorism.
In his first inaugural address, Obama (2009) still talked about a war “against a far-
reaching network of violence and hatred”, but in his later speeches does not refer to the
fight in terror as a one, distinct conflict. Bush did so with the phrase War on Terror, but
Obama refers to the events of what Bush talked about as parts of the War on Terror, such
as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as interrelated conflicts but not as parts of a whole.
For example, Obama uses terms such as “struggle”, “fight”, “counterterrorism efforts”
and “threat” to refer to the foreign policy issues concerning terrorism but does not adopt
one consistent phrase (Obama 2011; 2013b; 2014). This complicates the effort to identify
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the parts of the speeches when Obama speaks strictly about countering terrorism as he
does not necessarily separate the subject from the general lines of foreign policy or
security. However, with knowledge of the context of the addresses and the events of the
U.S. fight against terrorism, it is possible to identify the relevant sections for this study.
How  Obama  depicts  the  fight  against  terrorism  is  not  highly  consistent,  as  he  uses
different expressions to describe it. The most recurring way that Obama describes the
nature of the fight is as fighting a threat that the terrorists pose or their actions that
threaten the U.S. and its citizens (Obama 2010; 2012; 2013b; 2016). Another somewhat
recurring way that Obama describes it is referring to the U.S. actions of taking the fight
to al-Qaeda or taking direct actions against terrorists (Obama 2010; 2011; 2013b). The
choices of words get harsher by the end of Obama’s second term, as in his 2015 State of
the Union Address, Obama states that the U.S. continues to “hunt down the terrorists”.
Even further, in his last State of the Union Address, Obama (2016) states that the terrorists
must  be  “taken  out”,  and  when speaking  of  ISIL,  he  stated  that:  “We just  need  to  call
them what they are – killers and fanatics who have to be rooted out, hunted down, and
destroyed.”
This rather harsh tone is contrasted with Obama (2011; 2012) reassuring that the war in
Iraq is ending, and even more so with Obama speaking continually about ending the war
in Afghanistan and about the U.S. needing to consider its military operations more
carefully (Obama 2013b; see also e.g. Obama 2014; 2015). In his 2014 State of the Union
Address, Obama stated the following:
I have used force when needed to protect the American people, and I will
never hesitate to do so as long as I hold this office.  But I will not send our
troops into harm’s way unless it’s truly necessary; nor will I allow our sons
and daughters to be mired in open-ended conflicts.  We must fight the
battles that need to be fought, not those that terrorists prefer from us – large-
scale deployments that drain our strength and may ultimately feed
extremism.
So, even as we aggressively pursue terrorist networks – through more
targeted efforts and by building the capacity of our foreign partners –
America must move off a permanent war footing.  That’s why I’ve imposed
prudent limits on the use of drones – for we will not be safer if people abroad
believe we strike within their countries without regard for the consequence.
(Obama 2014.)
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This  quote  is  significant  for  this  study  because  it  encompasses  much  of  how  Obama
believes the fight against terrorism should be conducted. Obama establishes that the U.S.
uses force to protect the U.S. citizens and that it will be used if necessary, but only if it
serves  the  interests  and  aims  of  the  U.S.  and  does  not  inspire  more  extremism,  as  the
terrorists intend. Earlier on, Obama (2013b) stated that he does not believe that it is
necessary to send U.S. troops to occupy other nations to meet the threat of al-Qaeda, even
though direct action against them will be taken if needed. Obama’s tone regarding
military operations abroad seems more pacific and prudent before his last State of the
Union Address (2016), although already in his State of the Union Address of 2015 he
stated that the U.S. reserves to right to act unilaterally to hunt down the terrorists. Obama
(2016) also stresses the willingness of the U.S. to act solo in his last State of the Union
Address, as he states that: “American leadership in the 21st century is not a choice
between ignoring the rest of the world – except when we kill terrorists.” Thus, Obama
introduces the idea of American exceptionalism in the addresses by emphasising the
ability and readiness of the U.S. to act against terrorism alone, regardless of others, if
necessary.
The theme of American exceptionalism is extended to the topic of the importance of
American leadership that Obama reproduces in his addresses. Obama seeks to realign the
nature of American leadership, as he states that he believes in a “smarter” kind of
leadership, smarter than considering military operations as first options of problem-
solving (Obama 2015). In 2011, Obama stated that the U.S. leadership has made America
“not just a place on a map, but the light to the world”, and later emphasised the potential
of the U.S. leadership to do good in the world (Obama 2011; 2014). Although Obama
emphasises American leadership and its good qualities and sometimes even the
willingness to act unilaterally, he also expressed the will to find a way for the U.S. to lead
the world without becoming its “policeman” (Obama 2015). In this sense, Obama’s tone
is yet again more placatory than his predecessor’s. However, Obama does not portray any
less faith in U.S. responsibilities or role in the world and in the fight against terrorism
than Bush, as he connects the U.S. actions in the fight against terrorism to U.S. helping
the world and oppressed people gain peace and freedom. In 2011, Obama addressed the
fight against al-Qaeda and American efforts against nuclear weapons in Iran and North
Korea and stated that: “This is just a part of how we’re shaping a world that favors peace
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and prosperity.” Thus,  Obama portrays the fight against  terrorism as one branch of the
U.S. efforts and leadership to reach world peace.
Obama (2012) speaks about the “renewal” of American leadership, which implies that it
had been lost at some time, probably referring to the Bush administration. This is
connected to Obama speaking about “rejecting the false choice” between U.S. safety and
values, as Obama states that the U.S. must enlist its values in the fight (Obama 2009;
2010; 2013b). Furthermore, Obama (2015) states that the example of U.S. values is an
important part of their leadership, and that U.S. values are the greatest strength of the U.S.
abroad (Obama 2010). This is easily interpreted as critique towards the Bush
administration, especially combined with Obama’s efforts to close down Guantanamo
Bay, and as an effort of the Obama administration to change the course of U.S. action.
Once again, Obama reproduces the idea of American exceptionalism and the rightness of
their values and ideals by emphasising their power and meaning, for example by stating
that in their efforts against terrorism, the U.S. remains true to their Constitutional ideals
and sets an example for the rest of the world (Obama 2014).
Obama does not only emphasise the combability of U.S. values and action in the fight
against terrorism, but also stresses the American values and ideals that U.S. troops
personally portray in their actions abroad. “We honor them not only because they are
guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service”, Obama (2009)
stated in his first inaugural address. Obama emphasises the heroic and courageous nature
of the U.S. troops as they sacrifice for the security and freedom of the U.S. citizens (see
e.g. Obama 2011; 2012; 2013a; 2013b). Thus, like Bush, Obama reproduces the
American civil religion theme of sacrifice.
It is noteworthy that the lexicalisation in Obama’s inaugural addresses is different than in
his State of the Union Addresses. Unlike in the inaugural addresses, in his State of the
Union Addresses Obama does not mention God or express religious beliefs in the context
of  the  fight  against  terrorism,  except  for  when he  stated  the  notion  that  all  people  are
created equal when discussing American values (Obama 2010). In his inaugural
addresses, however, Obama in many ways implies that God is the motivation and reason
behind U.S. actions and values. He, like Bush, states that freedom is a gift from God and
that it must be secured by “His people here on Earth” (Obama 2009; 2013a). For example,
in his first inaugural address, Obama (2009) said the following:
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Let it be said by our children's children that when we were tested we refused
to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with
eyes fixed on the horizon and God's grace upon us, we carried forth that
great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations. (Obama
2009.)
In the same speech, he stated that the source of their confidence is the knowledge that
God  calls  on  the  U.S.  “to  shape  an  uncertain  destiny”  (ibid.).  Thus,  not  only  does  he
portray belief in God being the source of the freedom that they protect in their fight against
terrorism,  he  portrays  the  U.S.  as  a  nation  under  God’s  special  care  and  with  a  fate
determined by Him. Appealing to a higher power justifies the Obama administration’s
actions and establishes a relationship between the Obama administration’s politics and
religious beliefs. Furthermore, it reproduces the myths of the American civil religion and
continues its style of vague references to God that people of most faiths can relate to.
Unlike Obama’s inaugural addresses, the language regarding the fight against terrorism
in Obama’s State of the Union Addresses indicates secularism, since although they
reproduce the American exceptionalism myth and thus parts of the American civil
religion, they are not explicitly connected to religiously coloured ideas, such as the idea
of the U.S. being a God’s chosen or blessed nation. The different lexical style in Obama’s
inaugural addresses demonstrates the special role that inaugurations have as rituals of the
American civil religion.
The textual features of Obama’s addresses do not indicate many efforts to hegemonise
Obama’s message about the fight against terrorism, which may be due to the message
itself being incohesive, especially towards the end of Obama’s presidency. Obama’s
requirement to apply the U.S. values to their policies is intensified by appealing to shared
values as well as appealing to a higher power to convince the addresses’ audiences of the
role  of  the  U.S.  may  be  signs  of  efforts  to  hegemonise  the  discourses  Obama  is
constructing, and Obama often appeals to other shared cultural traits as he addresses the
audience  using  the  word we,  which  implies  shared  and  common  views.  However,  in
addition to these, other hegemonising techniques are not employed in the context of the
fight against terrorism in the text-level of the discourses.
5.2. Analysis of discursive practice
The second level of Fairclough’s model of analysis is the analysis of discursive practices,
which studies the production, consumption and interpretation of texts and their formal
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features. The analysis is conducted following the three main headings Fairclough
introduces: the force of utterances, the coherence of texts, and the intertextuality of texts.
(Fairclough 1992, 75.) Thereby, the analysis of discursive practices is concerned with
speech acts and what the texts are being used to do socially; revealing the ideological
assumptions behind coherence; and the influence of other texts on the texts themselves
and their interpretation. This level of analysis is interpretative and thus, the focus of the
analysis is not just in any sentences and clauses that are in the addresses, but in those that
somehow aim to create meanings upon the matters discussed, whether it is creating new
meaning or reproducing old. Knowledge of the contexts of the speeches and their topics
is important for the sake of interpretation.
5.2.1. Bush’s addresses
In terms of the force of utterances, Bush’s addresses are largely what is expected of
political speeches. Statements or assertions are used prominently in the addresses to
portray and conceptualise the Bush administration’s policies in a favourable way.
Because the role of the president is to offer the Congress advice rather than commands in
their  State  of  the  Union  Addresses,  there  are  not  many  direct  commands  in  Bush’s
addresses. However, some clauses can be interpreted as indirect commands, usually
concerning the support of the military troops. Bush also makes both direct and indirect
requests, mostly to the citizens of the U.S. and the Congress. Bush’s addresses also
involve convincing on behalf of his administration’s policies, and some promises to the
American troops, their allies and oppressed people especially in Iraq. In a less prominent
role are a few rhetorical questions and regular questions.
The assertions mainly describe U.S. actions in the War on Terror and the nature of U.S.
enemies, but they also explicitly state the religious beliefs that affect U.S. actions in the
conflict. The belief in a guiding higher power is also visible in a speech act which can be
interpreted as either an assertion of convincing. In his 2004 State of the Union address,
Bush stated: “The momentum of freedom in our world is unmistakable, and it is not
carried forward by our power alone. We can trust in that greater power who guides the
unfolding of the years.” Although at first sight the quote seems like an assertion,
appealing to a higher power may be a convincing technique as Bush is aligning his
administration’s policies with the actions of a higher power. As securing the freedom of
U.S. citizens and oppressed people abroad is what Bush says is  a central  object of the
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efforts in the War on Terror, Bush (2005b) aligns his policies with a higher power also
by claiming with a certainty that the road of Providence leads to freedom.
Bush (2002) talks of a close relationship with God with the assertion that: “[M]any have
discovered again that even in tragedy—especially in tragedy—God is near”, and in the
form of an indirect request to action as he expresses that as a blessed country, the U.S.
has a special calling to make the world a better place (Bush 2003). By calling the U.S. a
blessed country and appealing to this as he expresses the need for U.S. action, Bush is
also reproducing a foundational myth that is an important part of the American civil
religion (Bellah 1970/1967 175). The myth of American exceptionalism and the idea the
U.S. is a God’s chosen nation with higher morals and purpose are central for the American
civil religion and the American identity, and these perceptions are often used as
justifications for U.S. actions abroad (Marsden 2011, 328−329). Bush reproduces the
myth of American exceptionalism by assertions that emphasise the necessity of U.S.
leadership in spreading freedom (Bush 2004). Furthermore, in his second inaugural
address, Bush (2005a) asserts that: “We will persistently clarify the choice before every
ruler and every nation, the moral choice between oppression, which is always wrong, and
freedom, which is eternally right”,  implying that the U.S. has the right and true values
that others should follow, fitting to the concepts of the American civil religion. Bush also
stresses  the  singularity  of  the  U.S.  and  its  tasks  as  in  2002,  he  seeks  to  convince  his
audience about the rightness of their actions by stating that the U.S. has been offered a
unique opportunity, and that the moments should not be allowed to pass.
In terms of coherence, Bush’s addresses seem coherent at first as the topics flow easily
from one to another and the addresses are easy to follow. However, as the coherence of
texts is about interpretation and about their readers connecting topics together in some
meaningful way, it is important to mind the ideological assumptions and assumed
knowledge of the context that the addresses are based on and make the texts seem
coherent. A reason that can break the appearance of coherence is the lack of knowledge
of the context, as Bush often refers to the nature and reasons of U.S. actions in the War
on Terror in a way that assumes prior knowledge or views of the matters. Furthermore,
he seems to expect that the audience holds similar views as well. However, expressing a
view in a way that expects others to think the same way may also be a technique to
hegemonise his message. By not explaining the views or by not presenting any contesting
ones, Bush creates meanings in a way that he intends it, as he controls the discourse in
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his addresses. For example, in 2003, Bush stated that “America’s duty is familiar” without
clarifying the content of the duty or why such duty exists. Correspondingly, in 2004 Bush
spoke about the responsibility that the U.S. is rising to meet without specifying the nature
of the responsibility. These statements are also connected to the idea of American
exceptionalism, moral superiority and manifest destiny of the American civil religion, as
they portray the U.S. as an actor with a higher purpose.
Bush also makes a few seemingly unconnected religious statements that, provided that
they are interpreted as unconnected, break the coherence of the addresses. After
describing the character of the U.S. in the face of adversity and the right of every person
to be free,  Bush (2003) resumes to state that  liberty is  God’s gift  to humanity and that
Americans have faith not only in themselves, but in the “loving God behind all of life and
all  of  history”.  In  a  similar  manner,  Bush  (2005b)  moves  on  to  discuss  the  ways  of
Providence and its destination of freedom after addressing the dreams of the U.S. nation
and the already fulfilled dreams of the fall  of communism and imperialism. While one
interpretation may be that these religious notions are unconnected to the topics that
precede them, in Bush’s mind they seem to be connected or he seeks to connect the topics
to add religious meaning to matters that are often deemed secular as such.
The level of coherence in the addresses may also indicate ideological investment, as
Fairclough (1992, 89−90) argues that coherence, among other text or discourse features,
may easily be ideologically invested. Fairclough (ibid.) stated that discursive practices
can be ideological if they somehow sustain or restructure power relations, and with
presuppositions of shared knowledge and structuring his addresses in a way that allows
people to connect politics with religious beliefs,  Bush is upholding the significance of
religious belief in U.S. politics and the idea that they are connected.
Manifest intertextuality in Bush’s addresses is the most visible in the form of quotes,
many of which are the stories of veterans and military families or statements from allies.
Most of these quotes do not have relevance to this study since they do not concern the
research problem. However, in his second inaugural address, Bush (2005a) quotes
president Lincoln by saying: “The rulers of outlaw regimes can know that we still believe
as Abraham Lincoln did: ‘Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves
and, under the rule of a just God, cannot long retain it.’” This quote is significant because
not only does it appeal to the rule of God and its effects, but the statement has even further
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authority since it was originally said by Abraham Lincoln, a notable previous U.S.
president.  Thus,  the  quote  seeks  to  constructs  even  more  legitimacy  to  U.S.  actions
abroad.
Constitutive intertextuality is more dominant than manifest intertextuality in the parts of
the texts that discuss U.S. foreign policy and the War on Terror. Intertextuality and text
are understood broadly so that not only direct references are considered, but also
references to different orders of discourse. Constitutive intertextuality is created mainly
by references to U.S. history, previous presidents and Founders, religious texts, Bush’s
and his administration’s own previous actions, and collaborative acts with allies, such as
reports from the U.N. Religious intertextuality is created by many references to religious
themes  such  as  Providence  and  God,  and  God’s  actions  or  wishes.  Many  of  these
references have already been introduced in this analysis chapter. In keeping with the style
of the addresses, although the connection to some religious thought is visible, no specific
religion is identifiable from the references.
The discursive practices in Bush’s addresses imply a clear connection between religious
belief and Bush’s and his administration’s policies, thus they do not indicate secularism
nor can be called secular. The texts are produced in connection to religious beliefs and
they influence the interpretation and formal features of the texts. The discursive practices
reproduce some myths and beliefs of the American civil religion and retain its ambiguous
style in the way that all religious references are ambiguous enough so that people of many
faiths can relate to them. However, the speeches also include many speech acts and
references to other texts that do not have any religious connotations, so although religious
beliefs are present in the speeches and their discursive practices, they do not dominate
them entirely. Thus, some parts of the texts can be interpreted as secular even though
religious beliefs still exist in the background. The texts then accommodate both religious
and secular interpretation, because although the values such as freedom and equality are
often supported by religious beliefs, they are values that secular people can easily support,
too. Thus, the production, consumption and interpretation of Bush’s addresses align
religious beliefs with secular matters by speech acts such as assertions and convincing,
creating meanings by connecting matters together with the appearance of coherence, and
with versatile references to other texts, whether religious or secular.
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Fairclough defined ideologies as significations or constructions of reality that are built
into social practices. According to him, ideologies work the strongest when they are
naturalised within discursive practices so that they seem like common sense. (Fairclough
1992, 86−87.) The argument of this study is that in the context of the discourses in Bush’s
addresses, the American civil religion functions as an ideologically invested order of
discourse that influences discursive practices. The American civil religion signifies
reality in the sense that with its beliefs and myths it shapes the American identity and
creates meaning to the U.S. as a nation and to its policies. This is especially visible when
examining coherence as the meaningfulness behind many connections of the present day
to U.S. history are connected to the American civil religion and the myths of American
exceptionalism and manifest destiny. Talking about American duty, responsibility and
“generational commitment to the advance of freedom” without explaining or justifying
them is connected to the presupposition that these are already acknowledged facts about
the nature of the U.S. and its international role (Bush 2003; 2004; 2005b). Further, as the
members of Congress are expected to be conscious about the U.S. policies and history,
they are aware of the content of the myths that created the American civil religion that
affects U.S. policies, and thus are even more easily affected by this ideological investment
in the discursive practices.
Another ideologically invested level of discursive practice is the U.S. concept of freedom,
which is connected to the American civil religion but so central in the discourses in Bush’s
speeches that it must be addressed separately. The U.S. commitment to freedom and its
advance is naturalised within the discursive practices in all three levels of examination:
firstly, its significance and naturalness is established in assertions and convincing speech
acts. Secondly, its naturalised position connects matters together in a meaningful way and
creates coherence. In 2005, Bush (2005b) stated that: “Our generational commitment to
the advance of freedom, especially in the Middle East, is now being tested and honored
in Iraq”, naturalising the commitment using history. And lastly, it is supported with
intertextual references, for example by quoting Abraham Lincoln (2005a). The concept
of freedom gives significance to the U.S., its identity and its foreign policies, which is
why it also functions as an ideology.
The discursive practices contribute to the reproduction of the American civil religion but
can also be interpreted to convey a post-secular form of politics. Religious beliefs are
clearly present in the speeches without dominating entire discourses, but aligning secular
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matters, like values of freedom and equality, to religious belief that creates higher
meaning to those who hold religious faith themselves but does not prevent secular people
from  relating  to  them.  It  indicates  a  non-secular  attitude  towards  politics,  which
considering the formal separation of church and state in the U.S. (for which the U.S. can
be held secular), and thus it is reasonable to argue that the discursive practices not only
reflect the American civil religion but are also post-secular in nature.
5.2.2. Obama’s addresses
As in Bush’s addresses, the speech acts in Obama’s addresses when discussing the fight
against terrorism are mainly assertions, in addition to some commands, requests and
convincing. The assertions serve to portray U.S. actions in the fight against terrorism the
way that the Obama administration wants them portrayed, and also provide the
administration’s views on how matters should be changed. For example, Obama (2009)
stated his views about the nature of the conflict against terrorism with the assertion: “Our
nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred”, and described the
effects of U.S. military campaigns abroad by asserting that “this generation of heroes has
made the United States safer and more respected around the world” (Obama 2012).
Obama (2013b) also expresses his views about how the fight should be conducted more
peacefully by asserting that occupying other nations will not be necessary to meet the
threat of terrorism.
Assertions are often supported by convincing or sometimes they can also be interpreted
as indirect convincing. In his second inaugural address, Obama (2013a) states: “We, the
people, still believe that enduring security and lasting peace do not require perpetual war.”
The clause asserts Obama’s views about U.S. security, but as Obama uses the phrase we
the people,  he  not  only  appeals  to  his  fellow  citizens  but  also  makes  an  intertextual
reference to the U.S. Constitution which begins with those words.  By appealing to the
Constitution, which has a special role in the American civil religion (Levinson 1979, 123),
and  equating  the  views  of  others  with  his  own,  Obama  constructs  legitimacy  and
credibility to his statement, and thus the clause can also be interpreted as convincing.
Sometimes assertions, convincing, and orders are grouped together in the addresses to
further reinforce Obama’s message, as in the following quote:
Both al Qaeda and now ISIL pose a direct threat to our people, because in
today’s world,  even a handful of terrorists who place no value on human
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life, including their own, can do a lot of damage. They use the Internet to
poison the minds of individuals inside our country. Their actions undermine
and destabilize our allies. We have to take them out. (Obama 2016.)
First, Obama makes an assertion about the treat that al-Qaeda and ISIL pose, after which
he supports his assertion by convincing, as he further explains the actions of the terrorists.
And finally, Obama makes a command that al-Qaeda and ISIL have to be taken out. As
the president’s role is to give the Congress advice in State of the Union Addresses, instead
of orders, most of Obama’s commands are softened with the use of pronoun we, so that
the command does not only concern the Congress, but the president also. For example,
Obama (2015) stated that: “As Americans, we cherish our civil liberties, and we need to
uphold  that  commitment  if  we  want  maximum  cooperation  from  other  countries  and
industry in our fight against terrorist networks.” Nonetheless, these statements are clearly
commands, as they seek to affect  the actions of the Congress and the U.S. In terms of
requests, Obama, for example, asks the Congress to authorise military action against ISIL
(Obama 2015; 2016).
Only the speech acts in Obama’s inaugural addresses indicate a relationship between
religious beliefs and politics,  for example as Obama (2009) asserts the belief that  God
calls the U.S. to “shape an uncertain destiny”. Otherwise, the speech acts do not display
an  explicit  connection  to  religious  beliefs,  other  than  the  beliefs  of  the  American  civil
religion. The idea of American exceptionalism is visible in the speech acts, as Obama
seeks to convince his audience about the role of the U.S., for example, by the indirect
command that: “America’s moral example must always shine for all who yearn for
freedom and justice and dignity.” (Obama 2012.)
If coherence was only examined as a textual feature, Obama’s addresses would seem
coherent as they flow naturally from one subject to another. However, as coherence is to
be examined as a matter of interpretation rather than a text feature, the addresses,
especially from Obama’s first presidential term, seem significantly less coherent when
discussing the fight against terrorism. The fight is not discussed as a one whole conflict,
like Bush did as he called it the War on Terror, but rather as separate conflicts that are
connected to the larger security discussion. Obama does not always explicitly connect the
different elements of the fight against terrorism to the efforts to counter terrorism, or he
discusses the different elements only on a general level of the security discussion. Thus,
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in order to connect the conflicts that Obama addresses to the fight against terrorism, one
must be aware of the context and the different aspects of the fight.
For example, in 2009, Obama stated that: “As for our common defense, we reject as false
the choice between our safety and our ideals”. Knowing the context, it can be concluded
that Obama speaks of the threat of terrorism even though he does not specify it but speaks
of  security  on  a  general  level.  In  2012,  Obama spoke  of  “a  wave  of  change”  that  had
“washed across the Middle East and North Africa, from Tunis to Cairo; from Sana’a to
Tripoli.” Although he does not specify the nature of the change, it is likely to be connected
to the fight against terrorism as it was fought in the mentioned regions. Once the context
reveals the exact conflict that Obama discusses, it is possible to discover more of Obama’s
views about the fight against terrorism, as in the following quote:
As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble
gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts
and distant mountains. […] We honor them not only because they are
guardians of our liberty,  but because they embody the spirit  of service;  a
willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves. (Obama
2009.)
Context implies that Obama refers to the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, which links
Obama’s views to the fight against terrorism. After establishing this connection, it is
possible to interpret that Obama believes that the freedom of the U.S. is threatened by
terrorists, as he calls the troops fighting the terrorists “guardians of our liberty”.
The incoherent elements in Obama’s speeches are likely to be intentional to lower the
profile of the fight against terrorism and scale down the perceived scope of the conflict,
which is corresponding with the Obama administration’s agenda to make the fight against
terrorism a less dominant part of their foreign policy (McCrisken 2011, 782). Obama’s
addresses from his second term are more coherent in the parts where he discusses the
fight against terrorism, as stronger connections are made between U.S. actions and their
intentions to fight terrorism, like in his 2014 State of the Union Address:
While we have put al Qaeda’s core leadership on a path to defeat, the threat
has evolved, as al Qaeda affiliates and other extremists take root in different
parts  of  the  world.  In  Yemen,  Somalia,  Iraq,  and  Mali,  we  have  to  keep
working with partners to disrupt and disable these networks. In Syria, we’ll
support the opposition that rejects the agenda of terrorist networks. (Obama
2012.)
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The gaps in coherence do not serve any purpose to connect politics to religious beliefs or
even to the American civil religion. They instead incorporate the discussion of the fight
against terror to the larger security discussion, and in that way dissolve the Bush era
narrative of the fight against terrorism as a distinct war rather than a security concern
among others. Neither the force of utterances or coherence aspects of the addresses
exhibit any strong efforts to hegemonise Obama’s views about the fight against terrorism,
as they seek to lower its profile and increase others’. However, the coherence aspect of
Obama’s addresses indicates ideological investment in the sense that they seek to
restructure power relations, i.e. counter the Bush administration’s narrative of the conflict
against terrorism as a distinct war. Obama’s later addresses do not only seek to restructure
the earlier narrative about the nature of the war but sustain the new image that the Obama
administration is trying to construct of the conflict.
Obama’s inaugural addresses differ from the State of the Union Addresses by their
intertextual features as well. In general, they have strong connections to the American
civil religion and its themes and, unlike the State of the Union Addresses, some references
to religious texts. The State of the Union Addresses have mainly references to
Constitution and its ideals, to historic events to compare with contemporary problems,
and some references to previous presidents to reinforce the influence of the addresses.
Some intertextual references also reproduce the myths of the American civil religion,
especially the myth of American exceptionalism, such as Obama’s (2014) statement that:
“[W]e counter terrorism not just through intelligence and military action, but by
remaining true to our Constitutional ideals, and setting an example for the rest of the
world.”
In his first inaugural address, Obama (2009) appeals for example to the words of Scripture
and ideas of the Founding Fathers to strengthen the influence of his address. What is
notable in his reference to the Scripture is that it is clearly more connected to Christianity
than  other  religious  references  that  tend  to  be  ambiguous,  following  the  style  of  the
American civil religion. In the second inaugural address, Obama (2013a) also makes
intertextual references to religious texts and symbols connected to the American civil
religion, such as the Declaration of Independence, as is evident in the following quote:
What makes us exceptional – what makes us American – is our allegiance
to an idea articulated in a declaration made more than two centuries ago:
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“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” (Obama 2013a.)
Discursive practices in Obama’s addresses function to support the image, constructed by
the Obama administration, about the administration’s policies regarding the fight against
terrorism. The profile of the fight is lowered as the force of utterances and the deficiencies
in coherence function to counter the Bush administration’s portrayal of the fight against
terrorism as a separate, distinct war. Thus, the discursive practices are ideologically
invested. While the analysis of coherence did not reveal noticeable connections to any
religious beliefs or even to the American civil religion, the force of utterances and
intertextuality reproduce the myths of the American civil religion, especially the myth of
American exceptionalism. However, the influence of the American civil religion and its
myths  on  the  fight  against  terrorism is  not  as  evident  in  Obama’s  addresses  as  it  is  in
Bush’s addresses, although they effect the motivations that underlie the U.S. actions
abroad. In that sense, the myth of American exceptionalism in particular functions like an
ideology and affect the Obama administration’s policies, too.
Otherwise, the discursive practices in the State of the Union Addresses are predominantly
secular, whereas the inaugural addresses establish a relationship between religious beliefs
and politics in a much similar manner than in Bush’s speeches; by portraying the
underlying motive behind U.S. actions, such as the promotion of freedom, as originating
from the will of a God. Speaking of a God is accurate, as Obama maintains the style of
the American civil religion of not explicitly stating which God he is referring to, except
for the mention of Scripture that indicates Christian faith. In that sense, the discursive
practices in Obama’s inaugural addresses indicate a post-secular form of politics as
Bush’s addresses since they, too, align seemingly secular matters such as freedom and
equality with religious themes.
5.3. Analysis of social practice
The third level of the analysis, following Fairclough’s model, examines discourse’s
relation to ideology and power as hegemony. As discursive practices are also social
practices, hegemony and ideology have already been discussed in the context of
discursive practices, but the third level of the analysis takes the discussion further. To be
able to examine the social practices within which a discourse belongs, it is necessary to
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first properly discuss the presidents’ discourses about the fight against terrorism in their
entirety. After that, the analysis proceeds to examine whether they have ideological
features and if they engage in hegemonic struggle with other orders of discourse.
5.3.1. Bush’s addresses
Three distinct discourses, each of which have one to four sub-discourses, are identifiable
in Bush’s discourses. The discourses were formed based on the findings of the two first
dimensions of the analysis that are discussed in the previous chapters. The discourses are
divided based on how Bush portrays a certain aspect of the War on Terror, and the
different discourses and sub-discourses reveal the nature of the relationship between
religious beliefs and that particular aspect of politics.
1. Freedom-discourse
Sub-discourses











The Freedom-discourse constructs the idea that the U.S. is a freedom’s champion that
protects the freedoms of U.S. citizens and oppressed people abroad, as Bush talks of the
privilege and responsibility to fight for the cause freedom and leading the advance of
freedom (see e.g. Bush 2002; 2004; 2006). The U.S. is depicted as the only world leader
in the cause of freedom, whose efforts are necessary for the cause of freedom but opposed
by terrorists. This serves as a justification for the U.S. actions against terrorism. The
discourse  includes  the  belief  that  (a)  God intended  all  humans  to  be  free  and  thus,  all
humans have a natural will to be free (see e.g. Bush 2001; 2004). This belief also functions
as a central justification for U.S. actions abroad: it constructs the idea that the U.S. fights
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terrorists who oppress people and deny them their freedom, which is why, as a protector
of freedom, the U.S. must fight them. Furthermore, the discourse involves a particular
faith in freedom and its influence on people: Bush speaks of freedom being the right of
every  person,  which  is  connected  to  the  belief  that  freedom is  God’s  gift  to  humanity
(Bush 2003; 2006). The faith in freedom also includes the idea that free people are
peaceful in nature, and not drawn to violent ideologies. Freedom portrayed as a force that
can bring peace and hope on Earth, which is why achieving worldwide freedom for all
people is considered a vital goal.
The faith in freedom is connected to a sub-discourse, Striving for peace. In his addresses,
Bush constructs the idea that the U.S. acts abroad and is involved in the War on Terror so
that peace on Earth may be achieved and tyranny ended everywhere (see e.g. Bush 2003;
2005b). Because freedom is connected to peace in the Freedom-discourse, the aspiration
to end tyranny and achieve peace is portrayed as possible through spreading the U.S.
concept of freedom around the word. The Safety-sub-discourse is connected to the
Freedom-discourse in the context of the War on Terror. The sub-discourse constructs the
idea that the safety and freedom of the U.S. is dependent on the level of freedom in the
Middle East, and that the terrorists must be confronted and the fight taken to them in order
to win the War on Terror. Bush establishes this belief by statements that emphasise the
need to act abroad to secure the safety of the U.S. citizens at home (see e.g. Bush 2002;
2005a; 2005b). This is used as a justification for U.S. military operations abroad.
The Value-discourse is a top headline for a broader discourse that is divided into four sub-
discourses. The discourse concerns U.S. values, such as liberty, decency, self-sacrifice,
honour and human dignity, which are presented as to originate from the Founding of the
U.S., connecting the discourse evidently to the American civil religion. The discourse
holds that the U.S. mission against terror is based on and consistent with these values.
Bush constructs this idea by emphasising the good that the U.S. does abroad, such as
helping oppressed people gain their freedom and build democratic societies, and in
general emphasising the U.S. aim to help people in need (see e.g. Bush 2001; 2004; 2007).
The Compassion-sub-discourse describes the U.S. as a compassionate actor that aims to
protect and help nations in need without imposing American culture or the way of
government. Bush does this my emphasising the compassionate nature of U.S. troops and
their actions abroad (Bush 2003; 2006; 2008). Compassion is portrayed in the sub-
discourse as a central value in the American society, and the task of the U.S. as the duty
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to spread this compassion to other countries (Bush 2001; 2005b; 2007). Thus, the sub-
discourse constructs the idea that the military acts of the U.S. acts in the War on Terror
are acts of compassion. The Reluctant fight -sub-discourse constructs the notion that
terrorists started the War on Terror by attacking the U.S. on September 11th, 2001, and
that the U.S. did nothing to initiate the conflict, which Bush emphasises in his addresses
(Bush 2003; 2004; 2006). The sub-discourse portrays the U.S. as fighting the terrorists
reluctantly in a war that was forced upon them and that the U.S. cannot exit the war
without defeating the terrorists.
The Democratic faith -sub-discourse of the Value-discourse has some similarities to the
Freedom-discourse. The sub-discourse encompasses the idea that spreading democracy
to undemocratic areas will result in peace and more hopefulness among people. Bush
portrays the spread of democracy as the means to defeat U.S. enemies, because the sub-
discourse includes the idea that democracy is a source of hope and peacefulness that will
lead to world peace (Bush 2005a; 2005b; 2006). Thus, the sub-discourse associates
certain beliefs with democracy, similarly as the Freedom-discourse does with freedom.
The Democratic faith -sub-discourse is included as a sub-category of the Value-discourse,
rather than as a separate discourse like the Freedom-discourse, because democracy is
presented as a central value of the U.S. society. The Freedom-discourse, however, cannot
be included in the Value-discourse, even though freedom is a central value in the U.S.
too, because the Freedom-discourse itself is broad and has enough aspects included in it
to count as an independent discourse. The last sub-discourse of the Value-discourse is the
Just cause -sub-discourse, which Bush constructs to legitimise U.S. actions in the War on
Terror. The sub-discourse presents the military campaign of the U.S. as being based on a
“just cause”, and that the waging of the war is justified because its cause and aims are
legitimate and in accord with U.S. values. Bush presents the war as an ideological struggle
or as a fight between good and evil, in which the U.S. represents the good and right values
and protects the world from the evil of the terrorists. (See e.g. Bush 2002; 2005a; 2007.)
The third discourse, the Responsibility-discourse, concerns the global role of the U.S. and
the motivations behind its military interventions abroad. Bush often mentions in his
addresses that the U.S. is called to responsibilities in the world, and this affects the image
that he constructs about the role of the U.S. as an international actor (see e.g. Bush 2001;
2003; 2004). The discourse constructs the idea that the U.S. chooses to answer a special
call that compels it to take up responsibilities in the world and accept the unique
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opportunity that is offered to it by staying involved in the matters of other nations. The
source of the call is not explicitly concluded, as sometimes it is presented that the call
originates from the U.S. history, sometimes from its conscience, and sometimes it is
implied that the U.S. follows a higher plan as a chosen nation (Bush 2003; 2005a; 2008).
Whatever the origin of the call is, what is central is that the discourse encompasses the
idea that the modern-day U.S. is somehow called from the outside to responsibilities and
that  it  chooses  to  accept  them.  The  global  involvement  of  the  U.S.  is  portrayed  as  a
historic commitment to freedom, democracy, liberating the oppressed and ending
tyranny, so the responsibilities also have a historic nature. The calling is also presented
as one reason behind the U.S. actions in the War on Terror, as Bush (2006) emphasises
the U.S. responsibility to end oppression and tyranny, for example, which ties the
discourse to the conflict in question. The Justice-sub-discourse is more specifically
connected to the War on Terror as it  portrays the U.S. as being involved in the war to
bring terrorists to justice and punish them for their crimes (Bush 2002; 2004; 2008). This
emphasises the image of the U.S. as the referee of the world and brings further
legitimation to U.S. military campaigns abroad.
Bush gives the addresses alone and controls the discourses alone, so the addresses do not
explicitly portray a struggle for hegemony. Bush does not straightforwardly address
contesting  views  or  ideologies  often,  but  for  example  in  his  2004  State  of  the  Union
Address discusses them to better argument for his administration’s policies. These parts
of the texts show that a struggle exists.  One struggle concerns the whole nature of the
conflict: is the War on Terror a war at all? Bush (2004) justifies his position by arguing
that convicting some of the guilty for the attack on the World Trade Center and law
enforcement and indictments are not enough, and that the U.S. answers the terrorists’
declaration of war with war. Furthermore, in 2007, Bush stated that as long as the “evil”
behind the terrorist attacks of 9/11 exists, the U.S. remains at war. This struggle concerns
not only the nature of the conflict in itself, but the Responsibility-discourse and the sub-
discourses of Safety, Reluctant fight and Just cause. The struggle is connected to the
Safety-sub-discourse with regards to the idea that the U.S. must wage war abroad to
secure itself and its citizens. This sub-discourse and one of the justifications for U.S.
actions abroad lose their grounds if the nature of the conflict is reduced to something that
is less than a war. The cause of the struggle is similar with the other sub-discourses.
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The sub-discourses Reluctant fight and Just cause are largely based on portraying
terrorists as the initiators of the war that the U.S. entered reluctantly with a just cause to
defend its own safety, which would fulfil the jus ad bellum -criteria for the U.S. actions
in the War on Terror. Hence, the discourses must construct the idea of a war to legitimise
U.S.  military  campaigns  abroad.  The  Reluctant  fight  -sub-discourse  is  also  strongly
connected to the American civil religion and the idea of the U.S. as an innocent nation,
so the discourse also reproduces the American civil religion. The Just cause -sub-
discourse describes the War on Terror as an ideological struggle, which even without
clear specification of which ideologies are fighting against each other makes the sub-
discourse ideologically invested. Thus, the ideological struggle is between the ideology
of freedom and one that opposes it, as Bush presents the nature of the War on Terror in a
way that culminates to the questions of safety, liberty and oppression.
Bush (2007) stated that the evil behind the attacks of 9/11 is still on the large in the world,
which is why the U.S. is  nation at  war.  This connects the struggle of the nature of the
conflict to the Responsibility-discourse. Bush justifies U.S. actions in the War on Terror
by indicating that the U.S. does not wage war only to protect the people of the U.S., but
also to protect people outside of its borders. The Responsibility-discourse constructs the
idea that it is the responsibility of the U.S. to help those in need and to fight against evil,
so presenting the terrorists as evil and the nature of the conflict as severe and widespread
enough to pass for a war is central for the discourse and the legitimation of U.S. military
operations abroad. An ideological struggle that concerns the Responsibility-discourse and
the legitimation of the U.S. to wage war abroad is connected to the myth of American
exceptionalism. As an ideologically invested order of discourse, the American civil
religion influences discursive practices and contributes to the legitimation of the U.S.
actions by constructing the idea of the singular role of the U.S. and the responsibilities
and exemptions that come with it.
Another struggle for hegemony that is implied in Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address
concerns  the  war  in  Iraq.  Bush  (2004)  states  that:  “Some  in  this  chamber  and  in  our
country did not support the liberation of Iraq. […] For all who love freedom and peace,
the world without Saddam Hussein's regime is a better and safer place.” This struggle is
connected to the Freedom-discourse. By choosing to use the word liberation, Bush
constructs a favourable idea about the nature of the U.S. mission in Iraq and about the
motifs behind the invasion, corresponding to the idea of the U.S. as a protector of
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freedom. He also equates Hussein’s regime with evil and justifies the attack in Iraq by the
love of freedom and peace that the U.S. holds. Another criticism connected to the
Freedom-discourse that Bush mentions is whether democracy is a realistic goal for the
Middle East (Bush 2004). Bush (ibid.) answers this doubt by stating that: “I believe that
God has planted in every human heart the desire to live in freedom. And even when that
desire is crushed by tyranny for decades, it will rise again.” Bush uses religious
justifications for what he presents as his administration’s goals for the Middle East so that
U.S.  actions  in  the  Middle  East  seem  more  justified.  Bush  (ibid.)  states  that  the  U.S.
pursues a “strategy of freedom” in the Middle East as long as it “remains a place of
tyranny and despair and anger”, which relates to the faith in the special, peaceful qualities
and consequences of freedom within the Freedom-discourse. The statement is also
ideologically invested by the myth of American exceptionalism that allows the U.S. to
interfere in other countries’ matters because of its singular role.
These hegemonic struggles are significant as they concern the vital justifications that the
Bush  administration  provides  for  U.S.  actions  in  the  War  on  Terror.  It  is  important  to
Bush and his administration to hegemonise the discourses he constructs in his speeches
in order to legitimise his administration’s military campaigns. The Bush administration
constructs a whole narrative about the conflict as a distinct war, so that it justifies U.S.
actions abroad.
The relationship between politics and religious beliefs exists in the discourses of Bush’s
addresses. The Freedom-discourse and why the U.S. strives to act as a defender of
freedom are based on the idea, constructed by Bush in his addresses, that God has
intended all people to live in freedom and hence all people crave for it. Although the will
to act as a defender of freedom could as well be based on secular views, in this discourse
it,  and  thus  U.S.  actions  for  freedom,  are  based  on  religious  beliefs  and  a  relationship
between religious beliefs and politics is established. Striving for peace -sub-discourse as
such may seem secular, since it merely addresses the aim of the U.S. to achieve world
peace. However, it too is based on the idea of God-given freedom and its peaceful
qualities, which makes the background of that sub-discourse religious in nature also. The
Safety-sub-discourse is as such secular as it does not have clear connections to religious
beliefs.
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The Value-discourse implicates a connection to both religious beliefs and the American
civil religion. Bush’s addresses seek to convince the audience that the values that
originate  from  the  Founding  of  the  U.S.  guide  U.S.  missions  abroad.  Thus,  the
effectiveness of the values is increased by appealing to the Founders and history.
However, the religious beliefs are especially visible in the Compassion- and Just cause -
sub-discourses. Bush (2006) states that the reason the U.S. shows compassion abroad is
that they believe in the God-given dignity of people, and yet again uses a religious belief
to explain and justify U.S. actions abroad. The Just cause -sub-discourse is connected to
religious beliefs by the idea that the U.S. actions are guided by a higher plan and that the
aims of the U.S. and Providence are correspondent (Bush 2003; 2005b). Aligning a higher
plan with U.S. actions is used to convince the audience of the justness and righteousness
of the U.S. cause and justify them. The Democratic faith -sub-discourse is not connected
to any recognisable religious belief, other than the American civil religion and the value
of democracy that is derived from it. In that sense, the sub-discourse may be deemed
secular as it is not straightforwardly connected to any particular religious ideas but to a
value that is central in the American civil religion. Although not all parts of the Value-
discourse and its sub-discourses are connected to religious beliefs, the relationship
between religion and politics clearly exists in the assumptions that underlie the discourse.
The underlying idea of the Responsibility-discourse is connected to the myth of American
exceptionalism and thus to the American civil religion. The U.S. is presented as nation
with a special role and privileges compared to other countries, which justifies its actions
abroad. Also, constructing the idea of the U.S. responsibility to interfere in other
countries’ affairs constructs justification for U.S. actions abroad. Furthermore, the
discourse seeks to naturalise the responsibilities of the U.S. by justifying them with U.S.
history, constructing the idea about the historic work of the U.S. to promote freedom and
the end of tyranny.
The connections to religious beliefs in the Responsibility-discourse are not as obvious as
in the Freedom- and Value-discourses. Although Bush speaks of how the U.S. is called
to act, which may be interpreted as a call from a higher power, the origin of the call
remains unverified in the addresses. It is left open for interpretation: religiously inclined
people may interpret it religiously, whereas secular people may be more likely to interpret
that the call originates from U.S. values or from the international status of the U.S. as a
world leader, for example. The Justice-sub-discourse as such is a secular discourse and
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as it does not have any explicit connections to religious beliefs or to the American civil
religion, it may as well be based on them or any secular thought and values.
To conclude, the discourses in Bush’s addresses are constructed so that religious beliefs
justify and legitimise politics. It is important for the Bush administration to hegemonise
the discourses in Bush’s addresses because they play a central role in the legitimation of
their actions in the War on Terror, which is why the struggles for hegemony are centred
around the legitimising features of the discourses. Religious beliefs underlie most visibly
the Freedom-discourse and the Value-discourse, alongside their sub-discourses. It is more
appropriate to refer to the religious connections as connections to religious beliefs than
to any particular religion, since no particular religion or God can be identified from the
speeches or discourses, correspondingly with the American civil religion.
How Bush  presents  the  religious  elements  follows  the  pattern  that  Bellah  noted  in  the
speeches of John F. Kennedy: The God or religion are not identified so that people of all
faiths and even non-religious people can relate to the president’s words. The American
civil religion influences the addresses like an ideology in the sense that it constructs
reality and influences social relations, identities and values in a way that is not explicitly
connected to any religion. However, since it may be argued that the American civil
religion is largely based on Christianity, its religious influence cannot be ignored. The
parts of the discourses that reproduce the American civil religion, such as the exceptional
role of the U.S. and its origin, can be interpreted either religiously or secularly depending
on the interpreter, as religious people may interpret that the American exceptionalism
originates  from the  will  of  God,  while  secular  people  might  say  it  originates  from the
political might of the U.S., for example. However, religious interpretations are supported
by additional  religious  references.  This  does  not  indicate  either  a  purely  religious  or  a
purely secular way of relating to the relationship between religious beliefs and politics,
and thus indicates that the influence of the American civil religion on the U.S. policies
regarding the fight against terrorism is post-secular in nature.
This interpretation is enabled by adopting a post-secular lens through which religions are
reflect on, which due to its flexibility acknowledges more versatile religious phenomena
than the lens of secularism in its more classical sense. After all, the American civil
religion is a certain “charged” set of beliefs that influences American identity, which is
why it is possible to consider it as a religion from a post-secular perspective. The
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American civil religion leaves to the individual the option to interpret politics religiously,
but religious interpretation is not made inevitable, which accommodates the plurality of
ways to interpret reality. Furthermore, as the American civil religion connect religious
beliefs to politics, it demonstrates a fault in the expectations of the secularisation theory,
which provides a reason to call a phenomenon post-secular (Knott 2010, 23).
In short, both religious beliefs and the American civil religion underlie the discourses
Bush constructs in his addresses. The relationship between religion and politics does not
dominate the reasons and motives behind U.S. actions in the War on Terror but affect
them significantly as religiously invested presuppositions and views. The discourses also
reproduce myths and themes of the American civil religion, such as American
exceptionalism, innocent nation, and the self-sacrifice of the Americans, and also
continue the pattern of not specifying any religious belief. Furthermore, the American
civil religion is used to embed the U.S. actions in the continuum of history to naturalise
the actions and hegemonise the discourses.
5.3.2. Obama’s addresses
Whereas Bush constructs clear discourses about the War on Terror in his addresses,
Obama integrates the issue of the fight against terrorism into a larger security-discourse,
thus dispersing the discourses that concern solely terrorism. Obama also expresses this
idea visibly in his 2016 State of the Union Address:
The point is American leadership in the 21st century is not a choice between
ignoring the rest of the world – except when we kill terrorists – or occupying
and rebuilding whatever society is unraveling. Leadership means a wise
application of military power, and rallying the world behind causes that are
right.  It  means  seeing  our  foreign  assistance  as  a  part  of  our  national
security, not something separate, not charity. (Obama 2016.)
The issue of the fight against terrorism is integrated within the main security-discourse
that comprises all security threats against the U.S. and its sub-discourses that concern
American values and the U.S. responsibility to remain active abroad. Thus, Obama
connected the fight against terrorism to similar themes as Bush, even though the content
of the sub-discourses varies. The entirety of the security-discourse or its sub-discourses
are not discussed in this study as only their connections to the fight against terrorism
concern the research problem.
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The fight against terrorism is connected to the large security-discourse by depicting
terrorists and terrorist networks, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, as threats to U.S. national
security and to U.S. citizens. The security-discourse also includes the idea that military
action as the premise of the U.S. foreign policy should be replaced with more peaceful
ways of influencing international affairs, such as diplomacy. This idea is also connected
to the Obama administration’s views about how the fight against terrorism should be
conducted. The following quote expresses the role of the fight against terrorism within
Obama’s security-discourse well:
[T]o meet this threat, we don’t need to send tens of thousands of our sons
and daughters abroad or occupy other nations. […] And where necessary,
through a range of capabilities, we will continue to take direct action against
those terrorists who pose the gravest threat to Americans. (Obama 2013b.)
The American values -sub-discourse of the safety-discourse further elaborates the Obama
administration’s views on how the U.S. security should be protected. Obama requires that
American values and Constitutional ideals be enlisted in U.S. actions regarding security
in general and the fight against terrorism, and claims that as the values and ideals guide
the U.S., they also guide the rest of the world (see e.g. Obama 2009; 2013b; 2014).
Constructing the idea that U.S. missions abroad are compatible with their values supports
the Obama administration’s new, lower-profile approach to the fight against terrorism, as
it justifies the efforts to diminish U.S. military campaigns and remove the cruel treatment
of the suspected terrorists and their allies. The values that Obama favours are elaborated
in his praising words about the U.S. troops and civilians that protect the U.S., as he
commends them on their courage, heroicness, spirit of service and self-sacrifice (see e.g.
Obama 2009; 2012; 2013b).
The sub-discourse concerning the international responsibilities of the U.S., here referred
to as the American responsibility -sub-discourse for clarity, addresses the U.S.
responsibility to create a peaceful and safe world. In his second inaugural address, Obama
stated:
America will  remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the
globe.   And  we  will  renew  those  institutions  that  extend  our  capacity  to
manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than
its most powerful nation. (Obama 2013.)
The responsibilities of the U.S. are connected to the idea of U.S. leadership and how it is
conducted. Obama emphasises a smart kind of leadership and one that does not make the
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U.S. the “policeman” of the world, but nonetheless stresses the need of the U.S. to remain
engaged in helping the world into a new, peaceful era (2009; 2015; 2016). While the
special calling of the U.S. to act is prominent in Bush’s speeches, Obama rarely mentions
it. However, he mentions the call of history and in his first inaugural address even the call
of  God,  which  constructs  the  idea  that  the  responsibility  of  the  U.S.  to  act  is  not  only
derived from their interests (Obama 2009; 2010; 2013a). The special calling is not
otherwise emphasised.
The effect of religious beliefs is most evident in the American values -sub-discourse,
mostly established by the inaugural addresses. In his first inaugural address, Obama
(2009) speaks of carrying forward the “God-given promise that all are equal, all are free,
and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness”, which implies the aim
and way of conduct of the U.S. policies both at home and abroad. Thus, Obama presents
U.S. values as being largely based on religious beliefs, but also connects them to the
American civil religion, as he appeals on their constitutionality and historicity, and
emphasises the importance to hold on to the ideals that the Founding Fathers drafted
(Obama 2009; 2014). The myth of American exceptionalism is visible in the construction
of the idea that American values are superior and that they should serve as an example to
the rest of the world. American exceptionalism is also manifest in the American
responsibility -sub-discourse,  as it  emphasises the special  role of the U.S. as the world
leader. Furthermore, the sub-discourse indicates a weak relationship between religious
beliefs  and  politics  as  Obama (2009)  mentions  God’s  call  upon the  U.S.  to  “shape  an
“uncertain destiny” in his first inaugural address, but the meaning of this should not be
over-emphasised since the style of the inaugural addresses is more religiously charged
than the style of the State of the Union Addresses.
Otherwise, the larger security-discourse and its sub-discourses, in which the matter of the
fight against terrorism is embedded, indicate secularism in relation to the fight. As befits
the style of U.S. presidential addresses, God is recurrently mentioned in Obama’s
addresses, but the influence of religious beliefs is not visible in the views constructed
about the fight against terrorism, except in the inaugural addresses. Thus, the relationship
between religious beliefs and politics regarding the fight is much smaller in Obama’s
discourses than in Bush’s discourses. However, the American civil religion, and the myth
of American exceptionalism in particular, retain their significance, and function like an
ideology as they shape the U.S. identity and construct reality.
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Ideological struggles in Obama’s addresses are more easily discovered than in Bush’s
addresses, as Obama clearly contests the previous administration’s views about the fight
against terrorism. A visible ideological struggle concerns the conduct of the fight, as
Obama advocates for the application of the American values in it. The advocacy is
criticism towards the previous administration’s actions. Obama seeks to reinforce his
message and hegemonise it by appealing to the U.S. nation with using the pronoun we, as
he did in 2009 by stating that: “[W]e reject a false the choice between our safety and our
ideals”, and by appealing to the historicity and Constitutionality of the values, and
ultimately to the American civil religion (Obama 2009). Another ideological struggle
connected to employing U.S. values to the fight is Obama’s advocacy for diminishing the
military presence of the U.S. abroad, as he emphasises more peaceful ways, such as
diplomacy (Obama 2014). Obama also engages in the struggle about the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan  and  argues  that  is  necessary  to  end  them,  contrary  to  the  views  of  the
previous administration that started them. Obama does not contest the international role
of the U.S. as he emphasises the importance of U.S. leadership and involvement in the
world. However, the way in which the role should be conducted is disputed.
As Obama does not construct consistent discourses about the fight against terrorism but
embeds the issue in other, larger discourses, he is opposing the Bush administration’s
narrative of the conflict as a distinct war. The addresses also lower the profile of the entire
conflict, which is corresponding with the Obama administration’s foreign policy agenda.
In that sense, the hegemonic battle is between the Bush era narrative of the “War on
Terror” and the Obama administration’s lower profile portrayal of the conflict. Obama
(2016) expresses this, for example, by the notion that: “[A]s we focus on destroying ISIL,
over-the-top claims that this is World War III just play into their hands.” Although the
profile of the fight against terrorism is lowered and embedded in the larger security-
discourse and its sub-discourses, Obama continues to speak of fighting terrorist networks.
Thus, even though the topic is not as dominant in his administration’s foreign policy
agenda as it was during the George W. Bush era, it is not ignored.
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6. DISCUSSION
The analysis, conducted on eight speeches from George W. Bush and nine speeches from
Barack Obama, followed Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of critical
discourse analysis. The model of analysis is based on Fairclough’s three-dimensional
concept of discourse. The three dimensions of the analysis are textual analysis, analysis
of discursive practices, and analysis of social practices. All three dimensions were
included in the analysis of the research material. The analysis sought to answer the
questions: What is the nature of the relationship between religious belief and politics in
the discourses about the fight against terrorism? Are the discourses different from one
another? And additionally: How do the discourses reproduce the American civil religion?
The textual analysis was conducted using Janks’s (2005) linguistic analysis rubric. In
terms of textual characteristics such as voice, mood and tense, Bush’s and Obama’s
addresses were highly similar, as they imply certainty about the administrations’ policies
and assure the audience of their effectiveness. However, Bush’s addresses use more
versatile techniques to construct discourses than Obama’s addresses, and also discuss the
fight against terrorism more extensively. Whereas Obama uses pronouns us and them to
distinguish the U.S. from its allies and enemies as well, Bush uses them more strongly to
recreate the myth of American exceptionalism by emphasising U.S. leadership over its
allies.  Bush  also  emphasises  U.S.  values  and  their  superiority  by  means  such  as  using
definite article the to create an idea of the compassionate nature of U.S. military troops
and their missions abroad.
The lexical features of both presidents’ addresses proved central to the analysis, as they
reveal much of how the presidents want their policies depicted and how the discourses
are constructed. Obama’s efforts to lower the profile of the fight against terrorism is
implied already in lexicalisation as the addresses display over- and relexicalization of the
fight  against  terrorism.  Thus,  Obama’s  addresses  do  not  retain  a  consistent  way  of
referring to the conflict or constructing a coherent idea of it, as Bush’s addresses did by
calling it the War on Terror. Although religious vocabulary is not dominant in either
presidents’ addresses, Bush’s addresses reveal a strong relationship between religious
beliefs  and  politics,  as  Bush  often  portrays  God’s  will  or  plan  as  justification  for  and
motivation behind U.S. actions in the fight against terrorism. Bush presents traits such as
freedom and human dignity as God-given, which justifies U.S. actions that Bush claims
96
aim to protect them. Bush also implies that the U.S. is following a higher plan, which
further legitimises U.S. actions. It also reproduces the myth of American exceptionalism
which includes the idea of a manifest destiny by God (Marsden 2011, 326).
Whereas all Bush’s addresses retain similar overall and lexical styles, Obama’s inaugural
addresses differ noticeably from his State of the Union Addresses. Obama’s inaugural
addresses establish explicit relationship between religious beliefs and policy concerning
the fight against terrorism, as they also portray traits such as freedom and equality as God-
given, whilst  this relationship is  not manifest  in the State of the Union Addresses.  The
inaugural addresses also strongly demonstrate the influence of the American civil
religion,  as  Obama often  uses  the  symbols  of  the  American  civil  religion,  such  as  the
Constitution and the Founding Fathers, to support his arguments. Obama’s State of the
Union Addresses also reproduce the myths of the American civil religion, especially the
myth of American exceptionalism, as they emphasise the role of the U.S. in shaping a
peaceful world and leading it by their superior values.
The analysis of discursive practices follows Fairclough’s model and examines the force
of utterances (i.e. speech acts), coherence, and intertextuality. Discursive practices in both
presidents’ addresses reproduce the American civil religion, especially the myth of
American exceptionalism. While the discursive practices in all of Bush’s addresses
indicate grounds to interpret Bush’s policies as post-secular as they align seemingly
secular traits such as freedom and human equality with religious themes, only Obama’s
inaugural addresses portray the same phenomenon. The most prominent speech acts in
Bush’s and Obama’s addresses are assertions, convincing and commands, whether
indirect or direct, and seek to portray their administrations’ policies favourably and
influence the Congress to act according to them. Whereas the speech acts in Obama’s
addresses establish a relationship between religious beliefs and politics only in his
inaugural addresses, Bush establishes this also in his State of the Union Addresses, for
example by assertions that align U.S. policies with a higher plan.  This also reproduces
the myth of American exceptionalism.
The defects of coherence in Bush’s addresses function to create meanings that are
favourable to his policies, for example by constructing the idea that is the duty of the U.S.
to intervene abroad. They also connect religious themes to seemingly secular matters, like
freedom or the will to overthrow tyranny, and thus show ideological investment as they
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uphold the presence of religious beliefs in politics. Although Obama’s addresses also
have defects in coherence, they do not construct meaning in a similar way than in Bush’s
addresses,  but  rather  function  to  lower  the  profile  of  the  fight  against  terrorism  and
integrate the subject in a larger security-discourse. Thus, the aspect of coherence, or the
lack of it, does not connect religious beliefs to politics as in Bush’s addresses, but does,
however, indicate ideological investment as it seeks to restructure the Bush
administration’s narrative of the fight against terrorism as a distinct war.
The differing style and nature of Obama’s inaugural addresses is also visible in their
intertextual traits, as they make religious references to God, for example, in the context
of the fight against terrorism, while the State of the Union Addresses do not. However,
both forms of addresses make references to themes of the American civil religion, as
Obama appeals to U.S. history and the Founding Fathers to reinforce his message. Bush
also appeals to God and previous presidents to support his message in his addresses, and
both manifest and constitutive intertextuality indicate a relationship between politics and
religious beliefs.
To analyse social practices, i.e. the relation of discourses to ideology and hegemony, the
discourses that the presidents construct in their addresses were examined. Whereas Bush
constructs three distinct discourses with a total of seven sub-discourses, Obama embeds
the subject of fight against terrorism into a larger safety-discourse without constructing
separate discourses of the matter. The three main discourses that Bush constructs are the
Freedom-discourse, Value-discourse and Responsibility-discourse. The Freedom-
discourse establishes a clear relationship between religious beliefs and politics as it
portrays  the  U.S.  a  protector  of  God’s  gift  to  humanity,  freedom.  The  discourse  also
includes distinct beliefs about the peaceful features and effects of freedom that justify
U.S. actions abroad. The Freedom-discourse has two sub-discourses, Striving for peace
and Safety. The Striving for peace -sub-discourse constructs the idea that the U.S. is
seeking to establish worldwide peace by its actions of promoting freedom, which is
connected to the belief about the peaceful influence and characteristics of freedom and
free people. The Safety-sub-discourse contains the idea that the security of the U.S. is
dependent on the level and quality of freedom in the Middle East, which also functions
as justification for U.S. actions abroad.
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The Value-discourse has connections to both American civil religion and religious beliefs.
It depicts U.S. values, such as liberty and human dignity, as originating from the Founding
of the U.S. and also as God’s gifts to humanity. Thus, it appeals to religious themes and
themes  of  the  American  civil  religion  to  legitimise  these  values.  The  discourse  also
includes the idea that the U.S. military operations in the War on Terror are based on these
values. The Compassion-sub-discourse depicts the U.S. as a compassionate actor and U.S.
actions  in  the  War  on  Terror  as  acts  of  compassion,  while  the Reluctant fight -sub-
discourse constructs the idea that war was forced upon the U.S. by the terrorist who started
it. The Democratic faith -sub-discourse comprises the idea that spreading democracy
around the world will generate peace. The Just cause -sub-discourse legitimises U.S.
actions as it portrays them as just and guided by a higher power, which connects it to
religious beliefs. The sub-discourses function to construct legitimacy and justifications
for U.S. actions in the fight against terrorism.
Bush’s last discourse about the War on Terror, the Responsibility-discourse, reproduces
the myth of American exceptionalism. It constructs the idea that the U.S. is called to
responsibilities and leadership in the world, and that it is historically committed to
freedom, democracy and the liberation of the oppressed. The Justice-sub-discourse
further legitimises U.S. actions as it conveys the idea that the U.S. engages in the war to
bring terrorists to justice. Thus, the discourses in Bush’s discourses not only function as
legitimation and justification for U.S. actions in the War on Terror, but also reproduce
the American civil religion and demonstrate a relationship between religious beliefs and
politics.
The main hegemonic struggle that the discourses engage in concerns the nature of the
fight against terrorism. In order to legitimise U.S. actions abroad in the fight against
terrorism, it is important for the Bush administration to portray the conflict as a distinct
war. Constructing discourses that support the Bush administration’s narrative of the
conflict as a war supports the administration’s policies, as waging war is portrayed
necessary to protect the U.S. and its citizens. Bush also constructs the idea of an
ideological struggle between those in favour of freedom, portrayed as an ideology, and
those who are against it.
Obama counters Bush’s high-profile status of the fight against terrorism by not
constructing separate discourses about the fight and by integrating the matter in a larger
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security-discourse and its sub-discourses. Thus, the hegemonic struggle is between the
narrative and discourses of the Bush administration and the new way in which the Obama
administration seeks to construct the issue of the fight against terrorism. The fight against
terrorism is connected to the large security-discourse by portraying terrorists and terrorist
networks as threats to the national security of the U.S. Obama’s addresses constructs the
idea that in order to better secure the safety of the U.S., U.S. military presence in foreign
nations should be diminished. Thus, the addresses further counter the Bush
administration’s discourse that war must be waged to protect the U.S. The fight against
terrorism is connected to the American value -sub-discourse because of Obama’s
emphasis on enlisting U.S. values and Constitutional ideals to the fight, which criticises
the Bush administration’s actions. While the American responsibility -sub-discourse does
not contest the Bush administration’s view of the U.S. as a world leader, it modifies the
concept of the leadership as Obama emphasises more cooperative and peaceful ways of
leading. This is reflected on the idea that the U.S. should conduct the fight against
terrorism in ways that do not rely only on military interventions.
Thereby, similar themes, mainly about American values and international responsibilities,
exist within discourses connected to the fight against terrorism in both presidents’
addresses. However, these themes are interpreted differently, as Bush and Obama both
emphasise the importance of U.S. values and leadership but disagree on their nature and
application. The discourses of both presidents remain similar thorough their presidencies
and Bush’s discourses have some continuity to Obama’s presidency in terms of the
mentioned similar themes, but mostly the discourses of the two presidents differ widely
from one another. Both presidents’ discourses retain the American civil religion style of
not explicitly clarifying the God or religion that their references concern, so that people
of many faiths can identify with them. This is one way that the discourses reproduce the
American  civil  religion,  other  being  the  reproduction  of  the  different  myths  of  it,
especially the myth of American exceptionalism which is expressed in the emphasis on
the superiority of U.S. values, its manifest destiny and special role as a world leader. Both
Bush and Obama also mention God-given rights, such as freedom and human dignity,
which is one more thing that the addresses have in common. Ultimately, however, the
content of the discourses differ greatly from each other as Obama does not construct
distinct discourses about the fight against terrorism, and even similar themes about U.S.
values and responsibilities are interpreted differently. Furthermore, the whole narrative
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of the conflict  with terrorism is portrayed differently,  as Bush portrays it  as a war and
Obama as a serious security-issue among others.
The analysis demonstrated that neither president completely separates politics form
religious beliefs in the discourses concerning the fight against terrorism, although in
Obama’s State of the Union Addresses the relationship is hardly visible, unlike in his
inaugural addresses. It is possible to examine U.S. policies regarding the fight against
terrorism through Bhargava’s (2013) idea about the first-level disconnection between
state and religion. The second- and third-level disconnections, level of institutions and
level of law and public policy respectively, do not concern policies about the fight against
terrorism but rather the society and politics on a broader level, which is why only the first-
level disconnection is applicable to the topic of this study. The first-level disconnection,
the level of ends, concerns the separation between the objectives or religions and state.
The disconnection is established if the state has independent objectives and does not serve
any religion’s end. (Bhargava 2013, 21−24.) This disconnection is not established in
Bush’s and Obama’s discourses as they align their policies with a higher power and by
portraying their policies as aiming to secure people their God-given rights (see e.g. Bush
2003; Bush 2004; Bush 2005b; Obama 2009; Obama 2013a). Due to the maintained
connection between the ends that are connected to religious beliefs and the ends of the
policies in both Obama’s and Bush’s discourses, the policies cannot be described secular.
The discourses also reproduce the American civil religion, especially the myth of
American exceptionalism. The American civil religion functions like an ideology in the
sense that it influences the formation of U.S. ideology and concept of reality, as it appeals
to the U.S. history and myths about the nature and role of the U.S. to construct a certain
image of the nation. However, the American civil religion cannot be entirely separated
from religious beliefs as it sustains the role of religious beliefs in U.S. politics with its
religious base and style of maintaining the presence of religious vocabulary in U.S.
politics.
The conclusion of this study is that  the discourses constructed in Bush’s and Obama’s
addresses portray a post-secular relationship between religious beliefs and politics in the
context of the fight against terrorism. The relationship is established in different levels of
discourse as secular matters are connected to religious beliefs without the religious beliefs
being dominant in the motives behind the actions. Religious beliefs and the American
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civil religion underlie the motivations and justifications of U.S. actions, and although the
influence of religious beliefs is stronger in Bush’s policies than in Obama’s, Bush’s
policies are not justified with only religious arguments, either. However, the influence
still  underlies  the  policies  and  the  relationship  between  religious  beliefs  and  politics
exists, which is why neither presidents’ politics regarding the fight against terrorism can
be described secular.
The characterisation of Bush’s and Obama’s politics as post-secular does not, in this case,
make any conclusions about the religiosity or secularity of U.S. politics in general or the
U.S. society before the George W. Bush era. It refers to the alignment of religious beliefs
with politics in a way that does not indicate either pure religiousness or secularism, but a
new form of relationship between religious beliefs and politics that cannot be described
with either of the two terms. The argument about the post-secular nature of the
relationship between religious beliefs and politics in the context of the fight against
terrorism is justified since contrary to Habermas’s argument, it may be argued that the
concept of the post-secular is applicable to the U.S. This is due to the formal separation
of church and state in the U.S., the public awareness of the separation, and the typically
autonomous way of choosing the form of worship, despite the influence of religion in
U.S. culture and politics. (Dillon 2012, 257−258.)
The American civil religion is central to the discussion as it greatly influences both
presidents’ discourses. One possible meaning of the post-secular is the transformation of
religions,  a  shift  from  their  traditional  versions  to  ones  that  embody  the  changing
relationship between state and religious beliefs (Knott 2010, 34), which the American
civil religion reflects. Since the American civil religion is not a contemporary
phenomenon, it cannot be argued that it was born as a post-secular religion, but by
adopting a post-secular way of considering religions allows it  to be examined as such.
Although Habermas does not consider the concept of post-secular applicable in the U.S.,
he spoke of the post-secular as a change of consciousness in the sense that people seek a
new way of reacting to the continued existence and influence of religion in an increasingly
secular environment. The American civil religion reflects this changed consciousness in
Bush’s and Obama’s discourses as it is not a religion in the traditional sense of the word,
but nonetheless conveys religious views and maintains religious influence in U.S. politics.
It bridges a gap between different faiths and allows religious grounds to exist in politics
in a way that allows people of different faiths to relate to the political message.
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Consequently, even though Obama’s State of the Union Addresses have little connections
to any traditional religious faith, their strong connections to the American civil religion
enable the politics they represent in the context of fight against terrorism to be called post-
secular as well as Bush’s politics.
Thus, the relationship portrayed in Bush’s and Obama’s addresses reflects an attitude
towards the public role of religious beliefs that encompasses the diversity of different
faiths in the society and to a certain extent maintains the religious interpretation of
politics. Since religious arguments are not the only arguments used to justify politics,
people with or without religious faith can relate to the political message despite the
maintained influence of religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are not completely privatised
to the private sphere as the secularisation theory expects, but still influence politics in the
public sphere. However, the borders of the spheres are blurred as the final interpretation
of the religious beliefs is largely left to the individual because of the ambiguous style of
the American civil religion. In conclusion, the reproduction of the American civil religion
in addition to the more obvious religious references are central in upholding the
relationship between religious beliefs and politics in Bush’s and Obama’s discourses that
concern the fight against terrorism.
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7. CONCLUSION
This study contributes to the discussion about the relationship between religion and U.S.
foreign policy by analysing discourses about the fight against terrorism in former U.S.
presidents’, George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s, addresses. Although the religious
dimension of U.S. foreign policy has gained more interest  in the 21st century, it is still
under studied especially from the viewpoint of secularism and the post-secular
(Hackworth 2010, 357). Thus, a research gap for the subject of this study exists. Instead
of focusing on the influence of any traditional religion or religious group, this study
examines how religious beliefs and the American civil religion affect the U.S. presidents’
discourses about the fight against terrorism. The Faircloughian three-dimensional critical
discourse analysis answered the following research questions: What is the nature of the
relationship between religious beliefs and politics in the discourses about the fight
against terrorism? Are the discourses different from one another? How do the discourses
reproduce the American civil religion?
The existence of the religious dimension in Bush’s and Obama’s discourses was expected
as it was acknowledged in previous research. However, applying the three-part theoretical
framework of secularism, the concept of post-secular, and the American civil religion
enabled to analyse the research subject from a versatile approach and examine it from a
previously rarely used perspective. Not only did the analysis discover the post-secular
nature of the relationship between religious beliefs and politics in the context of the fight
against  terrorism,  it  also  proved  that  the  American  civil  religion  is  still,  at  least  until
recently, viable and influences U.S. politics. Furthermore, it is central in maintaining the
relationship between religious beliefs and politics, as myths such as American
exceptionalism uphold the idea of divine investment in the U.S. and its destiny.
Although the difference of religious involvement between Bush’s and Obama’s addresses
could also be predicted, the scope of the differences in terms of the forming of discourses
and their content were not expected, as Obama does not construct separate discourses
about the fight against terrorism as Bush does. Thus, there is also little continuity between
the presidents’ discourses. However, this is corresponding to the Obama administration’s
foreign policy agenda to lower the profile of the fight against terrorism. The special role
of inaugural addresses as rituals of the American civil religion was not particularly visible
in Bush’s inaugural address but highly visible in Obama’s inaugural addresses that
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differed in style from his State of the Union Addresses. Obama’s inaugural addresses are
the main source of the establishment of the relationship between religious beliefs and
politics in his discourses, which is why the relationship is much weaker in his discourses
than in Bush’s discourses and should not be overstated. However, the relationship should
not be discarded either as religious beliefs underlie the motives of U.S. actions and are
used to justify them.
Since the scope of this study is limited, it does not provide a complete answer about the
influence of religious beliefs in all  of U.S. politics,  which should be further examined.
More extensive research needs to be conducted on the relationship between religious
beliefs and U.S. politics to be able to draw larger conclusions, as this study only concerns
two presidents’ discourses about the fight against terrorism in a selection of their
addresses. The differences between the Republican and Democratic parties should be
considered also to avoid over-simplifying U.S. politics. In a supposedly secular West, the
absence of religious influence should not be taken for granted as otherwise an important
factor of politics will remain ignored. Knowledge of the American civil religion and its
nature should be extended with more contemporary research, and it should not be
excluded from the analysis of U.S. politics as its influence is evident. This requires an in-
depth review of the U.S. history and its former presidents to discover how the American
civil religion has taken shape and perhaps transformed over time. More contemporary
discussion and examination of the American civil religion is required to fully understand
its influence in the present day United States. This discussion should also be extended to
other seemingly secular states, so that religious involvement in politics would not be
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The selection/choice of wordings.
Different words construct the same idea
differently.
Many words for the same phenomenon.
Renaming
Created by synonymy, antonymy,
repetition, collocation.
Used for yoking ideas together and for the
discursive construction of new ideas.
Hides negative actions or implications.
Transitivity Processes in verbs: are they verbs of:
∂ doing: material process








Voice Active and passive voice constructs
participants as doers or as done-to’s.
Passive voice allows for the deletion of the
agent.
Nominalisation A process is turned into a thing or an event
without participants or tense or modality.




Free indirect speech (FIS).
This  is  a  mixture  of  direct  and
indirect speech features.
Scare quotes or “so-called”
∂ Who is quoted in DS/IS/FIS?
∂ Who is quoted first/last/most?
∂ Who is not quoted?
∂ Has someone been misquoted or
quoted out of context?
∂ What reporting verb was chosen?
∂ What is the effect of scare quotes?
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Turn-taking ∂ Who gets the floor? How many
turns do different participants get?
∂ Who is silent/ silenced?
∂ Who interrupts?
∂ Who gets heard? Whose points are
followed through?
∂ Whose rules for turn taking are
being used given that they are
different in different cultures?
∂ Who controls the topic?
Mood Is the clause a statement, question, offer or
command?
Polarity and tense Positive polarity (definitely yes)
Negative polarity (definitely no)
Polarity is tied to the use of tense.
Tense sets up the definiteness of events
occurring in time. The present tense is






Modality created by modals (may, might,
could will), adverbs (possibly, certainly,
hopefully) intonation, tag questions.
Pronouns Inclusive we/exclusive we/you
Us and them: othering pronouns
Sexist/non sexist pronouns: generic “he”
The choice of first/ second/ third person.
Definite article (“the”)
Indefinite article (“a”)
The is  used  for  shared  information  –  to
refer to something mentioned before or
that the addressee can be assumed to know
about. Reveals textual presuppositions.
Thematisation – syntax: the first bit
of the clause is called the theme
The theme is the launch pad for the clause.
Look for patterns of what is foregrounded
in the clause by being in theme position.
Rheme – syntax: the last bit of the
clause is called the rheme.
In written English the new information is
usually at the end of the clause.
In spoken English it is indicated by tone.
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Sequencing of information.
Logical connectors – conjunctions set
up the logic of the argument.
Sequence sets up cause and effect.
Conjunctions are:
∂ Additive: and, in addition
∂ Causal: because, so, therefore
∂ Adversative: although, yet
∂ Temporal: when, while, after,
before
Adopted from Janks (2005).
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Appendix B
Abbreviated table of the lexical analysis of Bush’s addresses






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Abbreviated table of the lexical analysis of Obama’s addresses




























































































































































































to war as a
last resort,
and I
intend to
stay true
to that
wisdom”
“God's
grace
upon us,
we
carried
forth
that
great
gift of
freedom
”
“while
freedom
is a gift
from
God, it
must be
secured
by His
people
here on
Earth”
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“we
reject as
false the
choice
between
our
safety
and our
ideals”
“reject the
false
choice
between
protecting
our people
and
upholding
our
values”
“America’
s moral
example
must
always
shine for
all who
yearn for
freedom
and justice
and
dignity”
“while
it’s
ultimatel
y up to
the
people of
the
region to
decide
their
fate, we
will
advocate
for those
values
that have
served
our own
country
so well”
“we must
enlist our
values in
the fight”
“we counter
terrorism
not just
through
intelligence
and military
action, but
by
remaining
true to our
Constitution
al ideals”
“there’s
one last
pillar of
our
leadership,
and that’s
the
example
of our
values”
“We
honor
them
not only
because
they are
guardia
ns of
our
liberty,
but
because
they
embody
the
spirit of
service”
“our
heroic
troops and
civilians”
“this
generatio
n of
heroes
has made
the
United
States
safer and
more
respected
”
“our
freedom
endures
because
of the
men and
women
in
uniform
who
defend
it”
“our
brave
men and
women
in
uniform,
tempered
by the
flames of
battle,
are
unmatch
ed in
skill and
courage”
“all this
work
depends
on the
courage
and
sacrifice
of those
who serve
in
dangerous
places at
great
personal
risk”
“because of
the
extraordinar
y troops and
civilians
who risk
and lay
down their
lives to
keep us
free, the
United
States is
more
secure”
“9/11
Generatio
n who has
served to
keep us
safe”
“we owe
[veterans]
every
opportunit
y to live
the
American
Dream
they
helped
defend”
“Ameri
ca must
play its
role in
usherin
g in a
new era
of
peace”
“do what
it takes to
defend
our
Nation
and forge
a more
hopeful
future for
America
and for
the world”
“This is
just a part
of how
we’re
shaping a
world that
favors
peace and
prosperity
”
“As the
tide of
war
recedes,
a wave
of
change
has
washed
across
the
Middle
East and
North
Africa”
“no one
has a
greater
stake in a
peaceful
world
than its
most
powerful
nation”
“America
must
remain a
beacon to
all who
seek
freedom
during
this
period of
historic
change”
“we will
continue to
work […] to
usher in the
future the
Syrian
people
deserve – a
future free
of
dictatorship,
terror and
fear”
“America
will
always
act, alone
if
necessary
, to
protect
our
people
and our
allies”
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“we are
ready to
lead
once
more”
“That's
the
leadership
we are
providing:
engageme
nt that
advances
the
common
security”
“whether
we sustain
the
leadership
that has
made
America
[…] the
light to the
world”
“The
renewal
of
America
n
leadershi
p can be
felt
across
the
globe”
“our
leadership
is defined
not just by
our defense
against
threats, but
by the
enormous
opportunitie
s to do
good”
“In Iraq
and Syria,
American
leadership
--
including
our
military
power -- is
stopping
ISIL’s
advance.”
“how do
we keep
America
safe and
lead the
world
without
becoming
its
policema
n”
